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Abstract
This study explores why strategic changes seldom tum out as intended. Based on the
assumption that strategic plans are modified upon implementation, the study sets out to
answer three questions:
(1) How is a planned strategy modified over time?
(2) Why do modifications occur?
(3) How do modifications affect change outcome?
A strategic change initiative is studied over time as it is implemented in three business
units within a corporation. Findings indicate that strategies are modified in at least five
different ways through: expansion, contraction, interpretation error, strategic
interpretation, and non-compliance. The different types of modifications are closely
linked to change outcomes, which fall between the more common categories of change
success and failure. Outcomes include changes that have been made on paper only, and
changes that involve a mixture of old and new strategy.
Strategic change triggers sensemaking processes, which lead to different construed
realities of the change content, process, and context. It is argued that multiple and
diverging construed realities cause modifications either directly or indirectly. Indirect
effects on modifications are channeled through conflicts or sensegiving activities.
Propositions are presented that predict when different types of modifications are likely to
occur, as well as when direct versus indirect causes for modifications are most likely.
One of the more surprising findings includes the tendency for major modifications to
occur late in the implementation process. Findings also indicate that when modifications
occur as a result of prolonged conflict and/or sensegiving activities, damages in the
organization in terms of loss of trust and deteriorating work environment are more likely.
Implications for change management are discussed.
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1. Introduction and Positioning
This study explores emergent features in planned change initiatives. It focuses
on the implementation of planned change and probes what happens to a
strategy after it has been decided upon and formulated at the corporate or top
level in an organization. As suggested over twenty years ago by several
researchers, even carefully planned strategies are likely to change upon
implementation (Mintzberg, 1978, Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Based on
this assumption, the study aims to identify and explain modifications in a
planned strategy over time. Empirical findings in the study reveal different
types of modifications and their relationship with different change outcomes.
Different reasons for modifications are explored by drawing on a cognitive
theoretical perspective.
It has been said that eighty to ninety percent of all strategies are never
implemented (Walter Kietchel in Fortune Magazine, 1984). This estimation
rests on a rather simplistic view of implementation as executing initial plans,
where any deviations from initial plans are classified as failures. Clearly, in
some cases, not following intentions could be positive, such as a sign of
learning or attentiveness and flexibility, which ultimately could lead to better
outcomes than outcomes based on initial intentions. In this thesis it is argued
that partially implemented changes should not necessarily be classified as
failures. On the contrary, not modifying a strategy during several years of
implementation should perhaps more often be classified as an implementation
failure. Not modifying a strategy during several years of implementation
suggests that either nothing significant has happened in the organizations'
surroundings during those years, which is highly unlikely in today's turbulent
world, or worse, nobody in the organization has noticed.
Strategic change and implementation literature has tended to exaggerate the
benefits of strictly sticking to previous (and perhaps outdated) decisions in
change processes by emphasizing tightly controlled planned changes. Findings
in this thesis indicate that tightly controlled change processes that emphasize ..
sticking to the plan might lead to symbolic changes, where changes are not
really made at lower levels in the organization. Modifications in the initially
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planned strategy, on the other hand, often ensure a better fit between the
formulated strategy and the actual changes within the organization.
In most organizations, many different change initiatives occur simultaneously.
Here, a specific planned strategic change initiative was studied over time in the
search for modifications, explanations for modifications, and effects of
modifications. Due to the lack of in-depth studies on modifications, an
exploratory design was chosen. Relevant literatures were probed for insights
and explanations, but the study is largely phenomenon driven rather than
theory driven.
Strategic change refers to large-scale changes that aim to change the
competitiveness of the firm. The goal of strategic changes has to do with
increasing performance. Some strategic changes do not affect the organization
much. One example is an acquisition that requires little integration of work
activities. Other types of strategic changes require a change in everyday work
activities. These deep kinds of changes are often extremely challenging, since
they require not only a change in the way employees perform work, but also a
change in how they think about work and a change in attitudes towards work.
The change initiative in this study was internally focused towards
reengineering work processes and hence realizing substantial cost reductions.
Strategic changes can evolve from any level in the organization. In this study,
changes that are planned from the top-levels in the organization are of interest.
More and more organizations feel pressure to initiate change processes and top
managers struggle to get their ideas turned into action. This is particularly
difficult when the change is proactive, i.e. when there is no immediate crisis in
the organization, but top managers sincerely believe they need to make changes
to survive in the long run. When planned changes are proactive, it can be
especially challenging to get commitment from employees, since there are few
explicit signs of a need to change strategy. The boundaries of the study thus
include planned, proactive, deep strategic changes that are initially formulated
at the top of the organization.
The findings of this exploratory study include a typology of modifications, the
major reasons for modifications, and three different change outcomes. The
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fmdings can best be understood within e~cognitive perspective. Sensemaking
represents a cognitive perspective and it is particularly useful in explaining
why modifications occur. The sensemaking perspective also creates the basis
for the development of an integrating model. Sensemaking has to do with
which cues we pick up and how we make sense of organizational context and
action. This perspective, which is also based on assumptions of social
construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), directs attention to the
dynamic features of strategic change outcomes. As people at different
organizationallevels make sense of the changes, modifications occur, which in
turn lead to different change outcomes.
A cognitive perspective of strategic change has previously been used to explain
how strategic issues are diagnosed (Dutton & Duncan 1987); to explore the
relationship between changes in interpretive schemes and structural
reorganization (Bartunek, 1984); to identify organizational mappers (Huff,
1990), and interpreters (Sims & Gioia, 1986); and to describe strategic change
initiation (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Only recently has the cognitive
perspective been applied specifically to implementation of strategic changes
(Balogun, 2001, Isabella, 1990). This thesis contributes to the limited work on
implementation issues within a cognitive perspective and it focuses on
consequences of sensemaking processes in organizations.
This thesis furthermore contributes to strategic change research by
emphasizing a dynamic view on planned changes. The study links strategic
content to the implementation process, and describes the effects modifications
in content have on change outcome. Change content, process, and outcome are
thereby linked. Change outcomes that fall in an intermediate category, between
change success and change failure, are introduced, as are different types of
modifications. The typology of modifications facilitates identification of
modifications in strategy, and the reasons formodifications make prediction of
when modifications are likely to occur possible. Change outcomes can also be
predicted based on the linkages that are presented between modifications and
change outcomes.
Finally, the study contributes by suggesting a theoretical framework for
understanding and studying implementation and change processes. The
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sensemaking perspective not only provides a useful framework from which to
explore reasons for modifications, but it can also be applied ås a theoretical
platform for understanding the whole implementation process.
The overall presentation of this study follows a chronological structure. The
chronological presentation emphasizes the explorative and eclectic nature of
the study, which began with a tentative research model based on selected
literatures and ended with a research model based on additional literatures and
one particular theoretical perspective - the sensemaking perspective. Findings
are not presented chronologically. Instead the research questions structure
presentation of the findings.
More specifically the thesis is organized as follows: chapter two, following this
introduction, discusses the phenomenon - modifications in a planned strategy.
A thorough presentation of the phenomenon is deemed as essential when the
phenomenon, rather than theory, guides the study. The chapter includes
definitions of key constructs and formulation of three research questions. In
chapter three, relevant literatures are probed to shed light on the phenomenon
of interest. Reviews of strategy research and selected implementation studies
within public policy and innovation are summarized and critiqued. A tentative
research model is presented followed by an introduction of the cognitive
perspective. Chapter four presents the methodology and includes choice of
design, research setting, descriptions of data collection and data analysis, as
well as a discussion of methodological strengths and weaknesses. Chapters
five, six, and seven combine description and analysis of data. In chapter five,
modifications in the planned strategy are identified, presented, and analyzed. In
chapter six, the major reason for modifications is introduced as multiple and
diverging construed realities. The data are organized and presented with a
focus on showing where there are discrepancies in construed realities. The
sensemaking perspective creates the basis for chapter six since diverging
construed realities are the result of sensemaking processes within the
organization. The reasons for modifications (chapter six) are then linked with
the actual identification of modifications (chapter five) in chapter seven.
Propositions predicting when modifications are likely to occur are developed.
In chapter eight, the findings from chapter five, six, and seven are pulled
together into an integrating model. The thesis ends with a discussion in chapter
4
rune of contributions, limitations, and practical as well as theoretical
implications of the findings.
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2. The Phenomenon:Modifications in
a Planned Strategy
This chapter discusses the phenomenon - modifications in planned strategies
upon implementation - and defines some of the key constructs in the study.
The purpose of the chapter is to provide a background for why this is an area
considered worth studying, as well as to provide an understanding for the
boundaries of the study.
In Norway, a decision is just the beginning of a debate. (Key actor in the
implementation of BRA in Gullfaks ,Statoil)
As the above quote indicates, a decision is not always just the outcome of a
debate, it can also trigger further debate. Most of us like to think that decisions
are based on careful analysis of alternatives and consequences, and that further
debate should be unnecessary once a decision has been reached. It is when a
decision has been made however, that many people really become concerned
about what the decision means for them, their work situation, and their
organization (Piderit, 2000; Bareil & Savoie, 1999).
Modifications in plans frequently occur in organizations. In media, stories
about how organizations change both ends and means over time can be found,
especially when they show that an organization has blown its budgets and time
limits, or failed to reach explicit goals. Sometimes the original strategy is cited
as the source of the problem and as needy of revision. At other times managers
explain that projects tend to "grow" over time and increase in scale and scope,
which causes increased costs and requires longer time. Regardless of how the
strategic plans change over time, these types of modifications are usually
presented as negative and as exhibiting a lack of control.
Within strategy research, modifications in a planned strategy are increasingly
being mentioned as critical and positive in strategy development and strategic
change processes (Dawson, 1999; Van.de Ven, 1995; Pettigrew & Whipp,
1993; Floyd & Wooldridge 1992; Reve & Grønhaug, 1991; Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991; Dutton & Duncan 1987; Kanter, 1983). This can be
illustrated by the following quotes:
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"Blueprints and forecasts are important tools and should be provided as
much and as frequently as possible. But they are only approximations
and they may be modified dramatically as events unfold. A well-managed
innovating organization clearly has plans, missions, strategies etc., but it
also has a willingness to reconceptualize the details... "(Kanter, 1983,
p.306)
"Those responsible for managing the change process [are required toJ
make continual assessments, repeated choices and multiple adjustments"
(Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993, p.1 O)
H ••• there are likely to be number of unforeseen contingencies which may
necessitate a modification of intended pathways. ... it is not uncommon
for... the content of change to be redefined during the process of
organizational adaptation" (Dawson, 1999, p.8 and p.J3)
"The original abstract vision is likely to become more well-defined and
undergo some modification (at least concerning espoused manifestations)
of the vision or processes used to achieve it" (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991,
p.434)
Despite this recognition of the importance of being flexible and emergent in
relation to a planned strategy, much of the strategy research ignores this and
treats a plan for strategic change as static and stable over time. Even within
literature that takes a dynamic approach to strategy (such as strategic change
literature and strategy development literature), there exists little knowledge on
how and why modifications of a formulated strategy take place and the effects
modifications have on the change outcome.
A focus on modifications in planned strategy requires a clarification of what is
meant by modifications and a planned strategy. According to the American
Heritage Dictionary, to modify means to change in form or character or to
alter. In this thesis, modifications refer to any substantial changes or alterations
in a planned strategy. While it remains difficult to prescribe a cut-off point for
substantial versus non-substantial alterations, the general rule is that alterations
that are likely to affect the final change outcome, and alterations that a majority
of organizational members agree upon as important will be viewed as
modifications. A decision to defer from implementing something included in
original plans will therefore be viewed as a modification. A delay in getting a
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new organizational structure in place will on the other hand not be treated as a
modification, unless organizational members insist on its importance for the
change outcome.
The planned strategy represents the content of strategy, also referred to as the
formulated strategy. It describes the "what" of strategy. According to
Hrebiniak & Joyce (1984), a planned strategy includes accepted definitions of
strategic ends and means. Ends and means can be defined in the following way
(Brews and Hunt, 1999, p. 891):
"Ends are the major, higher level purposes, mission, goals or objectives
set by organizations, each of which significantly influences the overall
direction and viability of the firm concerned. "
"Means are the patterns of action which marshal/allocate organizational
resources into postures that, once implemented, increase the probability
of attaining organizational ends. "
The lack of research on modifications in planned strategies can be attributed to
several factors. The first and most obvious reason is that it is simpler to study
strategy if a chosen strategy is assumed to be stable over time. While simplicity
has its virtues, it does not always enhance the understanding of complex
processes. It is argued in this thesis that to fully understand strategic change
processes, and to appreciate the context in which managerial decisions and
actions are made, complexity needs to be included and emphasized rather than
reduced to a minimum.
The other reason there exists little research on modifications in planned
strategies is tied to the focus of existing strategy research. Much of existing
research within strategy has focused on the relationship between strategy
content and performance. Content research explores how specific strategic
decisions (such as a decision to merge, divest, or enter a new market) and
broader economic structures (such as entry, exit, or mobility barriers) affect
performance outcomes (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). Possible changes and
modifications in a formulated strategy are' simply not considered in this line of :
research.
9
A similar problem can be found within the strategy process research that
studies the formulation phase. This research focuses on the strategy process, as
opposed to strategy content. Examples include how strategic issues are
identified and diagnosed (Dutton & Duncan, 1987), and interpretation
processes in strategy formulation (Dutton & Abrahamson, 1989; Kiesler &
Sproull, 1982; Walsh, 1995). However, like strategy content research, much of
this research attempts to link a strategic decision directly to performance,
without considering changes or modifications that might. occur in the strategy
over time and during implementation.
Implementation research should be in a better position to incorporate
modifications since it deals with the phase following the formulation phase.
Research on implementation remains fragmented, and much this research is
prescriptive and lacking in terms of theoretical basis. Theoretically based
studies on implementation will be reviewed in the next chapter.
There exists a stream of research within strategy that specifically focuses on
the dynamic aspects of the strategy process, which recognizes that a formulated
strategy is modified over time. This research is here referred to as "the
emergent perspective". However, as will be argued in the literature review,
although it incorporates modifications over time, this research does. not
adequately explain how or why modifications occur because it focuses mainly
on explaining how a strategy without clear intentions to begin with emerges
over time in organizations. In its extreme, this school is the complete opposite
of the content and formulation research discussed above, which only handles
the initially formulated strategy.
Deliberate and planned strategic change processes require an initial plan. While
a number of adjustments are likely to occur during formulation of the strategy,
this study focuses on modifications that are made after the strategic decision
has been made and an initial plan has been decided upon. This time period is
usually recognized as the implementation process.
Strategy implementation is generally understood as putting a strategy into
effect. Although there exist no widely agreed upon definition of
implementation, most definitions include the elements of putting something
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into effect and acting upon a decision or executing a decision. Wheelen &
Hunger (1992) provide a useful and fairly general definition that captures these
common features: "implementation is... the process by which strategies and
policies are put into action. .. " (Wheelen & Hunger, 1992, p.236)
Figure 1 shows how this study begins with the planned strategy. The study
thereby excludes the formulation process leading up to a planned strategy. The
initially planned strategy is expected to change over time (ti, t2,t3). The initially
planned strategy is identical to what Mintzberg (1978) refers to as the intended
strategy, while the strategy at time ts represents his realized strategy.
Modifications in the planned strategy are expected to occur during the
implementation process and they are expected to affect the relationship
between planned strategy (strategic decision making) and outcome (firm
performance).
r-------- ------: ..:· .· .
~ .. .. ~
: :· .· .· .... J
Figure 1: Illustration of Modifications in Strategy
The planned strategic change is conceptualized as an idea that trav_elsthrough
the organization over time. The initial ideas of change may originate from any
level, but final decisions are made at the top of the organization. Upon
implementation the planned strategy moves through the different levels in the
organization (Falkenberg, 2002). As the strategy travels through the different
organizationallevels, it is expected to change.
In this study, the focus is on following the journey of one particular change
initiative; identifying when major shifts occur in the strategy (compared to
what was initially planned); explaining why shifts occur; and finally exploring
how this affects the change outcome. Hence the fundamental question is what
happens to a strategy after the decision to pursue the strategy has been made?
More specifically, what happens to strategic content during the implementation
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process? This research thus begins at the time a decision of a planned strategy
has been made. While most strategic changes aim to improve firm
performance, firm performance will not be measured here. Rather, change
outcome refers to the realized strategy at any point in time. Change outcome
has to do what measuring actual changes in the organization, and based on that,
firm performance may be estimated, although not precisely assessed.
Specific research questions can now be framed in relation to the phenomenon
of interest. The research questions in this study are:
l) How is a planned strategymodified over time?
2) Why do modifications occur?
3) How do modifications affect change outcome?
Few academic contributions exist which specifically focus on modifications in
planned strategies during implementation. In the beginning of this chapter,
several quotes illustrated the increasing attention modifications seem to be
receiving among researchers. This suggests an emerging theoretical interest in
the phenomenon. Inparticular, researchers who have conducted descriptive and
longitudinal studies of strategic development or change processes (Burgelman
& Sayles, 1986; Pettigrew, 1985; Burgelman, 1~83; Mintzberg, 1978) have
raised issues of how strategy is shaped and changed over time in strategy
processes.
In addition, several researchers (Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993;
Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Kanter, 1983) argue that being able to modify a
planned strategy during a strategic change process is crucial. The capability to
carry through the changes implied by a strategy, and if necessary transform the
strategy through use has also been identified as a key intangible asset for
managing change (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993).
Despite this increasing interest and attention, little knowledge on how and why
modifications occur has been accumulated. Due to the lack of existing research
on modifications, the study will be explorative. It should nevertheless be
possible to gain a better understanding of modifications in planned strategies
and thus a better basis on which to conduct this study. Because of the
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complexity of the phenomenon and indeed of the study, existing research
contributes considerably by focusing the study on possible and plausible
reasons for and effects of modifications. Literature on strategic change and
development processes, particularly research on implementation processes, is
therefore reviewed. Because of the lack of theoretical focus on the issue of
modifications, and because of the sparse and fragmented body of literature on
implementation, the literature review also includes other fields that have
studied implementation processes.
Summary
This chapter discussed the phenomenon, modifications in a planned strategy,
and described the background for focusing on it. The chapter also defined key
constructs in this thesis.
Modifications were defined as any substantial changes to or alterations in a
planned strategy. A planned strategy consists of ends (higher level purposes,
mission, goals or objectives) and means (the patterns of action to attain ends)
(Brews & Hunt, 1999). Modifications in a planned strategy are expected to take
place in the implementation process, which was defmed as the process by
which strategies are put into action (Wheelen & Hunger, 1992).
In contrast to most strategy research, this study begins with the outcome of the
strategy formulation process - the planned strategy - and examines
modifications in planned strategies during implementation. The assumption
that a planned strategy changes over time rests on Mintzberg's (1978)
distinction between intended strategy (deliberate and planned) and realized
strategy (implemented strategy). Following up on this distinction between
intentions and realization, this thesis attempts to describe and explain what
actually happens to the strategy as it moves from intentions to realization.
While most strategy research either ignores or fails to capture modifications
that occur in planned strategy during implementation, a few researchers
(Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993; Kanter, 198.3;Dawson, 1999; Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991) point to the importance of being able to handle modifications that occur
in formulated strategy during a strategic change process. However, no studies
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explicitly address how and why a planned strategy is modified over time and
the effect modifications have on change outcome.
The lack of existing research on modifications calls for an explorative study.
However, since modifications are expected to occur in the implementation
process, and there exist considerable research on strategy implementation, this
literature will be reviewed in search for leads on how and why modifications
occur and possible effects of modifications. The next chapter presents the
literature review and presents a tentative research model.
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3. Literature Review and Research
Model
This chapter reviews existing research on modifications and implementation
processes. A tentative research model is presented based on the literature
review. The discussion of the phenomenon in the previous chapter narrowed
the focus in terms of relevant literature. It was argued that modifications in
strategy occur in the implementation process. Since there is limited research
dealing specifically with modifications in strategy, strategy implementation
literature was found as the most appropriate stream of research for review. A
thorough review of strategy implementation research and a review of selected
contributions within public policy research and innovation research can be
found in Stensaker (2000). In this chapter, these three streams of research are
briefly summarized and critically evaluated in terms of their respective insights
on implementation processes and contributions for understanding
modifications.
A tentative research model is developed based on the literature review. The
purpose of developing a tentative research model in an exploratory study is to
draw on existing research as much as possible and to guide data collection.
This is in accordance with Zaltman, Pinson, & Angelmar (1973) who argue
that researchers rarely start off with an empty head, and even in exploratory
studies researchers have hunches. In this study, the tentative model facilitated
the early phases of data analysis, but as the analysis proceeded, additional
literatures had to be introduced. The tentative nature of the model actually
indicates that the model is expected to need further development based on
empirical findings and, if necessary, additionalliteratures.
The data analysis indicated several limitations in the tentative research model.
Modifications were particularly difficult to understand and explain based on
existing strategy research. Rather than drawing on a number of fragmented
contributions on implementation issues, a particular theoretical perspective on
strategy implementation was therefore introduced. In explaining and exploring
modifications, the cognitive perspective remedies some of the most serious
shortcomings of the more traditional perspectives on implementation. A brief
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introduction to the cognitive perspective and its underlying assumptions is
included in this chapter, while a more detailed presentation or' one particular
stream of cognitive research - sensemaking - follows in chapter six, ,where
reasons for modifications are discussed.
3.1 Strategy Research
Since this thesis explores modifications in strategy, and modifications are
assumed to occur during implementation, the strategy implementation literature
is a natural candidate for review. Strategy implementation quickly leads into
the enormous bulk of strategic change research and implementation research
needs to be placed within this context.
The literature on strategic change can be divided into strategy content research
and strategy process research (Huff & Reger, 1987). Content research
typically asks which strategy a firm should choose in order to increase firm
performance while process research often focuses on the process of
formulating a strategy, i.e. the time period prior to reaching a decision about
strategic content. Less of the process research deals specifically with the
implementation process, i.e. the time period after a decision has been reached
concerning strategic content. Pure content studies, as well as strategy
formulation studies, are generally not concerned with the implementation
process. They focus on how decisions about strategy content are made and
which alternative is chosen. Strategic decisions are therefore often measured
directly against firm performance and implementation remains a black box, as
it is assumed to follow decision-making in a rather uncomplicated and rational
manner.
Implementation Process Studies
Since the purpose of this study is to explore modifications in a planned strategy
over time, the relevant literature is that which focuses on the implementation
process. Strategy process research focusing on the implementation phase
typically examines different aspects of the.implementation process. Rather than
linking process variables to firm performance, implementation studies often
measure the efficiency of the implementation process. Efficiency in terms of an
implementation outcome focuses on attaining the desired results with minimum
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expense or effort. Implementation process research has generally focused on
specific aspects of the process such as information and communication
(Cravens, 1998; Miniace & Falter, 1996); creating ownership or empowerment
(Cravens, 1998; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Guth & MacMillan, 1986;
Hambrick & Cannella, 1989; Morgan & Piercy, 1998; Smith & Kofron, 1996;);
participation or involvement (Elvekrok, 1998; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992;
Guth & Mac Millan, 1986; King & Rodriguez, 1981); commitment (Schwenk,
1986); motivation (Sandelands, 1994); attitude toward change (Lines, 2002;
Munday & Young, 1993), speed of implementation (Beckhard & Harris, 1987;
Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector,. 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hinings & Greenwood,
1988; Lamont et al., 1994; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Tushman, Newman, &
Romanelli,1986); resource allocation (Bower, 1970; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984;
Stonich, 1980); compensation schemes (Stonich, 1980); and performance
measurement and control (Camillus & Grant, 1980; Cravens, 1998; Ginsberg,
1984; Moon & Fitzgerald, 1996; Reed & Buckley, 1988; Smith & Kofron,
1996).
These studies point to critical dimensions in the implementation process and as
such they can be helpful for understanding modifications. However, the focus
on specific variables, and attempts at isolating specific effects, means giving up
some of the complexity inherent in organizational change processes. In
addition, because the attention is limited to process issues, none of these
studies discuss possible modifications in a strategy content over time.
In order to capture modifications in content, studies must not only focus on the
implementation process but also include the formulated strategy (the strategy
content). This requirement leads to an exclusion of a fair amount of strategy
research that focuses either on process or content. Several researchers have
argued that the traditional separation of content and process hampers
development in the field of strategy (Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991;
Reger & Huff, 1993; Wilson, 1992). Strategy implementation research that
includes both content and process can be divided into two main streams based
on the focus and underlying theoretical. assumptions. These two streams of
research are labelled (1) the planning perspective and (2) the emergent
perspective.
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The Planning Perspective
Research within the planning perspective emphasizes strategy as planning and
formal analysis. The seminal works of Ansoff (1994, 1991, and 1965) and
Andrews (1971) have been central in this perspective. In terms of
implementation issues, good and successful implementation processes,
according to the planning perspective, rely on careful planning.
Implementation problems can also be remedied by improved planning. While
much of the strategy literature explicitly takes a rational-analytic planning
perspective, much of the implementation literature implicitly suggest that
strategic change and implementation to a great extent can be planned.
There exists a growing amount of research on implementation tactics
(Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Hart, 1992; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1984; Hsiao &
Ormerod, 1998; Huy, 1998; Kanter, 1983; Kim & Mauborgone, 1997; Mezias
& Glynn, 1993; Nutt, 1989, 1986; Pfeffer, 1981; Waldersee & Griffiths, 1999).
The underlying assumption in these studies holds that managers, by using
different tactics depending on the content or context, can become more
successful in implementing change. The studies on implementation tactics
examine not only the tactics managers use to implement new strategies
however, but also determinants of different tactics and the conditions under
which different tactics are appropriate. The studies thereby link the
implementation process to both content and context.
Based on implementation tactic studies, the following relationship between the
strategy content and process can found. The planned strategy (strategy content)
affects the implementation process along three content dimensions (1) the
substance, (2) the specificity, and (3) the degree of change embedded in the
planned strategy. The implementation process can thus be expected to vary
depending on what is changed, how specifically as opposed to generally
formulated the strategy is, and the size or depth of the changes incurred by the
strategy. The studies on tactics do not address how the implementation process
affects content.
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The Emergent Perspective
The other central stream of research, which incorporates both content and
process, represents a more holistic view of strategic change processes. Within
this perspective, content and process are seen as interdependent and affecting
each other over time through continuous and intertwined processes of
implementation and formulation. This differs from the implementation process
research, which views formulation and implementation as two separate steps in
a strategic change process. It is also different from research on implementation
tactics because change is not merely an issue of getting people to do what the
manager wants them to do. In the emergent perspective, change is seen as
evolving from a combination of plans and emerging issues. Sometimes change
evolves as a result of lower-level initiatives (Burgelman, 1983; Quinn, 1980),
at other times change evolves without any clear initiatives or plans at all
(Mintzberg, 1994, 1991, and 1978). According to this perspective strategy
formulation (decision-making) continues throughout the change process and is
just as likely to take place after implementation (action) as before. This
dynamic approach to strategic change was found as the most promising and
appropriate in terms of understanding how a planned strategy emerges over
time (strategy formation) and why this occurs.
Research within the emergent perspective provides both theoretical and
empirical evidence of a discrepancy between intended and realized strategy.
Modifications in a planned strategy occurs as a result of process factors such
as: (1) employees fail to understand the ends and means formulated in the
intended strategy, (2) employees fail to agree or actively resist the intended
strategy, or (3) management changes its mind regarding the ends and means
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
Contextual studies also report interesting findings concerning why
modifications to formulated strategy can be found. Inner context, consisting of
structure, culture, politics, and resources, affects both strategic content and the
implementation process, as well as outer context, consisting of economic,
social and political factors at the. competitive, industry, national, or
international level. Unfortunately research on contextual influence remains
underdeveloped and empirical studies that explore how and when contextual
features become salient are (with the exception ofPettigrew, 1985) lacking.
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Research describing the existence of modifications can be found within the
emergent perspective on strategy. The planning perspective on strategy and
pure implementation research largely ignore any potential modifications in
strategy. In general existing literature on implementation processes remains
highly fragmented. Conceptualizations and definitions of implementation
remain unclear and there exists no agreed upon or unifying theoretical basis for
studying and understanding modifications or implementation processes.
In order to base this study on as much existing knowledge as possible about
modifications during implementation processes, other fields of research
focusing on implementation processes were probed as well. The next section
contains a selective review of implementation of public policy and innovations.
These additionalliteratures should provide a better platform on which to design
the study.
3.2 Other Relevant Research
The previous section presented relevant research within the field of strategy,
and it was deemed as insufficient for developing a useful research modelon
which to base this study. Therefore, this section probes literatures from other
fields of research. In order to draw on other fields of research, however, they
need to be relevant for sn:ategicchange processes. The implementation process
has been identified as critical for understanding modifications in planned
strategies. Additional relevant literatures therefore include research on other
kinds of implementation processes, particularly contributions that resemble the
emergent perspective on implementation. This was the perspective within
strategy that was argued as the most promising and enlightening in terms of
adding insight on modifications.
Research both within public policy and innovation has focused on
•implementation processes somewhat similar to strategy implementation
processes. Public policy literature is relevant because there exists a long
tradition for researching implementation within public policy. Furthermore,
public policy implementations often imply large-scale changes, where a
deliberate policy exists to begin with, which is similar to the deliberate
strategic changes of interest here. Innovations, like revolutionary and large-
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scale strategic change, represent something new to the organization.
Revolutionary change is often defined as breaking with the past. Damanpour &
Evan (1984) define innovations as "responses to environmental change or
means of bringing about change in an organization" (p. 393). Revolutionary
strategic changes can thus be viewed as innovations.
In order to contribute something to the strategy literature, additional literatures
also need to be different. The public policy literature reviewed here is different
from the strategy literature because it presents a different conceptualization of
implementation. Implementation is seen as a separate phase, which involves
continuous formulation activities. The innovation research of interest here is
also different from the strategy research because it explores how innovation (or
strategy in this case) goes through continuous development throughout the
change process. It also reveals different characteristics in a change process
depending on the timing, whether it is early or late in the change process.
Implementation of Public Policy
Public policy research is represented by Pressman & Wildavsky's well-known
book "Implementation: How great expectations in Washington were dashed in
Oakland" (1984). Pressman & Wildavsky's contribution to public policy
research is particularly interesting since they, like this study, are preoccupied
with understanding how and why strategies (or policies) change character over
time in an implementation process. The book furthermore provides a general
overview of research within public policy written by well-known and respected
researchers. This thesis therefore draws on this carefully selected piece of
public policy research to develop a deeper understanding of how the
implementation process affects the original decision.
According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1984), modifications occur through
negotiations and new agreements, often between new actors that were not
involved in the initial formulation. This leads to delays i.e. adjustments of the
schedule. Pressman & Wildavsky (1984) furthermore argue that disagreement
over means is more common than disagreement on ends. These findings
suggest both how and why modifications occur.
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Concerning the second issue of why modifications occur, some new and
interesting findings contributed to the development of a research model.
Content and contextual variables included multiple and contradictory goals and
changing circumstances. A new process variable, in addition to the
involvement of many unconnected people, was identified as technical details
about implementation. Technical details that could not be predicted at the time
of formulation were found as a major force pulling for modifications in the
planned strategy.
Adoption and Diffusion of Innovations
Innovation research includes a vast number of contributions, with one of the
most prominent and cited innovations researcher being Rogers (1982) In this
thesis however, innovation research is mainly represented by a research project
called the Minnesota studies (MiRP), where Vande Ven, Angle, and Poole
(1989) and a number of other researchers attempt to get beyond the "stages
models" of innovation. They do so by viewing the innovation stages as
activities and by assuming that they do not occur in any particular sequence
over time. They, in other words, study the multiple and sometimes parallel
progression of invention, development, diffusion, and adoption activities over
time. These activities are similar to formulation and implementation activities.
Innovation research points out factors within content, process, and context as
reasons for modifications. For example, different and perhaps unrelated
components in content require a division of work and sometimes even different
implementation processes. The innovation process was also found to be
partially cumulative and thus path dependent, which suggests that the sequence
in which changes are made could make a difference. Contextual factors lead to
mistakes and setbacks and included unanticipated events and a lack of attention
and resources. In addition, the innovation literature discussed conditions when
modifications were not made but should have been made. Reasons for failure
to modify an innovation were identified as learning disabilities and failure to
share and similarly interpret information, as well as a time lag required in order
to change the course of action. By turriing this around, one could say that
modifications occur through learning, sharing and interpretation of
information, and by minimizing the time lag for action.
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Public policy and innovation research add insight into how and why
modifications occur during the implementation process. The main reason that
these additional fields of research contribute in the development of a research
modellies in their alternative conceptualizations of implementation. In the next
section, the contributions and limitations of the different streams of literature
are discussed in more detail.
3.3 A Critical Evaluation of Existing Research
This section consists of a critical evaluation of existing literature, with
emphasis on the literature reviewed in the previous two sections. Strengths and
weakness are pointed out in terms of how well the different literatures
contribute in shedding light on and explaining modifications in strategy. A
perspective for this study is developed based on the literature review and
critique. The literature review consisted of two main parts: strategy literature
and other literatures of relevance. The critical evaluation is divided in a similar
manner. The main contributions to and limitations of the different bodies of
literature are summarized in the table below and discussed further in the text.
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Strategy!
Strategic
Change
Research
Implementation
Research
Highlights critical dimensicms
in the implementation process
e.g. communication, creating
ownership etc.
Focuses on intentions and plahs
Insights on specific process
issues often include
organizational aspects and
organizational behavior. e.g
political processes, cognitive
limitations.
F~gmented body of research.
No unified definition of or
theoretical perspective on
implementation
Studies process separately
from content, which does not
allow us to uncover
modifications in content.
Both inner and outer contextual
factors are generally ignored.
The Planning
Perspective on
Strategic
Change
Focuses on how managers can
realize intentions and plans by
using different implementation
tactics.
Some contextual factors are
included.
Strategy process and content
~reUnked but only in a one-
wayJelationship -- how content
affects the implementation
process.
The Emergent
Perspective on
Strategic
Change
Focuses on linkages between
contentand process.
Emergent features are
emphasized (in contrast to
planning perspective)
Recognizes that means and
ends are developed in the
change process, not only prior
to it.
Focuses too much on
emergent features as opposed
to planned and intended
features.
The emphasis on presenting
an alternative view of how
strategic and organizational
change takes place limits in-
depth exploration of
modifications.
Other
literatures
Public Policy
Research
Implementation is
conceptualized as separate
but intertwined with formulation.
Discusses why and how
modifications occur.
Possible differences between
implementation of public policy
and strategy.
The literature is only selectively
reviewed
Presents no explicit theoretical
foundation for understanding
modifications, although a
political perspective seems
dominant.
Innovation
Research
Implementation is both an
activity and a process! phase
in a larger process.
Presents details,
characteristics, and pattems in
innovation processes, which
are relevant for understanding
strategy implementation
processes.
Possible differences between
implementation of innovations
and strategy.
The literature is only selectively
reviewed.
Presents no expliCit theoretical
foundation for understanding
modifications, although a
leaming perspective is evident.
Table 1: Contributions to and Limitations of the Literatures
Strategy Literature
While strategic change research represents a particularly relevant body of
literature for the research questions posed here, much of the literature within
this line of research does not explain modifications. Several reasons for this
can be mentioned: (1) many of the studies fail to capture or indeed recognize
that modifications can and do occur; (2) some of the studies are only able to
24
capture "negative" modifications; (3) many of the studies lack a dynamic
approach and actually study strategic change in a static manner. Each of these
reasons will be elaborated below.
The first problem - failing to recognize modifications - was found in studies
that focused on the intended strategy and linked strategic choice directly to
performance. These studies could not capture any decisions or actions taking
place after the intended strategy had been formulated. Examples include
studies on strategy content and formulation process studies. Both can be argued
as more or less rooted in the rational/analytical perspective, which
conceptualizes implementation as a simple step following formulation.
Research on the implementation process was argued as more likely to shed
light on the phenomenon of interest. Implementation process studies
occasionally capture modifications but tend to treat modifications as negative,
which was identified as a second problem. In relation to this study, a negative
view of modifications represents a problem since it promotes "sticking" to the
plan and does not consider possible positive implications of modifications.
Large-scale change processes have been characterized as taking between three
and seven years (Nadler and Tushman, 1989). Considering the long time frame,
and the simultaneous changes in many related dimensions (context and
process) that occur during this time, modifications in planned strategies can be
expected to be both positive and negative.
In addition, much of the strategy research focuses either on content or process
and as such it illustrates the third problem - a failure to cover the dynamic
relationship between content and process. Most of the implementation process
research falls in this category, although a growing number of studies have
explored how content affects the process. The reciprocal effect, how process
affects content, has only been hinted at by researchers (Dawson, 1999; Gioia
and Chittipeddi, 1991; Kanter, 1983; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993) but has not
been studied in-depth.
The most promismg and appropriate stream of literature within strategic
change in terms of adding insight to modifications was research within the
emergent perspective. The emergent perspective refers to research that views
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content and process as affecting each other over time through continuous
processes of formulation and implementation. Contrary to' the rational-
analytical planning perspective, formulation thereby continues throughout the
change process, and formulation (decision-making) is just as likely to take
place during, or even after, implementation (action).
The emergent perspective contributes both to a better understanding of
modifications and to a broader view of the implementation process. It does so
by introducing a temporal and dynamic aspect in terms of variations in a
strategy at different points in time. The intended strategy represents the initially
formulated (and planned) strategy, while the realized strategy represents the
strategy that is actually effectuated. Due to emergent features and to the fact
that some dimensions of the intended strategy fail to become realized, the
realized strategy differs from the intended strategy. The questions of which
emergent features cause modifications and how this affects outcome still
remain however.
While the emergent perspective seems theoretically promising, empirical
findings that explain modifications in a planned strategy over time remain
sparse. The literature review showed that, in strategic change processes where
initial intentions actually exist, modifications to formulated strategy occurred if
(a) employees failed to 'understand the formulated strategy, (b) employees
resisted the ends and/or means in the strategy, or (c) newends and means were
introduced from the top of the organization. In order to understand and explain
modifications however, it is necessary to probe why employees fail to
understand the strategy, and why employees resist changes. What is it they fail
to understand or resist and why and when do top managers change the original
plan?
At least three reasons can be mentioned that explain why modifications in
planned strategies are inadequately treated in the emergent perspective: (1) the
preoccupation with explaining realized strategy, (2) the focus on the source of
strategic change and development, and (3) the treatment of formulation and
implementation as inseparable
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The focus on explaining realized strategy is particularly evident in Mintzberg
(1978) and Mintzberg & Waters' (1985) research. Although they introduce the
distinction between intended and realized strategy, their main concern consists
of describing empirically observed strategy processes that differ dramatically
from the normative rational-analytical planning model of strategy processes.
Mintzberg provides in-depth descriptions of how strategies evolve even when
no initial intention exists. While this research has been of tremendous value as
a counter-balance for the more normative rational analytical perspective on
strategic change, the intended strategy and the deliberate features of the change
process receive insufficient attention and the emergent perspective in and of it
self becomes less useful in studies of planned change processes.
The descriptive strategy development studies (Mintzberg, 1978; Burgelman,
1983; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986) are not only concerned with explaining how
a strategy evolves without initial intentions, but also attempt to explain how
change is triggered and who initiates change. Because changes in organizations
often are a result of unplanned actions and after-rationalizations it becomes
meaningless to separate formulation and implementation. Mintzberg therefore
introduces the construct strategy formation. Viewing formulation and
implementation as inseparable makes it difficult, if not impossible, to detect
any changes in original plans.
Evidently then, none of the existing studies within strategy specifically
examine modifications in a planned strategy over time. Research within the
planning perspective remains overly concerned with refining and improving
plans such as preparing and choosing the right implementation tactic. Research
within the emergent perspective points out the discrepancy between intended
and realized strategy and provides descriptive accounts of how change evolves
in organizations. But this stream of research is overly concerned with the
emergent features and the limited effect plans have on actual changes.
Other Literatures of Relevance
The other literatures, public policy implementation and innovation research,
were much more selectively reviewed than the strategy literature. Only
research resembling or including an emergent perspective of change processes
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was reviewed. Both the public policy and the innovation literature reviewed
here recognized modifications in plans as common, necessary and essential.
Public policy research (represented by Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984)
explained the deliberate and emergent features in policy implementation by
drawing on both the rational/analytical perspective (which focuses on the
intended strategy) and on the emergent perspective (which focuses mostlyon
the realized strategy). This literature thereby better incorporated both the
intended strategy and the realized strategy and provided evidence of and
explanations for why a discrepancy between the two could be found.
The main contribution of this literature consists of the idea that formulation and
implementation are interdependent yet separate. In the study by Pressman &
Wildavsky , a completely uncontroversial decision was studied based on the
argument that if modifications occur in a decision in which everyone originally
agrees, then modifications likely occur in all implementation processes. This
view on the relationship between formulation and implementation makes it
possible to empirically identify modifications in plans occurring during
implementation and to explore reasons for modifications.
The innovation literature strengthened the view of how complex and ill-defined
change processes appear: It also showed that complex change processes can
rarely be managed by any single managerial tactic or theory. A clearer picture
of how implementation processes evolve, from a seemingly unified decision
into a myriad of processes involving countless of different actors, shed further
light on how and why modifications take place.
The innovation literature made at least four main contributions in increasing
the understanding of modifications. First it introduced the distinction between
activities and phases. Instead of focusing on distinct phases, the research team
searched for patterns in activities and indeed they found that innovations were
continuously developed during implementation. Secondly, the cumulative
process was emphasized, indicating path-dependency and the importance of the
sequence of events, actions, and decisions. Thirdly, patterns of regularity in
innovation processes were revealed based on innovation studies. These patterns
of regularity may to a certain extent be transferable to strategy implementation
28
processes. For instance, findings indicate that the innovation process became
more structured and stabilized over time, which suggests that modifications are
likely to occur more frequently early in the process. Finally, this literature
stressed the need for reinvention and learning in the adoption process.
According to Van de Ven et al. (1989), modifications and adaptations in an
innovation should be welcomed as they make the innovation fit the local
situation and make the innovation more understandable and appropriate for the
organizational participants. Failure to learn and failure to share and similarly
interpret information was found to hamper modifications, which in turn
resulted in major crisis.
Innovation researchers VIew modifications as a product of the adaptation
between the innovation and the organization. In this sense, modifications are
connected with how different organizational levels learn about an innovation.
Modifications are said to enhance learning because the innovation is adapted to
the local situation. In other words, the local situation (for example a business
unit) adapts the innovation to that particular unit and this creates both a better
understanding for the innovation and a sense of ownership.
3.4 A Tentative Research Model
The literature review showed that the rational-analytic planning perspective on
strategy treated implementation as a rather simple and unproblematic step
following formulation in a change process. Implementation and formulation
were referred to as processes or phases in a change process. The emergent
perspective on the other hand, talked about implementation and formulation as
taking place continuously rather than stepwise. It seems that in the emergent
perspective, implementation and formulation were referred to as activities that
occur interchangeably. The research on innovation processes introduced this
distinction between phases and activities.
Whether implementation and formulation are viewed as activities or as
processes becomes crucial for understanding modifications. In the
implementation process, one might argue that both implementation activities
and formulation activities take place. The attempt here is to distinguish
formulation activities that take place in the implementation phase from those
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that take place in the formulation phase. Formulations that take place after an
initial decision has been made should ideally be framed and restricted by the
initial decision and consist of specific details or clarifications. If formulation or
decision-making during implementation significantly alters the initial strategy
then a modification in the planned strategy has occurred.
Modifications can be the result of decision-making or continued formulation,
but this requires the modification to be a consciously made decision. All three
literatures reviewed in this thesis suggest that after-rationalization occurs,
which means that actions are made rational in retrospect and decisions might
come after action. Modifications may therefore be the result of decisions or
actions (implementation activities).
Implementation activities are actions aimed at executing decisions. Examples
include introducing a new incentive scheme, firing/replacing people, and
employing new routines such as new forms of leadership. Implementation
activities represent a modification if they significantly alter the initial strategy.
This distinction between formulation activities, and modifications through
decisions or implementation activities makes it possible to work much more
precisely with continuous and intertwining formulation and implementation
activities during the implementation phase.
Planned change processes present an excellent opportunity to study the
implementation phase separately from formulation. In less deliberate change
processes this would be extremely difficult. Because of the fragmented and
insufficient knowledge on implementation, there is a real need to focus on the
implementation phase in a strategic change process as opposed to focusing on
the initial formulation phase or indeed on the whole change process. There are
several other reasons for this. First, the formulation phase and the
implementation phase represent different situations with different challenges.
In the formulation phase, the focus is on sensing the need for change,
identifying alternatives, generating ideas, and sharing knowledge in order to
reach a decision. In the implementation phase, the main focus is on acting on
the decision and making decisions that facilitate acting on the strategic
decision. The second reason for focusing only on the implementation phase is
that modifications in a planned strategy can by definition only be made after
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the initial decision itself has been made. Third, organizations commonly refer
to the implementation phase as distinct from the decision-making formulation
phase, and many organizations are particularly preoccupied with challenges
that are specific for executing decisions in contrast to challenges coupled with
making decisions.
In this study of a planned change process it is therefore argued that it may be
fruitful to conceptually separate implementation from formulation. In planned
change initiatives, the implementation process should be distinguished from the
formulation process, and it can and should be studied separately.
Implementation activities are distinguished from formulation activities, and
formulation activities that take place during the implementation phase are
called modifications if they significantly alter the original intentions. This is
because focusing on the implementation process and separation of formulation
activities that occur prior to implementation versus formulation that occurs
during implementation allows us to recognize modifications in a planned
strategy and make it possible to explore how and why modifications are made.
A more precise conceptualization of the implementation process, which is
different from both the planning perspective and the emergent perspective, will
create the basis for this thesis. Implementation is a multidimensional construct
and in this thesis it is recognized that implementation refers to (1) a phase in
the strategic change process (2) an activity that can occur at any time during a
change process (3) a process consisting of both implementation activities and
reformulation activities.
A Tentative Research Model
Based on the literature review and the perspective presented above, a tentative
research model can be developed. The tentative research model should
illustrate the research questions and guide data collection. The research
questions were:
1) How is a planned strategy modified over time?
2) Why do modifications occur?
3) How do modifications affect change outcome?
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These questions, and hypotheses about potential answers, can be modeled in
the following way:
I
I
I---------------------
+
~------------------ I
Figure 2: A Tentative Research Model
The model shows that modifications in strategy are expected to occur over
time. This is in accordance with the initial illustration of the phenomenon (see
figure 1) where strategy content changes during the implementation process.
As the research model above illustrates, organizational context, change content,
and the implementation process represent the major reasons for modifications.
More specific variables within each of these categories are presented below,
but the model depicts general categories in line with an exploratory approach,
and allows for further development based on data. The arrows between these
three factors point to their interrelatedness. Context, content, and process are
furthermore expected to change over time. Hence the planned strategy changes
over time through modifications. Including time and the variations in the
variables over time emphasizes the dynamic aspects of the change process.
Modifications made early in the change process are thus not only expected to
affect later modifications, but also the context and process over time.
The dependent variable - modifications in strategy - consists of two parts. First
an identification of modifications, which is related to research question one,
reveals whether or not modifications actually do occur as well as what is being
modified. Is it the ends or means; what kind of elements "fall out" of the
strategy; and what type of elements emerge and become a part of the strategy
in the implementation process; and finally are there different types of
modifications that occur in the implementation process? Because the literature
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review gave few clues in terms of these questions, this part of the model will be
developed further based on data. The second part of the dependent variable has
to do with the third research question concerning effects of modifications. It
includes an evaluation or estimation of the effect modifications have on change
outcome. For instance whether or not a specific modification is perceived as
positive or negative for the change outcome. This too remains a rather
exploratory question.
The independent variables deal with research question two - explaining why
modifications occur. Through the literature review, a number of likely reasons
for modifications appeared. These reasons are not specified in the model, since
the model needs to be open for other findings from the data. However, these
reasons describe the logic behind the model and they will be guiding data
collection. Reasons for modifications that were uncovered through the
literature review are therefore integrated and summarized below.
Content
Strategy content refers to the planned or formulated strategy, and consists of
the ends and means of a change initiative. In strategy implementation research,
the planned strategy was found to affect the implementation process through
several dimensions. The substance (Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew, 1987; Waldersee
& Griffiths, 1999), the specificity (Brews & Hunt, 1999; Huy, 1998;
Kruijswijk & Haines, 1989; Pettigrew, 1987), and the degree of change
incorporated in content (Hrebiniak & Joyce 1984; Dawson, 1999) represent
dimensions of content that might be linked to the implementation process,
particularly to the managerial style or tactic employed for implementation.
The public policy literature furthermore uncovered the frequency of vague,
multiple, inconsistent, conflicting, and even hidden goals in policy content.
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984) Multiple, conflicting, and inconsistent goals
relate to the substance of the content, while vague or hidden goals refer to the
specificity of the content. These features were found to affect not only the
implementation process, but also the planned strategy (content) over time.
Based on this, one might expect that modifications are more likely if the
planned strategy contains elements that contradict current practices or values.
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Furthermore, if the content is very specific in terms of details, then
modifications are more likely because very specified plans might not fit or be
well received in all parts of the organization. If the content, on the other hand,
is very general, then the plans are also likely to be changed compared with the
underlying and original intentions. General and abstract ideas must at one time
or another be worked out into further detail, and in that process anything might
be fitted into a very general strategy, although it might be quite different from
the original underlying ideas. Finally, the greater the degree of change, the
more likelyare modifications, since greater change can be expected to be more
controversial.
Implementation Process
Several process variables were found to affect the planned strategy over time.
They include a failure to understand the formulated strategy, resistance to
comply with the formulated strategy, and managers changing their minds and
introducing newends and means (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).
The selective sampling of public policy research revealed two major ways in
which process affects content over time, and the first one captures much of
Mintzberg & Waters' (1985) findings. The first process dimensions was the
involvement of many unconnected people. This leads to many different
interpretations of content (understanding of content) as well as many different
wishes and priorities (resistance to content). Due to this, renegotiations become
necessary and original agreements and original content were modified
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
The second process variable that affected content was working out the
technical details about the implementation process. This was found as a major
cause of delay and modifications to content, especially because these details
could not have been worked out in advance. Information was not always
available at that time, and sometimes the technical details did not even exist as
issues prior to implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
Research on innovation processes also introduced two process variables. The
first, a need to divide work, describes why many unconnected people become
involved. The second variable however, has to do with the partially cumulative
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process, and it brings in the question of path dependency (Bryson & Roering,
1989; Van de Ven et al. 1989) and hence it implicitly suggests that sequencing
matters. The innovation research also brought in factors that explain why
modifications in a planned strategy do not occur when they perhaps should.
Learning disabilities as well as failure to share information or failure to
interpret information similarly were identified as reasons why modifications in
plans did not take place (Van de Ven, 1995).
This means that if many unconnected people are involved in the
implementation process, then modifications are more likely. The more people
involved, the greater the number of different interpretations, wishes and
priorities. Furthermore, because there is an element of path dependency,
decisions made early in the implementation process are expected to frame later
decisions. Major modifications are therefore likely to be found early in the
implementation process.
Context
Context means the circumstances in which a particular event occurs. In line
with Pettigrew's (1985) research, context is s.eparatedinto inner context and
outer context. Inner context includes the structure (Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew &
Whipp 1991), culture (Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991;), politics
(Dawson, 1999; Kanter, 1983; Huy, 1999; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991), and
resources (Dawson, 1999; Huy, 1998; Nutt, 1986; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1984).
Outer context, on the other hand, consists of economic, social, and political
factors at the competitive, industry, national, or even international level
(Dawson, 1999; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991). Any changes in inner or outer
context are potential triggers for modifications in strategy.
The tentative research model presented here was based on an eclectic approach
to existing literature. The literature was probed for clues on modifications as a
phenomenon. While the literature could be categorized based on thematic focus
and underlying assumptions, and a model tying the different clues together
could be developed, the perspective and model represent no specific theoretical
basis for explanation. In the next, section, a theoretical perspective IS
introduced.
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The cognitive perspective captures many of the arguments within the tentative
research model, but it takes them one step further by tying descriptions and
findings to an established theoretical foundation. Before the cognitive
perspective is introduced it is important to point out that the choice of
theoretical basis in this thesis was made after data collection and preliminary
analysis. The cognitive perspective was chosen among several other theoretical
alternatives (see the methodology chapter for further elaboration) because it
provided the best fit with the data. In retrospect it is clear that the cognitive
view also incorporates many of the ideas within the emergent perspective on
strategic change, the public policy literature, and the findings from innovation
research, although none of these literatures refer specifically to cognitive
theories and the tentative research model was not developed based on a
cognitive perspective. The revised theoretical model, which presents reasons
for and outcomes of modifications, was developed based on the sensemaking
perspective, which is within the cognitive tradition.
3.5 A Cognitive Perspective on Modifications
The cognitive perspective is well established within strategy research. An
abundance of strategic issues, particularly focusing on initiation of strategic
change, have been researched from a cognitive perspective. Most of the
cognitive strategy researchers focus on early stages of the change process and
study how sensemaking and cognition is important in order to understand
decisions made early in the change process. For example, Bartunek (1984)
links interpretive schemes with organizational change (restructuring). Gioia &
Chittipeddi (1991) describe how managers make sense and give sense in
initiating change, and Dutton & Duncan (1987) study how managers identify
problems or challenges through strategic issue diagnosing.
Lately, a cognitive perspective has been used to understand strategy
implementation as well. Isabella (1990) studied evolving interpretations as
change unfolds. While Isabella focused on explaining how managers
collectively construe events and interpretations over time, this thesis will use a
cognitive perspective to identify construed realities across organizationallevels
and across time. The focus is on' probing the consequences of different
interpretations rather than the causes of different interpretations. Hence, the
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cognitive perspective (more specifically the sensemaking perspective) will be
applied in order to understand the implementation process, and particularly to
explain why modifications occur.
The cognitive perspective draws on cognitive psychology. In strategy research,
cognition has to do with what goes on in the heads of managers and
particularly how managerial cognition shapes organizational decision-making
and action. The cognitive perspective has been employed at individual, group,
organization and industry level. (For a thorough review of strategy research
within the cognitive perspective see for example Walsh, 1995).
The cognitive perspective views managers as information workers that spend
their time absorbing, processing, and disseminating information about issues,
opportunities and problems. The information worlds are extremely complex,
ambiguous, and munificent (Walsh, 1995). One major assumption within the
cognitive perspective is that individuals have limited information processing
capacity (Simon, 1955). Due to the complexity of information worlds and
individuals' limited information processing capacity, people develop highly
abstract knowledge structures, called schemas or interpretive schemes.
Schemas or knowledge structures are "mental templates that individuals
impose on an information environment to give it form and meaning" (Walsh,
1995, pg. 281). These knowledge structures consist of simplified
representations of the world and they serve as maps by which individuals can
filter information and understand e.g. new situations or new information.
Knowledge structures facilitate information processing by providing maps for
understanding and interpretation. However, knowledge structures can also
hamper information processing by restricting attention to information that
already exists within the knowledge structures. Existing knowledge structures
have been found to affect which information receives attention (Nisbett &
Ross, 1980). Existing knowledge structures also limit the range of alternative
solutions to issues that have been identified (Cyert & March, 1963; Dutton,
Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983). According JO Barr, Stimpert, & Huff (1992), the
problem with mental models (or knowledge structures) is that they may
become inaccurate. They argue that mental maps will always be incomplete
due to cognitive limitations.
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Cognition provides the underlying logic for managerial action (Walsh, 1995).
Early work on cognition and decision-making revealed that individuals, due to
limited cognitive capacity, often base their decisions on what they perceive as
rational motives. Simon (1957) and March & Simon (1958) introduced
decision-making theories based on bounded rationality. Tversky & Kahnemann
(1974) followed up this work by presenting several judgmental biases, or
heuristics, which are based on cognitive limitations. One example is the
tendency to remember extreme observations better than more mediocre
observations. Another example is the tendency to seek confirming rather than
disconfirming information, and thereby strengthening existing knowledge
structures. These limitations and judgmental biases also apply at organizational
and industry levels. Grønhaug & Falkenberg (1989) found evidence of similar
problems at industry level. In an empirical study, they found that industry-level
perceptions were not widely shared.
When cognition is employed at group or organizationallevel, the social aspects
of how knowledge structures are formed and used become increasingly
important. Social cognition has to do with how cognitive processes influence
social behavior and how people make sense of other people and themselves
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). According to this view, knowledge structures, are
mental structures that not only represent knowledge about a concept, but they
also refer to people's expectations about themselves, other people, the
situations they encounter, and the effects of these expectations. (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). Members ofa society (such as an organization) make meaning
out of their activities through interpretation.
One stream of literature within social cognition assumes that reality is socially
constructed. Berger and Luckmann (1967) introduced the term social
construction of reality. Social construction of reality means that there exists no
objective reality. Reality only exists in our heads' as a construction of our
beliefs and actions. In other words, strategies and organizations are products of
the beliefs and interpretations of members of a society. According to this view,·.
people invent and sustain the meanings of terms and then use these meanings
to understand the world. Hatch (1997) argues that reality is often believed to be
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objective because it is objectified, which means that reality IS socially
constructed in a way that makes it seem objective.
Social construction of reality can perhaps best be described through an
example. Imagine having seen a movie with a group of friends. During the
movie everyone is silent and each person understands and interprets the movie
based on his or her knowledge structures (based on past experience and so on).
After the movie however, the group of friends begin to discuss the plot. In this
kind of situation it is not unlikely that the discussion uncovers different
interpretations of what actually happened in the movie. Through the discussion
however, individuals can affect each other's knowledge structures, by
introducing alternative interpretations. A movie may not be reality, but the
same applies for situations like business meetings, lectures, negotiations, and
other organizational activities. When the message, the main ideas, or the
purpose is discussed, it is likely that different perceptions of reality are
uncovered and that individuals affect each other's interpretations.
Enactment theory (Weick, 1979) overlaps with social construction ofreality as
it also focuses on the subjective dimension of organizational realities.
Enactment theory not only assumes that reality is socially constructed but
emphasizes the active construction of reality by managers and organizational
members. According to enactment theory, individuals actively construct,
rearrange, single out, and demolish features of their surroundings (Hatch, 1997
pgA l). Sensemaking draws on social cognition, social construction of reality
and on enactment theory. The sensemaking perspective will be presented more
thoroughly in chapter six.
The cognitive perspective employed here thus highlights not only the cognitive
limitations of organizational members, but also the active and social processes
by which organizational member shape their environment. People talk about
strategy, organizations, and organizational environment as if they exist
objectively, just waiting to be discovered correctly. Social cognition and
theories based on social construction of reality, such as the sensemaking
perspective, emphasize the subjective nature of strategy and organizations.
According to these perspectives, there is a good chance that an organizations'
strategy will be presented differently depending on whom you ask, whether it
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is the top manager in the organization, a lower level employee, or someone
from a competing organization.
The social cognition view that assumes a social construction of reality is quite
different from the rational view of strategy. According to the rational view,
which continues to dominate much of the strategy literature, the organization is
"like a tool in the hands of top managers" and strategy is perceived as "a
process of designing the organization to achieve a predefined purpose"
(Hatch, 1997 pg.11S). The cognitive perspective on implementation as
employed here is also different from the emergent perspective on strategy,
where the organization is viewed as an adaptive system in which "strategy
emerges from the organization 's struggle to survive" (Hatch, 1997 pg. 115).
According the cognitive perspective as presented here, the organization and its
members much more actively take part in the creation of their environment.
Through interpretations of the environment and what goes on in the
organization, organizational members actually contribute in shaping their
environment and organization.
The cognitive perspective is clearly different from the theoretical assumptions
underlying the reviewed literature on implementation. The introduction of
cognitive theory represents an attempt at tying different research contributions
together. While existing research on implementation processes remains
fragmented and often without an explicit theoretical foundation, the cognitive
perspective represents a well-established theoretical foundation. The theoretical
perspective did not guide the development of the research model, but it
appeared as a fruitful theoretical basis to explain empirical findings later in the
research process. The cognitive perspective not only provides coherent and
logical explanations for the findings, but also remedies some of the weaknesses
of existing implementation research by providing a link between different
explanations for modifications that can be found in the different streams of
research.
3.6 Summary
This chapter first identified and briefly reviewed relevant research on
implementation processes. The review included research on strategic change
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processes, particularly contributions that focused on implementation while
including both the strategy content and process. Three streams of research
provided insights into modifications in planned strategies. They were (1)
implementation research, (2) the planning perspective on strategy, and (3) the
emergent perspective on strategy. In general the strategy and implementation
research was found as fragmented and dominated by assumptions that rarely
opened up for capturing and explaining modifications in planned strategies.
There tended to be either a focus on planned features of strategy or on
emergent features, and few contributions combined the two.
Additional research on implementation processes was therefore consulted.
Implementation of public policy and implementation of innovations provided
relevant and similar settings, but with additional insights, in terms of how
implementation processes could be conceptualized and how modifications
might be explained.
A research perspective was developed drawing on strategy, public policy, and
innovation research. A tentative research model was presented. The research
model was developed in a deductive manner based on a literature review for
the purpose of guiding data collection. The tentative nature of the research
model is connected with the goal of this study, which consists of developing a
theoretical model of modifications. A fmal model will thus represent the output
of this study and it will be the result of a combining existing research with
inductive findings.
The three research questions were depicted in the tentative research model in
the following way. The dependent variable - modifications - included both an
identification of modifications (research question one) and an estimation of the
effects modifications have on change outcome (research question three). The
independent variables - content, context, and process - will guide data
collection in the search for reasons for modifications (research question two).
The literature review provided a good. overview of possible reasons for
modifications. A set of key variables within the categories content, process,
and context were therefore presented. Important variables within content
consisted of substance, specificity, and degree of change. Process variables
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were the number of unconnected people involved, technical details of
implementation, and path dependency/sequencing. Finally, the contextual
dimensions included structural, cultural, political, and resource dimensions
reflecting inner context, and economic, social and political dimensions
reflecting outer context.
While rather specific predictions could be made concerning the reasons for
modifications, the type of modifications and effects of modifications remained
highly exploratory, and rather than formulating hypothesis at this stage, the
reasons for modifications were kept open for possible and probable
adjustments in a final research model.
The cognitive perspective was introduced at the end of the chapter. This is
because although the cognitive perspective did not contribute in development
of the tentative research model, it is central in the development of the final
model, which is presented as a theory explaining modifications. The cognitive
perspective focuses on managers as information processors. Information
worlds are extremely complex, and managers, like all individuals, have limited
cognitive capacity. Therefore they form and use knowledge structures to guide
information processing, decision-making and action. Knowledge structures
(called construed realities) among groups will be central in explaining why
modifications occur. The sensemaking perspective, which is one particular
stream within the cognitive perspective, will be presented in chapter six, where
data are analyzed based on sensemaking.
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4. Methodology
In this chapter methodological issues are discussed. These include the research
design, research setting, data collection, and data analysis. The choice of
research design is presented through a discussion of design requirements and
alternatives. Data collection methods include different sources of data and
details about how the data were collected. In the section on data analysis, the
different steps in the analysis process are presented along with the specific
analysis methods, such as narrative strategy, visual mapping strategy, temporal
bracketing strategy and alternate templates strategy. Strengths and weaknesses
of the chosen methodology conclude the chapter, before a final summary
highlights the most important methodological issues.
4.1 Research Design
The design of a scientific study depends on the research questions and on how
much existing theory there is within the domain of interest. The research
questions in this thesis concern how and why a formulated strategy is modified
over time, and the effect modifications had on change outcome. The study aims
to develop an understanding for how a planned strategy changes upon
implementation. These research questions pose several requirements to the
research design, which limit suitable design alternatives.
Criteria for Design
Based on the research questions, this study requires Ca)an identification of the
initially planned strategy, (b) an identification of modifications in the strategy
over time, (c) an exploration of major reasons for modifications, and Cd) an
evaluation of modifications' effect on change outcome. Furthermore, because
modifications are assumed to occur in the implementation process, the study
also requires Ce) an implementation process that can be studied. Each of these
requirements will be discussed below.
In planned strategic change and development processes, intentions and initial
formulations can usually be found in a document or strategic plan. The plan
commonly includes strategic goals, such as ends and means, although the
degree of detail on this type of information varies considerably. A written
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document of this type, in combination with verbal information to clarify or
extend the written information, makes it possible to identify the initially
planned strategy. The research design therefore needs to incorporate both
secondary data, such as written documents, and primary data, such as
interviews and observations.
In addition, modifications must be possible to identify over time. Initial
intentions can more easily be identified than modifications because of the
negative connotation that often accompanies changes in plans. Organizations
and organizational members might be hesitant in admitting that modifications
take place. Because modifications in strategy are sensitive issues and most
likely difficult to detect, revealing modifications requires a close relationship
with the organization(s) studied. Revealing modifications requires both in-
depth understanding and knowledge about the organization, as well as trust
from organizational members. It furthermore requires the possibility to observe
actions and events since not all modifications are likely to be referred to as
modifications, and modifications are not necessarily documented in formulated
plans.
Studying modifications requires incorporation of the temporal aspect into the
design. Data has to be collected over time. This can be done in several ways,
either by collecting data' at certain time intervals (time-series design) or by
collecting data continuously over a longer time period (longitudinal design).
In order to capture major reasons for modifications, events -and actions
occurring prior to modifications need to be traced. Possible methods include
asking for information retrospectively and/or collecting real-time information
where data is reviewed after the identification of a modification. Due to the risk
of after-rationalization and failing or skewed memory, real-time data is usually
preferred over retrospective data. Real-time data ensures that the reasons for
modifications actually occur prior to the modification.
The literature review suggested that reasons for modifications might vary over
time. Reasons for modifications early in the process may differ from reasons
later in the process. This brings us back to the temporal aspect. While
modifications can be identified either through a time-series design or a
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longitudinal study, an in-depth understanding of why modifications occur
which incorporates possible variations in reasons over time requires a
longitudinal study. Furthermore, only by collecting data continuously over a
longer time period is it possible to ensure that the reasons for modifications are
included in the data set. Collecting data at specific points without continuity
risks a focus on certain issues were stressed at a particular point in time, while
in a longer time perspective these issues may have carried less weight and
importance. A longitudinal design provides a better understanding of the
critical and reoccurring issues that affect actions, meanings, and decision-
making.
Data from the time period after a modification provides information on effects
ofmodifications. As mentioned in the literature review, there were few clues as
to which effects modifications have on change outcome. The research design
therefore needs to allow for a fairly open-ended approach that makes it possible
to capture relevant effects based on the data.
Access to an organization remains a fundamental requirement for study an
implementation process. The implementation process has to involve a planned
strategic change, with explicit ends and means, which can be studied over
time. It has been argued throughout this thesis that an implementation process
must be studied in its natural setting in order to capture the complexity and the
contextual features that affect the process. Access to real-time organizational
processes in their natural setting represents the greatest challenge for this type
of research.
To sum up, based on the research questions, the design needs to: incorporate
both primary and secondary data (in this study collected as verbal and written
information); allow for a close relationship with the organization being studied
to ensure that sensitive information can be revealed; allow for collection of
data over time - preferably through a longitudinal process study; include real-
time data; and provide in-depth information from an actual implementation
process.
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Choice of Design
It has been argued above that the phenomenon of interest requires detailed and
in-depth information. A qualitative study was therefore found most suitable.
Quantitative studies are more appropriate for studying well-structured
problems based on well-developed and advanced research and theory. The lack
of existing theory and a well-structured problem also restricts designs such as
laboratory experiments and surveys. Since there exists limited knowledge
about modifications, an exploratory study was more suitable in this case.
Having ruled out designs such as experiments and surveys, several alternatives
remain within the category of qualitative, exploratory, and longitudinal studies.
These include grounded theory, ethnography, and case study designs. While
all three were equally suited for building theory and for exploring in-depth
sensitive and complex issues, only case studies allow extensive reliance on
existing research (Meyer, 1996). As argued previously, the large but
fragmented body of research on strategic change and implementation processes
provides a better understanding on which to base the study of modifications.
Existing research also directs this study toward already established critical
dimensions in the complex process.
Case studies can, according to Eisenhardt (1989b), be useful when little is
known about a phenomenon, when current perspectives seem inadequate
because they have little empirical substantiation, or when they conflict with
each other or common sense. Furthermore, case studies are appropriate when
there is a need for a new perspective, in the early stages of research on a topic,
or to provide freshness in perspective to an already researched topic.
Research that specifically refers to modifications remains very limited. This
was the rational behind choosing an exploratory design. Since implementation
research was found as rather fragmented and as exhibiting a surprisingly static
view; a case study approach can provide a new perspective and develop
existing research. Grounded theory and ethnography can equally well provide
explanations of the phenomenon, but' these designs care more likely to
contribute to the already fragmented !IDddisperse body of literature by adding
new concepts and new terms to describe the phenomenon. This study aims to
bring together existing knowledge about modifications in strategy, and to draw
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on this knowledge, while a the same time remain open for new insights that
could bring research on modifications and implementation further and pull
existing contributions together. A case study approach was therefore chosen.
4.2 Research Setting
The research program, "BRA Følgeprogram", funds this dissertation, and it
provides access to one of Norway's largest companies - Statoil. BRA
represents a planned strategic change as it is based on a corporate decision to
implement a new IT system and organizational changes. This decision was
made in 1996. Clear intentions existed in terms of both strategic ends and
means. At the time the decision was made, the change initiative could be
classified as a typical business process reengineering (BPR) initiative.
Three key features characterize BPR changes from other types of
organizational and strategic changes (Knights & Willmott, 2000):
1) A focus on moving from functional division to process organization.
2) Entrepreneurialism. A central assumption holds that everyone in the
organization is driven by a desire to provide the best and most
profitable customer service.
3) Information technology. Organizational change is enabled by IT
changes and ideas include empowerment, team-working etc.
In Statoil, the change involved and affected the whole corporation and it was
expected to bring enormous performance improvements. The fundamental
argument behind BRA was to improve the corporation's competitive situation
by cutting administrative costs dramatically and subsequently increasing firm
performance.
In this chapter, the corporation Statoil is first briefly presented. A presentation
of BRA, with a focus on strategic ends and means, follows. The presentation
should answer what type of changes the BRA change initiative involved and
how the corporation planned to achieve the changes.
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The Corporation: Statoil
The integrated oil and gas corporation, Statoil ASA, operates in twenty-five
countries with over sixteen thousand employees. The production of oil and
natural gas on the Norwegian shelf creates the basis of Statoil's business. Over
the last ten to twenty years however, Statoil has increased its international
activities substantially due to market growth and the goal of being among the
leading players in the industry.
Statoil was established in 1972. Statoil's first oil field was found in the North
Sea two years later. Then followed twenty-five years of discovery of new oil
fields both nationally and internationally, development of the organization, and
continuous growth. During these years there was no real need to be cost
conscious. Growth was substantial and the focus was naturallyon managing
the growth situation. In the late nineties however, the growth had reached a
peak and focus was turned towards cost control. International competitors
showed cost levels far below Statoil. In June 2001, Statoil's ownership
situation changed as parts of the corporation went public on the stock market.
On Statoil' s webpages the following ambitions for the corporation are listed:
• Being the first choice among customers
Being a leading gas supplier inEurope
Being the most efficient oil and gas operator
Being a driver in terms of applying new technology
Value creation through productivity and growth.
•
•
•
•
Statoil's organization chart was changed during the course ofthis study. When
the study began the corporation had a corporate management team consisting
of the CEO and six top managers. In addition to the corporate staff were fifteen
business areas. These business areas were later reduced to the following six:
1) UPN Exploration and Production in Norway
2) INT International Exploration and Production
3) Natural Gas
4) Processing and Marketing
5) Technology
6) Corporate services and corporate center
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The cases included in this study came from UPN and Processing and
Marketing. UPN is the operator of ten oil and gas fields. The business area is
divided into three main geographical areas which each include several business
units:
HaltenINordland: Åsgard, Nome, Heidrun
Troll/Sleipner: Troll Gas, Sleipner, Veslefrikk, Huldra, Glitne
Tampen: Statfjord, Gullfaks
Within Processing and Marketing lie all supply, refining, distribution and sale
of oil and petrolium products. Two refineries belong in this business area. The
Norwegian refinery and business unit, Mongstad, will be presented further at
the end of this section.
The Planned Strategy: BRA
In the fall of 1996, the corporate leadership in Statoil decided to invest in the
information system SAP Rl3 as a corporate administrative platform for Statoil.
The decision was based on an internal assessment and it involved major
organizational changes along with the IT changes.
The change program BRA was launched as a performance improvement
project, which aimed to develop Better, Faster Administrative (Bedre Raskere
Administrasjon - BRA) procedures enabled through a new IT-system. BRA's
goal was to make the administrative procedures in Statoil more efficient and
standardized and thereby reduce redundant work and encourage and facilitate a
focus on value-creating activities. The ambitions of BRA were high, officially
stated as a 50% reduction in administrative costs. Potential savings were
calculated at 1,4 to 1,8 billion NOK per year and most of this was within
procurements (expected savings within procurements of 1,2 billion NOK).
Furthermore, 600-900 employees would be transferred to more value-creating
work.
Different presentations of BRA focused on different aspects of the changes.
Common for most information about BRA was the focus on standardization,
simplification, and horizontal coordination. Changes expected through the
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BRA program included changing the organization of work from functional
orientation to process orientation by introducing the following:
• A holistic perspective
• A focus on task
• Elimination of duplication of work
• Decentralized decision making and increased authority at lower levels
• Empowerment through requiring employees to actively seek
information
• New leadership roles. Leadership roles change from focus on control to
support and motivational functions
• A new IT-system (SAP)
According to a presentation of Statoil' s BRA program at NHH (1997), BRA
would result in a more purposeful workday for employees by bringing a new
organization; a new IT system; simpler and more standardized data and
reporting routines; multiple skills; new skills; decisions at lower levels; a
learning organization; more time for value-creating activities; and new forms
of cooperation. In short, BRA was presented as a great opportunity for
employees to increase their skills and become better prepared to meet future
challenges.
In the initial phases of the change initiative, Statoil' s previous organization was
often characterized as a collection of parallel silos, where employees strived to
do their best within their organizational boundaries, but where coordination
and standardization across business units and functions could be improved
dramatically. The new concept through BRA was illustrated as a house with a
common ground, based on coordination and similar solutions.
The idea was to abandon traditional functional division and move towards
process organization. Process organization was defined as a way to view
internal organization. Instead of viewing an organization as a set of different
functions, such as purchasing, the new idea was to view the organization as a
set of work processes. Procurement was often mentioned as an example of a
process. Procurement means to attain. material for a task, for example
maintenance of an offshore installation. The procurement process is not limited
to merely purchasing the material, but means to follow the whole process from
ordering material to completing the maintenance job. The process approach
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was presented as a holistic and interconnected approach to organization, where
the interface between different tasks would become as efficient as possible.
This would secure optimal use of resources. One important goal in process
organization was to make the processes self-steered or self-managed by
transferring the necessary authority to the operating levels, and by eliminating
unnecessary control functions.
The process organization would be based on networks where people with the
same functional tasks cooperate (such as engineers, sales people etc.) and
integrated teams, where people with different disciplinary and functional
backgrounds cooperate (such as an operations team on a platform consisting of
engineers, maintenance people and business people).
Information technology facilitated both standardization and interconnection of
processes. Identical computer tools, routines, procedures, constructs, and
codes were necessary to achieve standardized administrative processes in the
different units of the organization. An enterprise resource planning (ERP)
system - SAP - made it possible to simplify registration and transmission of
information since the information would then be registered one time and
subsequently could be used by all of the following stages of the process.
SAP has become increasingly more popular on a global basis. In the petroleum
industry, SAP now represents the industry standard. Once implemented, SAP
would replace many of the existing systems in Statoil. SAP stands for Systems
- Applications - Products. SAP version Rl3 is an Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) system especially developed to support processes. Enterprise systems
are software packages that allow integration of all information flowing through
an organization. SAP can be used as a common administrative platform and it
allows for integration across traditional system boundaries. Data from one
division (for example stock) can be collected directly or be transferred to other
system (such as accounting, maintenance, logistics). Routine work processes
can be automated and it is no longer necessary to register the same data more
than one time.
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BRA in other words consisted of both an IT-project and an organization
development project, and as the table of benefits shows, most of the benefits
were expected to come from the organizational changes.
Procurement Automation 250-300 100-150
Sales & Logistics Common warehouse
Standardization 500-550 10-20
Better utilization of capacity
Operations and Integrated teams
Maintenance Better information 290-439 290-430
Status/condition-based maintenance
External Accounting Standardization and simplification 40-50 40-50
Steering, budget and New governance model 70-100 70-100
plan Increased coordination between budget,
plan and accounting.
Finance Automation
Coordination 100-250 50-60
Internationalization
HRM Register hours and travel
Standardization 50-60 50-60
Better steering of competence
ISIIT Reduction in number of systems 60-100 40-70
Standardized system
Table 2: Benefit Potential
The Implementation Process
The change initiative was organized as a project. A corporate BRA project
(called the BRA Program) was first established to work on developing the
content of change further and planning the implementation process. The
corporate BRA project involved a large number of consultants and they worked
from corporate headquarters for one year mainlyon designing change content
and directing the implementation process. In 1998, the number of people
involved in the BRA Program counted 175.
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Figure 3: Organization of the BRA Program
The BRA Program was organized directly below corporate management and it
was lead by a Steering Committee. Tasks were divided into the BRA Skill
Center, BRA Staff, BRA Working Processes and BRA Implementation. Within
BRA Skill Center, the main ideas were worked out through what was called
BRA Basis. The Skill Center also included SAP Technical, Training and
Documentation, and Change Management. Within the BRA Implementation
section, details about how implementation and local implementation teams
would run were decided.
A number of questions concerning how to implement the changes were dealt
with. The timing, sequencing, and tempo of changes were decided and plotted
in an implementation plan (appendix B and C). As the plan shows, BRA was
planned implemented worldwide in the corporation within a time frame of four
years. The implementation would occur subsequently in business unit by
business unit in a roll-out fashion. While the BRA Program held responsibility
for implementation, the responsibility for change and realization of benefits
was placed with the line management.
The BRA Guide was developed by the change management group to guide
implementation in the respective business unit. The BRA Guide was not a
method, but a framework for implementation and it provided methods,
deliveries, tools, techniques, tips and examples that could be helpful for
initiation, implementation and completion of local implementation projects.
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The BRA guide targeted all people who held an active role in the
implementation, such as the implementation team and the line management.
The BRA guide was under continuous development until early 1998.
A separate database for memos (called working papers) with standard formulas
to make reporting standardized was also established. The purpose of both the
BRA guide and the database was to standardize implementation in the different
business units and create a simple and structured tool for the implementation
project team, as well as a structure for experience transfer. The experiences
from implementation would then lie in the working papers and could later be
collected in a "Best Practice" database.
The Cases
Case A
The fIrst case in this study is Mongstad, a refinery within the Processing and
Marketing division. The refinery was established in 1975 as a result of district
politics. Multiple owners existed at that time. By 1989, the refinery was purely
Statoil owned and it then employed 750 people. Mongstad was among the first
to implement BRA. Only the refinery in Denmark, which was the BRA pilot
implementation site, preceded Mongstad.
CaseB
The second case is an offshore installation within the Troll/Sleipner area of
UPN. The unit was established in the early 1990s based on ideas of modem
organization. The organization was flat with multiple competencies and few
divisions and with an onshore "shadow" organization responsible for
everything that could be done onshore. A lean and multi-functional work force
could therefore be kept offshore. Approximately 340 employees work in
Sleipner. Sleipner was in the middle in terms of the implementation plan. Some
of the other UPN units had already implemented BRA, but there were still
several to go.
Case C
The third case, Gullfaks, is another offshore installation within UPN, but this
time within the Tampen geographical area. The field is old and complex and
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includes three large concrete production platforms, Gullfaks A, Gullfaks B, and
Gullfaks C. The three platforms began production respectively 1986, 1988, and
1989. Unlike the modem organization in Sleipner, the "old" platform and
organization In Gullfaks demand many functions and specialists.
Approximately 850 employees work at Gullfaks. Gullfaks was among the last
business units to implement BRA. Only one business unit began
implementation after Gullfaks.
Limiting the sample to one organization reduces the complexity of the study
somewhat. Although each division had traditionally been autonomous with
different historical and contextual features, keeping within one organization
secures many similar factors across the business units as well. Governance
systems, incentive systems, and corporate culture represent some factors that
were identical across the cases. There had also been recent attempts at
increasing corporate identity rather than emphasizing business unit belonging
through "We in Statoil" (Vi-i-Statoil). The same formulated strategy (BRA)
was studied in different but related settings. This represented a unique
opportunity to examine modifications in strategy over time. Modifications
occurring within in one business unit could thus be captured. Modifications at
corporate levelover time could also be revealed however. Corporate level
modifications were expected to affect several business units.
4.3 Data Collection
This section deals with how data was collected. The section on res_earchdesign
revealed a demand for primary as well as secondary data, and real-time as well
as retrospective data, but there are also many other issues concerning data
collection that need to be addressed. The different sources of data are presented
first in this chapter, followed by a more detailed description of how data were
gathered.
Data were collected in three ways:
1) Interviews
2) Observations
3) Archival data
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Two surveys were conducted as well during the course of the study. One was
an evaluation performed for business unit C, and the other survey targeted ten
upstream business units with the aim of assessing the degree by which they had
implemented the changes within BRA. The surveys have not been included in
the data set for this study, but provide additional background information
similar to other types of archival data.
Primary Data
Interviews. The most important source of information was personal interviews.
While archival data might indicate when modifications had taken place, only
personal recollections and interpretations could reveal why modifications were
made. The interviews also indicated that a number of different accounts of the
change content and process existed within the organization. These different
interpretations did not appear in archival data and were difficult to observe in
meetings, where consensus was often a goal.
The interviews were semi-structured and based on the tentative research model.
At the same time the questions were open-ended and allowed for discovering
new issues, which could serve to develop the research model further (see
appendix C for a typical example of an interview guide). While the main issues
in the interview guide remained the same, the exploratory research design
opens up for adjustments in the process. As issues and relationships became
clearer, it was thereby possible to adjust the interviews accordingly. Each
interview lasted from 60-90 minutes and with a few exceptions where the
respondents objected, all interviews were tape-recorded.
Interviewees at different levels of the organization were targeted. Initially this
was to ensure that any findings were not based on data coming from «one side»
only. As it turned out, the different views that appeared through this multi-level
focus became a major point in the findings from the study. The corporate level
and the business unit level represent the two levels of analysis. Most of the data
were collected within the business units, as this was the main level of analysis.
Within the business unit level, respondents were divided into top management, :
middle management and employees. Top managers included all members of
the management team such as Human Resource Manager, Platform Managers,
and Operations Manager. Line leaders were defined as middle managers.
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Observations in the form of participation in meetings and workshops also
provided rich data. They served as important supplementary data and revealed
other types of information compared with interviews. Information included
how people related to one another, power relationships, informal coalitions,
moods, and so on. Initially the goal was to refrain from taking part in
discussions in meetings and workshops. It soon became clear however, that
organizational members expected those who were present to participate. With
time it also became clear that through limited participation, more and richer
data became available. While being conscious of the risks of affecting the
process, and avoiding input directly related to the research questions of this
study, limited and carefully selected participation was therefore seen as
beneficial.
Secondary Data
Archival data represents a good way to gain background information about the
organization being studied. In addition it can serve to double-check other
information. In the BRA change project, several databases were used to
document progress and experiences made during implementation. These
databases were probed regularly, although the business units only relied on
corporate databases to varying degrees. Written material from headquarters
mainly consisted of descriptions of the strategy and rationale behind it (the
content of BRA) and plans for the implementation process. The most relevant
documents from the business units consisted of Organization Development
(OD) Plans, Action Plans, BRA Plans (Communication Strategy, Training etc.)
and Evaluations.
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Business unit A 26 22 11 Contact established fall 1998
Intensive Data collection from
Top managers, keyactors 9 Jan. 1999 - Sept 1999
Middle managers and 17
employees Follow-up interviews until Dec.
2001
Business unit B 38 5 12 Contact established early spring
2000
Top managers, key-actors 12
Middle managers and 26 Intensive Data Collection from
employees May. 2000 - Dec. 2000
Follow-up interviews until Dec.
2001
Business unit C 14 5 10 Contact established early spring
2000.
Top managers, key actors 11
Middle managers and Intensive Data Collection from
employees 3 95 Jan.2001 - May 2001
Follow-up interviews until Jan.
2002
Table 3: Sources of Data
Timing
The table above shows the sources, levels and timing of data collection.
The number of interviews indicates how many interviews were conducted at
corporate level and within each business unit. Some key actors were
interviewed more than once (particularly at corporate level), but the number of
interviewees correlates highly with the number of interviews conducted.
Number of observations refers to points of observations. The majority of the
observations took place during meetings within the BRA Project (at corporate
level) or within the business units. The number of archival data refers to the
number of documents (hard-copy or electronic copies) that were probed and
found useful for this study.
Most of the interviews and observations provided real time data, but some of
the questions and discussions naturally had to do with past events as well. The
intensive data collection periods within each business unit took place a few
months after the official implementation date. It was therefore necessary to
supplement documents about the period prior to implementation with verbal
accounts. Archival information was also a combination of real-time and
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retrospective data. While some documents provided historical accounts and
background information, others described the process as it was evolving. This
combination of real-time data and retrospective data was fruitful. Most studies
of processes are retrospective and conducted after the outcome is known.
Explanations and recollections are then usually colored by the outcome. Van
de Ven (1993) posits that real-time studies of strategic change processes are
best because they unfold in their natural field setting. Kanter's (1983)
description of organizational change as emerging constructions of reality,
including revisions of the past, also suggests problems with purely
retrospective studies.
At the corporate level, the contact was mainly with the Corporate BRA Project.
A close relationship was established with the manager of what later became the
Change Management Group (ELTÆST). Interviews at this level were often
informal and combined with meetings and workshops. The contact subsisted
during the whole study - that is four years.
At the business unit level, the local (meaning within the business unit)
implementation project was contacted first. Initial meetings with the local
implementation project/leader provided background information and relevant
documentation. Our primary contact person in the business unit was usually the
implementation leader or a person in a similar position such as the
improvement group leader. The implementation leader and the human resource
manager then typically cooperated to provide a list of interviewees from
different levels in the business unit and within different positions and
disciplines. The CEO and the implementation leader in each business unit were
interviewed in all cases, and sometimes on several occasions. All interviews
were conducted at the respondents' work place, and interviews offshore were
carefully scheduled so as to not interfere with the important coffee and lunch
breaks. While offshore, we were also invited to circulate during coffee breaks
and talk informally with employees.
All of the data were collected together with another researcher. Data collection
was conducted so as to ensure that both of our (highly related) research
questions were covered. Interviews were typically scheduled parallel. This
meant that one day ofinterviews offshore resulted in 12-16 interviews.
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Criteria for choice of cases
Case studies can consist of one or multiple cases. A common reason for
choosing multiple cases is because this leads to greater possibilities for
generalization (Leonard-Barton, 1990). This is certainly true for a large number
of cases, but if the question is one, two or three cases, generalization to a larger
population remains difficult. Several researchers have argued however, that
carefully designed case studies can increase generalizability based on
replication logic similar to experiment designs (Andersen, 1997; Yin, 1994).
This study' s primary aim is not to generalize fmdings to a larger population. In
this study, multiple cases provided a useful foundation for comparison and
created possibilities of learning about the phenomenon during the research
process.
In case studies, there is also the choice of what constitutes a case.
Organizations are often used as cases, but critical events such as a modification
can also be studied as a case. Using each modification as a case might increase
the number of cases and hence contribute to a greater level of generalizability.
In this study, business units within one organization represent the cases. This
is natural since the business unit is where implementation takes place and
where modifications are most likely found. At the same time however, it is
important to monitor and keep track of what is happening at corporate level.
Once the implementation process has been traced and modifications are
identified, it is more relevant to use each modification as a case. In a sense this
is done in the data analysis when different types of modifications are
developed.
In choosing which cases to study, several dimensions can serve as selection
criteria. Randomization is not always a goal in case studies. Eisenhardt (1989b)
states that although cases may be chosen randomly, random selection is neither
necessary nor even preferable. Due to the limited number of cases that can be
studied simultaneously in a longitudinal study, samples providing extreme
situations and polar types will be useful for replicating or extending theory
(Pettigrew, 1990). Diverse sampling can also contribute to enhancing the
generalizability of the findings (Gersick, 1988). It was decided that three
business units would be studied. Inorder to capture the longitudinal dimension,
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at least at a corporate level, the cases would need to cover different time
periods.
Several researchers argue that the larger and more diverse an entity, the more
difficult it is to effectuate and manage change (Davenport, 1993; Nadler &
Tushman, 1989)). The first case was selected because of its size and
complexity. The business unit had over 700 employees and a relatively long
history, which meant that routines and attitudes toward work were well
established. In the preliminary analysis of the first case it became clear that
upstream business units (offshore) were more important in a corporate
connection. The selection of a second case was therefore limited to the
upstream business units and implementation sites within the "medium" time
period. Again, a relatively large unit was sought out with the help of the
Corporate BRA Group. The third case was opportunistically selected. While
working on the second case it became clear that large modifications were
occurring in the third case. We therefore worked actively to gain access to the
third case. Again this was a large, upstream business unit, but unlike the second
case, which was a young and modem organization, this unit was older and
more complex.
It is important to point out that gammg access remains a key concern,
regardless of the criteria for sampling. Sometimes gaining access requires a
trade-off in terms of giving something back to the organization. In our case, we
became more involved than initially planned, and agreed to perform some
evaluations in trade for interviews and process information. This involvement
in the business units provided us with invaluable information and observations,
which could not have been attained by simply entering the organization to
observe meetings or to interview organizational members.
The sample was limited to one corporation and this reduces the complexity
some~hat. Although each business unit traditionally had been rather
autonomous with different historical and contextual features, choosing cases
within the same corporation secures several similar factors. Governance
systems, incentive systems, and corporate culture are some of the factors that
will not affect the results of this study, since they are identical across the cases.
Limiting the cases to one corporation also means that implementation of the
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same strategy, BRA, in different settings will be studied. This represents a
unique opportunity to examine modifications in strategy over time, not only
within the business units but also modifications that reach the corporate level
and affect other business units as well.
4.4 Data Analysis
All data analysis has to do with classification and data reduction. Many
methods to analyze qualitative data remain rather informal. There is a growing
interest in developing and prescribing new ways to analyze qualitative data,
and several qualitative researchers have provided thorough and rigid methods
for qualitative data analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000 and 1998; Langley,
1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pettigrew, 1997 and 1992). In this section, the
steps in the data analysis in this study are presented along with the methods
used to analyze data.
The fmdings presented in this thesis are the result of employing a sensemaking
perspective. The attempt is to report on the findings in a logical and orderly
fashion structured by the research questions. The data analysis was far from
orderlyand logical however. In presenting the methods used to analyze data,
the attempt is to clarify the steps from raw data to findings. This presentation is
therefore more true to the actual research process than the presentation of
findings in subsequent chapters. As the description below will show, the
analysis was rather messy, switching between largely inductive approaches and
consulting existing theory. The goal here is to describe the analysisprocess in a
way that makes it possible to follow and if necessary replicate the analysis. The
presentation is divided into three overarching types of analysis: preliminary
analysis, within-case analysis, and across-case analysis.
Although data collection was guided by a theoretically deduced model and
early data analysis focused on key variables in the model, the analysis was very
much an inductive process. The theoretical framework was never forced on the
data. Although the tentative model focused the process, analysis was kept open
to what the data were "saying". Interpretation and understanding of what the
data are "saying" requires sensitivity and creativity, and hence this type of
inductive analysis takes place in the context of discovery.
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Prior to analysis, all data were transformed by the researcher into electronic
format and entered into a database. Many of the documents, such as
Organization Development Plans, and evaluations were already in an electronic
format. Documents that were originally hardcopies were probed and relevant
information was selectively transformed into electronic format. Interviews
were transcribed verbatim within a few days of the interview, as were
handwritten records from meetings and workshops. The electronic format
simplified coding in the software program NUD* 1ST.
NUD*IST is a non-numerical computer software which allows the researcher
to hierarchically structure vast amounts of qualitative data. The database builds
on two systems, one for storing and organizing all documents, and one for
indexing and coding. The document system keeps track of all documents and
text files while the index system organizes coding and keeps track of the way
coding hierarchy. Once an index system has been built up, it is possible to
change it, search it, and make reports based on it.
Preliminary Analysis During Data Collection
Data were collected over a time-period of four years. Some preliminary
analyses were deemed necessary to ensure that the most pertinent issues at that
time were not skewed or forgotten at a later time.
After the intensive data collection in each business unit a report was written.
The report focused on critical issues in the respective business unit
approximately six months after implementation. Table of contents from each of
the three reports are enclosed in the appendix (see appendix D). While the
research questions guided interviews, findings were reported by focusing on
capturing the essence of what was going on in the business units.
Electronic data were coded in NUD*IST, not based on prior categories, but
rather based on what we interpreted as the main issues. The reports were
presented for the business units and we "received feedback on factual matters
and on our conclusions. The feedback provided verification from the units
being studied and some facts were corrected based on this feedback.
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Conclusions were sometimes modified, but never changed. The reports were
later used as evidence for how we had interpreted the situation at that time.
Within-Case Analysis
With the vast amount of data that qualitative research often involves, it
becomes important to find an appropriate structure to be able to begin to
analyze the data.
The within-case analysis began with establishing a chronology. Visual
mapping in the form of process flow charts (Langley, 1999) and simple time
lines (Eisenhardt, 1989b) were drawn up. According to Langley (1999), visual
mapping provides an intermediary step between raw data and a more abstract
conceptualization.
Once the chronology was in place, coding began. Since a tentative model had
been developed to guide data collection, it was natural to use this model in the
data analysis as well. All electronic data were coded in NUD*IST based on
criteria established in the tentative model. During coding, several new
categories evolved and these were included in the coding guidelines as they
evolved. Lists of coding criteria from three different points in time can be
found in appendix E. Introducing new categories meant that data often had to
be recoded several times and the coding criteria had to be updated.
It became clear through the first coding that there was too much material and
the data had to be categorized further. Temporal bracketing was therefore
introduced. The data were divided into three distinct phases, a preparatory
phase, the local implementation phase, and a training and evaluation phase.
These phases were based on how the change processes in the business units
were organized. All units had divided their work into these phases, although
they differed somewhat in length of time and the type of work they involved.
The three phases were superimposed on the data as they were written up in the
within-case analysis.
In writing up the data, a narrative strategy was employed (Czarniawska, 2001).
This method for analysis involves construction of a detailed story from raw
data. According to Langley (1999) this is almost always a step in the analysis,
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either as a data organization device, a validation tool, or an analytical element.
The narrative strategy serves to make sense of a process through stories,
meanings and mechanisms. In this study, the narrative strategy was not merely
story-telling as recapturing the process, but story-telling focusing on certain
critical issues, such as level of involvement, the specificity of the strategy and
so on. The story was built upon the theoretically deduced framework, but as
mentioned, it also included some new categories. The within-case analysis
provided a step in the analysis consisting of an analytical description of the
implementation process. It was analytical because it was steered by a
theoretically deduced framework. This framework was not a theoretical
perspective however, and it merely organized and focused the description of
the change content, context and process.
Some new categories (central themes) evolved through the within-case
analysis, e.g. intended changes versus actual changes, reactions to the change
process and reactions to the change content, the use of evaluations and
performance measurement, and perceptions of excessive change (see
Stensaker, Meyer, Falkenberg, and Haueng, 2001 on excessive change). More
importantly however, it became clear that the preliminary model was not
emphasizing what was perceived as the critical reasons for modifications.
The result of the within-case analysis was approximately fifty pages of
analytical descriptions about the implementation process in each of the three
cases. Tables summarizing the findings from the within-case analysis can be
found in appendix F.
The set of key variables in the tentative model, explaining why modifications
were expected to occur, had been helpful in data collection and in structuring
the narration in the beginning stages of data analysis. It focused the interviews
and organized the data. However, the primary within-case analysis showed
clear discrepancies in how different organizational members described, for
instance, the substance of content. Organizational members at the corporate
level tended to give different answers than managers within the business unit",
and employees within the business unit often had yet another perspective.
Within each organizational level, however, relatively unitary' answers
concerning the strategy content, organizational context, and strategy process
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emerged. The answers not only varied across organizational levels but also
over time as implementation proceeded.
Although it was possible to estimate how specific the planned strategy was at
to or t1, it became increasingly evident that my estimation of the content,
process or context did not really matter. My estimation was not guiding action
by organizational members. Only their own estimation of how specific the
planned strategy was at the time could help me understand why they initiated
modifications. Likewise, my count of how many people had been involved in
different activities was irrelevant. I could argue that half the staff had been
involved in one way or the other, but if employees felt they had not had any
impact or influence in the change process, then again, my account of what
happened would be irrelevant. The "variables" in the preliminary model thus
proved to be of less value once the importance of the subjective understandings
of these variables became apparent, and the potential importance of differences
across organizationallevels and time became evident.
A new model, based on theory as well as data, was needed to incorporate these
different perspectives, which depended on the level of the organizational
members and on the time at which they were asked.
Across-Case Analysis
The within-case analysis indicated that organizational members differed in
their reports of e.g. the level of involvement in the change process. A new
theoretical framework, which emphasized and explored the different
understandings of the change, was introduced to facilitate comparison across
cases. Theories based on the assumption of social construction of reality
emphasize how different people or groups interpret and view things differently.
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Based on what was interpreted as key issues from
the data (the so-called themes) and the requirement for capturing social
constructions of reality, three theoretical perspectives were considered as
foundations for the across-case analysis; a sensemaking perspective, a political
perspective, and a learning perspective ..
The sensemaking perspective focuses on how people at all levels of an
organization make sense of their surroundings and events and actions related to
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the organizational context. This theoretical perspective lies within the cognitive
perspective and key issues include how mental models and interpretive
schemes change and develop and relate to organizational change. The within-
case analysis, which revealed different views and understandings of the
changes in the organization made this perspective relevant.
The political perspective assumes that people in organizations have different
goals and agendas. This often leads to conflicts and negotiations. The political
perspective has been employed for many years to understand strategic change
processes, among others by prominent researchers such as Pettigrew (1985),
Pfeffer (1981) and Hardy (1994 and 1995). The political perspective on change
also creates the foundation of much of the literature on resistance to change. In
the within-case analysis of the implementation of BRA, several conflicts
appeared. Hence the political perspective was found as a natural potential
perspective for across-cases analysis.
The learning perspective focuses on changes in an entity (such as an
organization, a planned strategy, or changes in behavior) based on processing
of information (Huber, 1991) or through the principle of feedback (Hendry,
1996). Learning theories can be divided into behaviorist and cognitive theories
(Glynn, Lant, and Milliken, 1994). The cognitive stream of learning research
focuses among other things on how people form plans and images, act on these
and then actively modify perceptions, plans and behavior based on feedback
(Hendry, 1996). The perspective was considered partly based on the literature
review and partly based on the preliminary fmdings. The literature review,
particularly research on innovation and public policy implementation, closely
linked modifications to learning processes. The data also indicated that
learning and experience transfer occurred throughout the change process.
Before deciding on theoretical perspective(s), the chronology at the corporate
level was drawn up showing the processes within each case in relation to each
other and in relation to the corporate activities. Visual mapping was thus again
employed. Visual mapping, when employed in this way, allows for the
simultaneous representation of a large number of dimensions, and it can be
used to show precedence, parallel processes, and the passage of time. By
comparing several visual maps, patterns can be traced and causal maps
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generated. This strategy is good for uncovering patterns, but does not
necessarily reveal the underlying forces driving the sequences of events
(Langley, 1999).
Visual mapping facilitated synthesis between the cases. The process in each
business unit was compared and contrasted with other business units by
drawing up tables and figures that focused on key themes and issues. No new
theory had been introduced yet. Themes and issues were based on descriptions
or interpretations of what interviewees seemed to think was important.
The three theoretical perspectives were then applied to explain themes and key
issues. This is what Langley (1999) refers to as an alternate templates strategy.
The alternate templates strategy is a strategy where several theoretical
perspectives are presented to describe a phenomenon. The alternative
perspectives do not test theory, but rather provide different interpretations
through different variables, levels of analysis and reveal different dynamics.
While the three theoretical perspectives served well to explain different key
issues respectively, it was difficult to establish a tight fit between them.
Inductive research evolves from the data and one of the main goals of inductive
research is to build theory. While deductive research springs out of a theory
and thus has theoretical connections, inductive research has no inherent
connection and therefore it requires a tight theoretical fit. To establish this tight
fit it became necessary to choose one perspective that integrated the findings.
The sensemaking perspective was found as the most suitable and appropriate
theoretical perspective to explain how and why modifications occur. The
sensemaking perspective employed at multiple levels (corporate and business
unit level) allowed for an emphasis on the interplay between those who
formulate strategy - the "mappers" (Huff, 1990), and those who implement
strategy - the "interpreters" (Sims & Gioia, 1986). The sensemaking
perspective was furthermore broad enough so that conflicts and learning
processes could be adequately explained within the theoretical framework. It
thus incorporated the main themes and issues.
Once the theoretical perspective had been chosen, it was possible to work on an
integrating model and propositions. Propositions were formulated as described
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by Eisenhardt (1989b), namely by (a) comparing cases and categorizing
according to variables of interest and (b) through a series of iterations between
data and propositions. Once the propositions had been developed, existing
literature was consulted. This was again based on Eisenhardt's (1989b)
arguments of introducing existing literature "to elevate the conceptual level of
the findings ....and to enhance internal validity" (pp.82) .
Writing up the cases
A number of different styles have been used to present qualitative and
inductive research. Often a description of the data precedes the analysis.
Another choice, more in line with deductive research, would be to first
introduce the theory, and then describe data within the theoretical framework.
Here, a third alternative was employed. A ''tell and show, show-and-tell" style
(Huff, 1999; Golden-Biddle, 1997) consisting of a mixture of descriptions,
supported with quotes, and analysis was used. The analysis relies both on
inductive methods and existing theory, such as the sensemaking perspective,
organizational identity and image theory, and procedural justice theory.
Sometimes description intertwines with analysis. At other times the description
comes first, and the analysis afterwards. Rather than structuring the
presentation strictly in terms of description and analysis, the findings are
presented around the research questions.
In order to avoid confusion about what constitutes description versus analysis,
the chapters with findings can be described as follows. Chapter s_evenbegins
with a description of the change journey both within each business unit and at
an overall corporate level. The focus is on research question one - identifying
modifications; and research question three - exploring the effects
modifications have on change outcome. An analytical discussion where
different types of modifications and outcomes of modifications are presented
follows after the description. The analysis is based on the data, and no new
theory has yet been applied.
In chapter eight, the sensemaking perspective is introduced and the cases are
presented with the help of sensemaking perspective. Multiple and divergent
descriptions about content, context, and process can be explained and clarified
using the sensemaking perspective. In this chapter theory precedes description.
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The description remains analytical, which means that the theoretical framework
guides the description.
Chapter nine is mainly analysis and linking up the findings from chapter seven
and eight. In chapter nine the attempt is to move to a higher-level analysis.
Since theory is built on the basis of data, and thus is contextually bound, the
data is summarized as evidence. The main attempt of the higher-level analysis
is to move from thick and contextually bound description to a higher level of
abstraction by introducing a general integrating model based on the data. This
way, the findings are more easily transferable to other contexts in future
research.
4.5 Methodological Strengths and Weaknesses
All methodologies have their strengths and weakness. Methodologies should
first and foremost be judged according to how appropriate they are for
examining the research questions. In addition to this assessment, there are
some implicit strengths and weaknesses with all methodologies. Careful
design of the study and explicit analysis methods can remedy some inherent
methodological weaknesses.
Strengths of case studies that aim at building theory include: they are likely to
generate new theory; constructs are readily measurable and hypothesis readily
testable; and theory is likely to be empirically valid (Eisenhardt, 1989b). These
strengths are based on the close relationship between the theory and data. The
close relationship between data and theory also implies some weaknesses.
Theories based on case studies are likely to be overly complex and narrow.
(Eisenhardt, 1989b).
The strengths and weaknesses above assess the outcome of the research
process - the theory that is built. In order to thoroughly evaluate the findings of
the study however, the research design, data collection, and data analysis need
to be assessed as well. Common research evaluation criteria include
objectivity, internal and external validity, and reliability. These evaluation
criteria have been criticized as tailor-made for quantitative and theory-testing
research (Altheide & Johnson, 1998; Cassell & Symon, 1994;Maxwell, 1992;
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Orlikowski & Baroudi, 199; Symon & Cassell, 1998) and there is an ongoing
debate about the criteria upon which qualitative research should be judged.
Regardless of the criteria upon which evaluation of research is based, the point
is to enable others to evaluate the strength of the method and the evidence
grounding the theory. Others need to be able to assess whether or not the
researcher has followed a careful analytical procedure, whether evidence
supports theory, and whether rival explanations have been ruled out
(Eisenhardt, 1989b).
In the following discussion describing how inherent methodological
weaknesses of longitudinal case studies have been met, the following criteria
are used: descriptive, interpretive, construct, and internal validity; usefulness
and transferability; and reliability. These criteria serve as a way to present how
essential threats or weaknesses of the study have been met, but the discussion
should make it possible to use other research evaluation criteria as well.
Validity
Four different types of validity are relevant to discuss in this study. They are:
descriptive validity, interpretive validity, construct validity, and internal
validity.
Descriptive validity refers to the factual accuracy of the data and whether or
not enough description has been provided to adequately understand the setting
(Maxwell, 1992). The descriptive validity of the data becomes a crucial point
when it is assumed that the researcher has inherent beliefs and values, and that
multiple realities exist within the research setting. Descriptive validity was
secured in several ways in this study. Data was collected at multiple levels of
the organization and through multiple sources. In addition, data was collected
over time. Facts were checked out with another researcher during and
immediately after data collection. Facts were also verified by organizational
members within each business unit during workshops, where in-process reports
were presented.
Interpretive validity has to do with the credibility of the research in the eyes of
the researched population (Maxwell, 1992). This is also called the ernie
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perspective. Participant verification as described above, in the form of
workshops and in-process reports, also ensured credibility of the research in the
eyes of the researched. There is always a risk, however, that organizational
members will disagree with the interpretations researchers make, especially if
the interpretation puts the organizational members in a bad light. As explained
previously, factual information was always corrected based on feedback.
Disagreements based on interpretation were not always corrected, especially if
they were connected with applying theory. When main themes and issues were
identified however, it was important that organizational members recognized
and verified main issues in the implementation process.
Another important validity requirement in this type of study is the ability to
provide logically coherent and analytical accounts of the phenomenon. This
includes both (a) construct validity: the validity of the concepts and (b) internal
validity: the validity of the postulated relationships among the concepts. While
descriptive validity and interpretive validity requires that the research is
credible in the eyes of the researched, construct validity and internal validity
requires that the research is theoretical and analytical, and hence credible for
other researchers.
The development of a tentative research model based on a-priori specification
of constructs increases construct validity because it allows more accurate
measurements of the constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989b). There is no guarantee,
however, that the same constructs will be used in a final model and in the
development of propositions. Development of propositions - strengthens
construct validity through the constant comparison between data and constructs
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Multiple sources of evidence and multiple indicators serve
to increase the validity of emerging concepts. Evidence of decision-based
modifications found in interviews could for instance be backed up by similar
evidence in documents. Statements concerning which changes had been made
in plans and goals during the change process could be coupled with statements
concerning how the business units could affect the change content and process,
and these different indicators strengthened the evidence that decision-based
modifications were taking place
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Internal validity, or the relationships among the concepts were strengthened
through the longitudinal nature of the study. Process studies leave little doubt
as to the direction of causality. Relationships among concepts can nevertheless
be strengthened if patterns are found over time. The analysis methods of
temporal bracketing and alternate templates strengthen the relationships
between the concepts by providing patterns (through temporal bracketing) and
mechanisms (through alternate templates) that link the concepts. The search for
"why" behind postulated relationships also strengthens internal validity, as
does comparison with conflicting literature (Eisenhardt, 1989b).
Usefulness and Transferability
Usefulness and transferability replace the criterion external validity. External
validity means "the extent to which one can generalize the results of the
research to the populations and settings of interest in the hypothesis" (Judd,
Smith, & Kidder, 1991, pg. 28). This definition of external validity
presupposes an attempt to generalize to a larger population, which is usually
the case in quantitative studies. In qualitative, theory-building studies on the
other hand, the researchers goal is to generalize to theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b;
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Yin, 1994). This means the researcher aims to
elevate findings to a higher level of abstraction, rather than to directly apply
findings to a larger population. Yin (1994) refers to this as analytical
generalization as opposed to statistical generalization. Since case studies rarely
rely on random sampling, generalizing to a larger population is seldom a goal
in these types of studies. In generalizing to theory, the question of how useful
and transferable the theory is becomes relevant since further research is
required to assess the generalizability and external validity of the theory. In
general, the more coherent the research is, the more useful and the easier
transferable it will be.
Using a multiple case design might increase transferability slightly. Especially
if the cases studied are outliers, or extremes. Then one can argue that if the
phenomenon is found in extreme opposites, it is likely to be found everywhere.
However, when the choice is between one or a few cases, the strengths of a
multiple case design lies more in its comparative dimension.
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Simple and parsimonious theory makes research more useful and transferable.
As stated previously, case studies often produce complex and contextually
bound theory. Some data analysis methods, such as visual mapping and
temporal bracketing are more likely to result in abstract theory than other
analysis methods, such as the narrative strategy for data analysis and grounded
theory approaches (Langley, 1999).
In order to be able to answer the three research questions, several different
methods for analysis were used in this study. Using multiple analysis methods
increases the likelihood of meeting several research criteria, since the different
analysis methods score differently along the research criteria (Langley, 1999).
While the presentation of the findings in the next two chapters remain
contextual, the discussions, the integrated model, and the formulation of
propositions represent attempts at moving from contextually bound theory to
more useful and transferable theory. The integrating model probably
represents the most easily transferable theoretical contribution ofthis study.
Reliability
Reliability has to do with whether or not another researcher, if following the
same procedures, would arrive at the same conclusions. While some qualitative
researcher (such as Venkatesh, 1998) would argue that replicability is not a
goal in qualitative research, most researchers would agree that it is important to
describe how the conclusions have been reached and how theory has been built
in order for others to, if not replicate, at least assess the reliability of the
research.
This methodology chapter included a careful description of the research
process. One purpose of the chronological description was to increase
traceability of the findings, and hence increase reliability. All of the data in this
study are stored as electronic documents in a database in NUD*IST. This
makes replication by another researcher easily accessible.
Reliability in coding was secured by providing explicit guidelines for coding,
which can be used by another researcher. In this study, two researchers
formally crosschecked coding during preliminary analysis. For the within-case
analysis, specific coding guides were developed and archived over time (see
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appendix E) and informal crosschecks were performed on a needs basis. Inter-
coder reliability, which refers to whether or not another researcher would code
the data similarly, was thereby secured.
All data was collected with another researcher who worked on a highly related,
but different topic. Findings as well as research procedures were discussed and
made as transparent as possible.
4.6 Summary
This chapter probed methodological issues. The first part of the chapter dealt
with the selection of research design and requirements to the design. A
longitudinal case study design was chosen to meet the following demands:
• Possibility to identify the initial formulated strategy
• Possibility to reveal modifications in this strategy over time
• Need to be able to explore reasons for modifications over time
• Need to be able to evaluate the effect modifications have on change
outcome
• Access to an implementation process that can be studied in real time
• Possibility to rely on existing research which is both limited and
fragmented, yet informative
A large Norwegian oil company, Statoil, was selected as the research setting.
Within Statoil, three cases, or business units, were chosen for in-depth study
and data collection. The business unit represented the main level of analysis,
although an embedded case study design was chosen to incorporate the
corporate level as well. Organizational members in different positions and at
different levels were targeted within the business unit. The unit of analysis was
the implementation process.
While data collection was steered by a deductively developed model, the
primary data were also allowed a certain flexibility and openness to incorporate
emergent issues. Interviews, observations. and documents were collected at two
main levels in the corporation; the corporate level and the business unit level.
As mentioned, within the business unit level, interviewees at top management,
middle management and employee level were targeted. The data analysis was
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very much inductively driven, and although certainly affected by the tentative
and deductive model, not confmed or restrained by it. Preliminary analysis,
within-case analysis and across case analysis were performed. The different
methods for analyzing process data included visual mapping, narration,
temporal bracketing, and alternate templates.
The chapter ended with a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the chosen
methodology. Efforts to minimize inherent weaknesses of the chosen
methodology were made explicit through a discussion of descriptive validity,
interpretive validity, construct validity, internal validity; usefulness and
transferability; and finally reliability. The methodological descriptions and
challenges presented in this chapter are an attempt to increase the reliability of
the study.
Qualitative studies have been criticized as difficult to verify because "the
researchers don 't report clearly on their methodology because there are no
shared conventions for doing so" (Miles & Huberman, 1994 pg. 281). In this
methodology chapter, the goal has been to be clear about the methodology by
describing exactly how the research was performed, step-by-step and as
specifically as possible, with emphasis on the steps between raw data and the
presentation of findings. The findings, which are presented in the following
chapters, are not presented chronologically. Instead the three research
questions create the foundation for the presentation of the findings.
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5. Tracing Modifications in Strategy
Modifications have been defined as any substantial changes to or alterations in
a planned strategy. This is a general definition and it reflects the
conceptualization of a strategy that travels through the organization over time
(Falkenberg, 2002). This chapter traces the BRA strategy's journey with a
focus on identifying modifications. The chapter addresses the first research
question: How is a planned strategy modified over time?
The descriptions and illustrations of how Statoil moved from old to new
strategy lead up to an analytical. discussion of modifications. The analysis
reveals different types of modifications, which contribute to a more precise
definition of modifications. Three change outcomes based on modifications are
presented: loose coupling, assimilation and accommodation. Findings related to
the third research question, concerning modifications' effects on change
outcome, are thereby also included in this chapter.
5.1 Moving from old to new strategy
Brief descriptions of the change process are presented along with illustrations
showing how each business unit, and the whole corporation, moved from old
strategy towards new strategy. The focus is on identifying modifications in
strategy. More elaborate descriptions and analyses of the change process
follow in the next chapters. A model by Denis, Langley, and Pineault (2000)
creates the basis for the illustrations in figures 3 to 6. They used similar
illustrations to show how new leaders establish a position of leadership. In this
study, however, the illustrations depict the old strategy and the new strategy as
two endpoints. The idea is that over time, an organization moves between the
old and new strategy. Ideally it ends up at the right-hand side, which means
that the organization has implemented everything within the new strategy.
The illustrations need to include both planned changes and more emergent
features. A solid line represents the p~anned strategy. Any shift in this line
indicates that modifications have occurred through formal decision-making or
changes in plans. The illustrations also show how much the corporation and
respective business units have actually changed. This is illustrated with a
Norr!!'>'! Handelshøyslw1Z
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dotted line. Actual changes ideally match intentions. When strategy is viewed
as a pattern in decisions and actions over time, and the realized strategy is
expected to differ from plans (Mintzberg, 1978), the degree of actual change
might not always coincide with plans. Any gaps between planned and actual
changes indicate that modifications have occurred.
Time is depicted vertically in the illustrations. The implementation process
begins at the top of the illustration. Process descriptions are presented at the
left-hand side while with visual accounts of the degree of changes are
presented at the right-hand side. The planned change (solid line) and the actual
changes in the business unit (dotted line) can be traced over time as the
business unit moves between the old strategy and the new strategy. It is
important to point out that the degrees of planned and actual change are only
estimations and not precise accounts. Furthermore, the time line is not drawn to
scale, but rather meant as a visual aid for grasping how the implementation
proceeded in the three business units as well as at corporate level.
The bottom of the illustration indicates how far each unit has come in terms of
implementing the changes approximately one year after the official
implementation date. For instance, figure 4 indicates that business unit A lies
approximately halfway between the old strategy and the BRA strategy.
Corporate Level
At the corporate level, the planned strategy was, of course, one hundred
percent based on a new way of organizing - a BRA strategy. The new IT
system and all organizational changes (including introducing work processes at
all leveIs, moving responsibilities and decisions to the lowest level, and simpler
and more standardized administrative routines) would be implemented in all
business units subsequently.
It soon became clear that the first business units were not implementing all of
the intentions in BRA however. This became evident through a gap between
actual changes and planned changes. Amodification, based on the aggregation
of what was actually implemented in the business units, appeared (Mod.1).
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Formulation phase (1996-1997)
The BRA principles were formulated by the BRA Program
based at headquarters.
Implementation phase (1997-2000)
Mod. 1: The first units implemented only the new IT-system and
few if any organizational changes.
Mod.2:. In upstream businsess units BRA was connected with
IBD. BRA and IBD were compatible and the ideas reinforced
one another. Linking BRA and IBD widened the scope of the
original BRA plans and lead to an emphasis on changes within
operations & maintenace (O&M).
Mod.3: Management of the upstream business units (UPN)
decided that a certain degree of flexibility in implementing new
organizational principles was necessary and acceptable (UPN
Report). In practice, flexibility meant that some BRA changes
became optional.
Mod.4: Many business units performed evaluations which
legitimized abandoning some of the BRA and IBD principles.
The gap between corporate plans and actual changes increased.
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Figure 4: Moving from Old to New Strategy at Corporate Level
With time, the business units became more successful at implementing
organizational changes and the gap between the planned changes and the
implemented changes decreased. Experiences from the first business units
indicated that it could be beneficial to start work on organizational (OD)
changes early and this was done in subsequent business units, The upstream
business units furthermore decided to link the BRA change with another
change (lBD). IBD focused on improving operations and maintenance and
included incentives in the form of a pay-raise. The underlying principles of
BRA and IBD were basically compatible and in a sense they reinforced each
other. By combining BRA and IBD then, the planned BRA strategy was
emphasized but some new elements were also introduced (Mod.2). This
combination also meant that competition for attention and resources between
the two change initiatives would be avoided.
The sharp turn in the solid line towards the end of the implementation phase
represents a major modification in strategy. This was in the summer of 1999.
The Norwegian Upstream Division (UPN, see glossary) decided that a certain
degree of flexibility needed to be introduced with regard to some of the
organizational changes. This was quite a radical modification since it opened
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up for local variations and adjustments in a strategy where one of the main
goals was to standardize work processes across the business units. It also
meant that some of the BRA changes became more or less optional (Mod.3).
At the end of 2001, several business units had performed evaluations to assess
which BRA principles needed to be further emphasized and which should be
dropped. There was some evidence that many of the business units were
initiating similar evaluations. These modifications at business unit level
restricted the potential degree of change at the corporate level as well because
they meant that less changes would actually occur in the business units. So,
although corporate intentions remained the same and there was no change in
plans, the gap between the planned and the actual change increased indicating
that a modification in strategy had taken place (ModA).
The dotted line in the illustration above shows actual changes as an aggregation
of what was implemented in the business units. In order to fully understand the
modifications that occurred in the implementation process, the business units
have to be examined. After all, the business unit is the level at which change
and implementation actually occurs.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 indicate that the three business units studied here ended up
implementing approximately the same amount of changes. This was despite
somewhat different intentions and quite different implementation processes.
Illustrations similar to the one above visualize the journey of BRA within each
business unit and reveal when modifications in the strategy occur. -
Recall that the implementation process in each business unit was divided into
three distinct phases. This was done during early data analysis to emphasize the
temporal dimension and to facilitate comparison across cases. The first phase
in each of the business units consisted of preparatory work prior to launching
of the official BRA implementation project in the respective business unit. The
second phase, the implementation phase, refers to what was officially planned
as the implementation period. Corporate BlcA supplied resources to the local
BRA project during this phase. The respective business units labeled the last
phase somewhat differently. Case A called it the local improvement phase,
while case B referred to the last phase as the testing and evaluation phase. Case
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C on the other hand called it training and evaluation. Although it was labeled
somewhat differently, the last phase referred to the period after the intensive
implementation work had ended. In case A and B this meant the local BRA
project was demobilized, although case A followed up with local improvement
projects. In case C, the local BRA project continued long after corporate people
had left the business unit.
Business Unit A: Early Implementor
In the first business unit, early intentions were difficult to trace because there
was not much preparatory work performed in the unit. Corporate BRA
intentions were still geared toward implementing a one hundred percent BRA
strategy. Once the local implementation project group was mobilized however,
focus within the business unit was quickly turned towards implementing the IT
component of BRA. The illustration shows a large gap between planned and
actual strategy. This is because while the actual implementation consisted
mostly of a new IT system, the formal strategy for the unit was never changed
(Mod. l ). Interviews showed that organizational members did not perceive this
gap however, since most people either expected the IT focus and/or agreed
with it. The same gap was evident in another business unit (the pilot
implementation site, which was not one of the three cases included for in-depth
data collection). Employees at the pilot site were very disappointed and upset
about the gap and expressed that they had had much higher expectations
concerning organizational changes.
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Preparation Phase (mid 1997 - Oct.199B)
Few preparations were made before the local implementation
project team was established. Therefore, there is little evidence
of the content of BRA (other than corporate plans) during this
phase.
Implementation Phase (Nov.199B - Jan.1999)
Mod.1: The implementation project included OD changes in
their formal plans, but actual work was focused on implementing
IT. IT was implemented in January 1999. OD was handed over ø
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Locallmprovement Phase (Feb.1999 - ) !
A newly established local improvement group became :
responsible for the OD changes. The group continued working !
on plans from the implementation group and developed plans :
of their own. Their time span was 1-2 years, but after 6 months :
a new group took over. t _
Mod.2: A new improvement team was appointed, and in
cooperation with Shell, this group implemented an improvement
program geared towards improving Operations and Maintenance
(The Merit Program). Merit met many of the BRA requirements
within O&M, but left out many of the other BRA principles. The
narrowing focus was formalized in specific project plans and
resulted in actual changes within O&M.
Mod.3?: Almost two years after implementation of IT, a third
improvement team worked on a new OD process where teams
and new work structure would be defined. The content of this
OD process was not yet established when data collection
ended. Time ?
Figure 5: Moving from Old to New Strategy in Case A
Organizational changes were not introduced until in the last phase, and no
organizational changes were implemented until over a year after the
implementation of IT. The organizational changes then consisted of narrowly
focused changes within one area - Operations and Maintenance. Three different
improvement groups continued to work on BRA and related changes during the
local implementation phase. No modifications occurred during the work of the
first improvement group. The second local improvement group was responsible
for the narrowly focused organization development (OD) work (Mod.2). Two
years after the IT implementation, a more broadly based OD process was
initiated by the third improvement group. The business unit then planned to
reintroduce some of the other change issues that were originally included in
BRA (Mod.3). No formal decisions had been made on this issue at the time
data collection was completed (Dee, 2001), which is why the modification has
a question mark.
In summary, bits and pieces of the intended changes were implemented in this
business unit in a long-term gradual fashion with long periods between each
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change initiative. The focused and sequenced implementation resulted in a
fairly good match between plans and actual changes, but it took long to get
each part of the new strategy implemented, and there was still a good ways to
go when data collection for this study was completed (in 2001).
Business Unit B: Middle Implementor
The second business unit studied here implemented BRA midways through the
corporate roll-out plan. It thereby had several other units in the corporation to
draw on in terms of experiences. The intention in the business unit was to
implement all BRA principles rapidly, first focusing on organizational changes
in January, 2000, and then implementing the new IT-system in April, 2000.
Although different from the corporate implementation plan, this was in line
with accepted experiences and learning during implementation. The unit
experienced five modifications in strategy.
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Testing and Evaluation (Jan 2000 - Jan 2001) -----
Mod.3: After the summer holidays and revision stop, people ----------
went back to working in the old way. A long period where the ,,'--..--@ ..
map did not fit the terrain followed. The changes on paper were ,
not reflected in actual changes in the way people worked. :,,
ModA: The change process was slowed down, The newly :
appointed implementation coordinator continued working with !
the organization on OD changes. Employees were picking up :
signals from managers saying that refraining from som changes "'"
was acceptable. """
" "
Mod.5: One year after implementation of the new organization !
several BRA principles were abandoned. This and the process :
leading up to it reduced the gap between planned changes and :
actual changes. Time '
Preparation Phase (mid 1998 - Dec.1999)
Mod. 1: BRA was coupled with another improvement process
in the upstream divisions called IBD. The ideas and principles
in BRA and IBD were seen as compatible and reinforcing each
other, but IBD widened the scope of BRA.
Local decisions and plans showed intentions of going all the
way towards a BRA and IBD strategy.
Implementation Phase (Jan 2000 - April 2000)
Mod.2: The implementation phase began with implementation
of all organizational changes. Employees were not able to
perform all of the changes immediately. Actual changes in the
organization were therefore less than planned changes.
IT was implemented in April.
Figure 6: Moving from Old to New Strategy in Case B
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Like in most upstream business units, BRA was coupled with IDD. Some new
ideas and concepts were thereby included in the new strategy (Mod. l )
As in case A, there was a gap between plans and actual change early in the
change process (Mod.2). Unlike the first case, however, the mismatch was not
due to deliberate focus on e.g. IT. Rather it was connected with problems
among employees in actually working in new ways. The gap was fairly large
and it grew over time. This indicated that the strategy had been modified
(Mod.3). Over time, employees became very concerned about the "mismatch
between the map and the terrain" as they called it.
For a long time, management continued pressuring to implement the BRA
strategy, while employees continued to basically work in the old ways. Only
when management increased support, slowed down the change process, and
started suggesting (off-the record) that adjustments would be made, did
employees warm up towards some of the BRA changes again (Mod.4).
A major modification occurred one year after the implementation of the new
organizational model. The modification was based on a one-year evaluation
and the result was a reformulated strategy for the business unit where several
of the most controversial BRA principles were abandoned (Mod.5). The
modified strategy thus conformed better to the way in which people actually
worked and closed the gap between planned and actual changes. The
reformulations included: (a) integrated teams changed to situational teams,
meaning employees stayed in their respective disciplines (b) middle managers
were reintroduced and actually increased in number (c) responsibilities were
moved back to managers from teams.
Business Unit C: Late Implementor
In the third business unit, which was among the last units to implement the new
strategy, BRA was quickly coupled with IBD (Mod. l ) The preparatory phase
first resulted in suggestions of going all the way towards a BRAlIBD
organization, but with one major difference compared with corporate plans.
Instead of implementing everything in three months, the changes would be
introduced in a four-step process over several years. Hence, the model for new
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strategy in case C differed in terms of means, but the ends were similar to the
corporate plan.
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Mod.2: Because of resistance in the workforce, management
dropped all controversial change issues, and came up with a
revised model. This basically meant the old organization would
prevail, but with a new IT system.
Mod.3: A "revised" revised model was then presented by union
members, and it included minimum requirements for IBD :
approval. :----------------------------------------I----~---I--I---------
Training & Evaluation Phase (Dec.2000 - Dec.2001)
Three months after implementation an evaluation was performed
to see if the organization had achieved its intentions. The
evaluation showed that actual changes matched intended
changes.
Preparation Phase (Nov.199B - April 2000)
Mod.1: BRA was coupled with IBD and this widened the scope
of the change initiative. A "representative" group worked out
a solution in line with all of the BRA and IBD principles, but
with a longer time frame.
Mod.4?: One year after implementation a larger evaluation was
performed. At this time the implementation leader expressed
disappointment in how little they had atually changed compared
to their intentions.
Figure 7: Moving from Old to New Strategy in Case C
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Prior to implementation of BRA, the suggested model was altered (Mod.2).
The modification was based on a Consequence Analysis, which contained
many extremely negative opinions about the suggested changes. Management
viewed the Consequence Analysis as the voice of the employees and modified
the strategy by abandoning all of the controversial changes. However, at the
same time they made it clear that IBD approval, and the higher salary level that
came with it, was out of the question. The "new and revised organizational
model for Business Unit C" was basically a model that retained the old
strategy. In an attempt to secure higher wages, union representatives then re-
introduced the changes that were necessary to apply for ffiD approval. This
represents another modification (Mod.I). The preparation phase therefore
ended in a revised "new and revised organization model for Business Unit C"
consisting of two steps (rather than the initial four) and these were
implemented along with the new IT-system in November 2000.
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No modifications occurred during implementation or during the following
training and evaluation period. As the illustration shows, there was no evidence
of any significant gap between plans and actual changes.
After a major evaluation, which was performed one year after the official
implementation date (the evaluation report was released in January 2002), it
was suggested to move further away from some of the BRNIBD ideas, such as
teams (Mod.4?). No formal decisions had been made at the time data collection
ended however (Jan.2002). The one-year evaluation also hinted that the gap
between actual and planned changes might have increased somewhat compared
with the conclusions of previous evaluations.
Com parison of the Cases
The change journeys illustrated above show that there were some initial
differences in terms of how far towards a BRA strategy the different business
units were actually prepared to go. Business unit A gave priority to the new IT
system at the expense of organizational changes. Business unit B and C on the
other hand, started out with local plans that were very much in line with the
corporate BRA decision. The implementation processes in the three units
proceeded quite differently and the processes will be discussed thoroughly in
the next chapter. All business units experienced a number of modifications, and
modifications occurring within the business units affected the implemented
strategy at corporate level as well.
The stepwise implementation that was taking place in business unit A meant
that only parts of the corporate strategy was being realized. This improved with
time, and the first business unit continued working on organizational issues.
Although it took some time, organizational changes were gradually being
implemented. While the UPN (corporate level) decision, in the summer of
1999, might have been expected to influence the intentions of subsequent
business units, this did not seem to be happening. Indeed both the second and
third business unit formulated local plans that were very close to the initial
BRA and IBD plans despite the fa~t that the UPN decision at corporate level
opened up for more local variations. Modifications were made in both of these
business units at a later time however, and they resulted in abandoning some of
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the BRA principles. This affected the degree of change achieved at the
aggregated, corporate level.
The different modifications that appear in the data lead to a more precise
definition of modifications, which includes the more emergent features in any
change process. A closer examination of the modifications also reveals
different types of modifications.
Despite good intentions, none of the three business units came close to
realizing the BRA strategy as it was originally intended. Modifications in
strategy resulted in partial implementation of the new strategy. The partially
implemented strategy at the corporate level reflected equally partially
implemented strategies at lower organizational levels. In the analytical
discussion below, a typology of modifications and three different change
outcomes are presented.
5.2 A Typology of Modifications
The modifications that were identified in the previous section were either based
on decisions or actions. Modifications based on decisions are relatively easy to
identify as they are reflected in changes in plans. Modifications based on
actions, on the other hand, are more difficult to reveal, since they rarely
become documented.
Five different types of modifications could be found in the data. The typology
was developed through comparison of all of the identified modifications. In a
sense, this means taking each modification and treating it like a case. The
comparison revealed similarities and differences beyond the broader categories
of decision-based versus action-based modifications. Five different types of
modifications were identified: expansion, contraction, interpretation error,
strategic interpretation, and non-compliance. Expansion means adding new
elements and thus widening the scope of the original strategy, while
contraction means eliminating elements from the original strategy and thus
limiting or focusing the scope. Both types of modifications are based on formal
decisions and are thereby documented changes in plans, which can easily be
traced. The remaining three types of modifications are action-based and cannot
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be traced through document scanning. Interpretation error refers to
misinterpretations of the original strategy. Strategic interpretation is also a
misinterpretation of the original strategy, but here the strategy is purposely
(mis)understood in a way that benefits the interpreter. Non-compliance means
that although the original strategy is understood, organizational members are
unable or unwilling to actually change. The table below presents the typology
of modifications along with examples and empirical evidence.
Expansion Including new elements in the Coupling BRA with IBD Case B (mod. 1)
strategy and thereby expanding increased pressure and Case C (mod. 1)
the scope of the strategy brought incentives. Case A (mod. 3)
Case C (mod. 3)
Requires changes in plans Re-introducinq strategic Corporate (mod. 2)
issues that previously had
been dropped.
Contraction Eliminating some of the original Eliminating controversial Case A (mod. 2)
elements in the strategy and elements from the new Case B (mod. 4)
thereby narrowing the scope of strategy. Case C (mod. 2)
the stratey Focusing only on parts of Case C (mod. 4)
the new strategy (O&M Corporate (mod. 3)
Requires changes in plans focus). Corporate (mod. 4)
Officially making the new
stratey optional (UPN report)
Interpretation Misinterpreting the formulated Employers and middle Case B (mod. 2)
error strategy (not deliberately). managers do not Corporate (mod. 1)
understand what and how
to change.
Can also be the result of a
time lag between decision
making and action.
Strategic Deliberately misinterpreting the Making off-the-record CaseA(mod.1)
interpretation formulated strategy suggestions or Case B (mod. 4)
interpretations of the new
strategy. Interpretations that
are clearly different from
original intentions and often
to the benefit of the business
unit.
Non- Being unable or unwilling to Employees continued Case B (mod. 3)
compliance actually change working in the old ways
Table 4: Types of Modifications
The tentative research model and existing literature suggested that emergent
features affect not only incremental and evolutionary change processes, but
also planned change processes. It was also suggested in the methodology
chapter that not all modifications would be found in documents. Action-based
modifications became increasingly evident during data analysis. The action-
based modifications were found due to obvious gaps between plans and actual
changes. While the gap indicated that a modification had occurred, activities
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prior to the gap had to be traced to identify which type of modification had
occurred. Evidence on action-based modifications include:
Evidence of interpretation error showing that organizational members had
problems understanding what the change was about:
What does integrated teams mean? At Case A one shift consist of 40-45
people. Is this a team? Or do we split up further and say that the
production area is a team?" (Middle Manager, case A)
This is one of my tasks. But I haven 't started doing it yet. We lack tools to
work with this. (Middle Manager, case B)
Evidence of strategic interpretation showing that organizational members
deliberately misinterpreted the formulated strategy:
... it 's possible to define teams as you want and thereby say that you work
in teams. (Head of operations, case B)
They just rename the disciplinary units and call them integrated teams.
(Internal Consultant in BRA Project, case C)
Evidence of non-compliance showing that organizational members were unable
or unwilling to actually change strategy:
To compensate this [the" not- so- intelligent" changes] we work in the
old ways, because this is how we have to work to reach our goals.
(Employee case B, during phase Il)
We work the best we can according to the old organizational model ...
(Employee, case B)
We do go to team meetings. It's just.for show. Butwhen we work it's'
according to old practices. Within my discipline, we have to ignore the
team dimension [which is new] (Employee, case B)
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The first definition of modifications presented in this thesis focused only on
decision-based modifications of the planned strategy. The definition
"modifications are any substantial changes or alterations in a planned
strategy" ignores the more emergent and action-based types of modifications.
Based on data, the definition of modifications can be expanded to include "any
substantial changes or alterations in a strategy that occur during
implementation. " Modifications can be based on decisions and/or actions. In
the new and more precise definition, strategy is not limited to plans but
includes actions as well, which is more in line with the conceptualization of
strategy as "a pattern in decisions and actions over time" (Mintzberg, 1978).
The next section links the five types of modifications to different change
outcomes. Three different change outcomes are presented as effects of
modifications.
5.3 Three ChangeOutcomes
In general, a planned strategic change has three potential outcomes:
1) 100% of the plans are implemented. This refers to what we often view
as a successful organizational transformation. It can also be described
as change success ,or implementation success.
2) None of the plans are implemented. This is usually considered a
failure. The organization has not done what it decided to do. Only if the
intended strategy represented an obviously bad plan _would this
outcome be viewed as beneficial.
3) Some of the plans are implemented. This is usually also considered a
failure.
Based on data and existing theory, this section presents three change outcomes
within the last category - partially implemented strategies.
It has been argued that modifications refer to actions or decisions, but how do
the modifications affect change outcome? Change outcome has to do with the
state of affairs in the organization at 'anyone point in time. Based on the
descriptions of the movement from old to new strategy, all three cases (as well
as the aggregated corporate level) can be categorized as partially implemented
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changes. Some of the plans were implemented, but not all. The corporation did
not succeed in implementing all intentions, and neither did any of the three
business units. From a strategy research perspective this is likely to be viewed
as a failure.
While the outcomes in the three business units appear similar, a closer
inspection of change outcomes, particularly over time, reveals differences in
outcomes. Snapshots within the business units at different points in time
indicate several different change outcomes, which all fall in the "partially
implemented" category. This suggests that multiple outcomes in the third
category (partial implementation) can be found and that timing is crucial in
assessments of change outcome.
Drawing on existing research and linking it to the data made it possible to
identify different outcomes within the partial implementation category. In the
attempt to grasp the different change outcomes that seemed to lie in the data,
additional literature was consulted. Several contributions seemed to describe
the change outcomes observed in the business units, although existing literature
never referred directly to change outcomes or to partial implementation. Three
partial implementation outcomes were identified in the data through continuous
and iterative processes moving between data and existing research.
The idea of different outcomes based on modifications in strategy can be linked
to research on different modes of adaptation (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, & Hunt
1998), outcomes of implementing management fads or techniques (Denis,
Langley, & Pineault, 2000; Langley, & Denis, 2001; Røvik, 1998), outcomes
from changes in interpretive schemes (Bartunek, 1984), and tracks in
organizational archetypes (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). Below each of these
works will be tied to partial implementation outcomes and modifications.
Mod~s of adaptation, as discussed by Fox-Wolfgramm et al (1998) do not refer
to how an organization adapts to environmental change. Rather modes of
adaptation have to do with how an organization adapts to a new strategy, and
how the strategy is adapted to the organization. While previous strategy
research has often treated strategy' implementation as merelyamatter of
"putting the strategy in place" (e.g. Wheelen & Hunger, 1992; or see
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Rajagopalan & Spreitzer 1996 for an overview of strategy research within the
rational lens perspective), Fox-Wolfgramm et al.(1998) recognize that the
strategy itself is often affected (or modified) as it is put in place. Research on
implementation of IT or new technologies has taken a similar approach
(Leonard-Barton, 1988; Leonard-Barton & Deschamps, 1988; Orlikowski &
Hofman, 1997; Robey, Boudreau, & Rose, 1998; Robey & Sahay, 1996).
While this literature clearly, though indirectly, refers to modifications through
its focus on adaptations in the strategy during implementation, it also opens up
for multiple outcomes. An organization may adapt itselfto the new strategy, or
it may adapt the strategy to fit the organization, or both.
This point is taken further in several studies of different modes of interaction
between techniques and organizations (Denis, Langley, & Pineault, 2000;
Lozeau, Langley, & Denis, 2002; Røvik, 1998). These authors examine how
management fads or techniques affect organizations and how organizations
"use" management fads and techniques. They find that as the techniques are
implemented in organizations, either the technique or the organization or both
are changed. They also introduce a typology of modes of interaction between
the technique and the organization. Transformation means that the technique
transforms the organization so that its functioning fits the theory behind the
technique. Customization means that the technique is adapted to make it more
compatible with the organization without destroying its main aims. The
technique may also be adopted superficially, retaining only a ritual function,
and this is referred to as loose-coupling. Finally, the technique may be captured
and used to reproduce existing roles and power structures, and this is called
corruption.
In a study of changes in interpretive schemes, Bartunek (1984) found that
changes in interpretive schemes were linked with organizational changes.
Changes in interpretive schemes were found to occur through dialectical
processes where old and new ways of understanding interacted, resulting in a
synthesis. Syntheses are based on combinations of old and new, and as such
they represent something new in themselves, This idea of change as a result of
combining old and new ways of understanding can be transferred to the
organizational level. A strategy that both changes the organization and is
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changed by the organization can be viewed as a synthesis between old and
new.
Hinings and Greenwood's (1988) view of strategy as archetypes present a
different, but useful approach. A design archetype is defmed as Ha set of
structures and systems that reflect a single interpretive scheme" (Greenwood
and Hinings, 1993 pg.1052). They argue that organizations, as they attempt to
move between archetypes, leave tracks. Strategic change can be viewed as an
attempt to move between archetypes. The BRA strategy represents a new
archetype based on ideas of process organization, empowerment, and
teamwork. Hinings and Greenwood (1988) studied tracks for decoupling and
re-coupling interpretive schemes arid they present four different tracks: inertia,
aborted excursion, unresolved excursion, and reorientation. Inertia is when an
organization does not move to a new archetype. This is similar to
implementation failure. Aborted excursion refers to an attempt to move, but
then the organization falls back into the old archetype. An unresolved
excursion is an attempt to move, which leaves the organization in no-mans
land. In this situation the organization has neither established a new archetype
nor moved back to the old archetype. Reorientation means a successful move
from one archetype to another and this is similar to the first category of change
outcomes called implementation success. Aborted excursion and unresolved
excursion, on the other hand, represent intermediate change outcomes that are
neither a clear success nor failure.
The studies above introduce intermediate outcomes that serve to nuance the
polar change and implementation outcomes of success and failure and fill the
broad category of partial implementations. Partial implementations can thus
take on different forms, some closer to implementation success than others. In
the figure below, the different change outcomes found in the literature are
plotted. The two end-points are implementation failure and implementation
success, and the purpose is to show the number of intermediate outcomes
found within the partial implementation category.
Three different change outcomes based on partial implementation were
identified in the data. They are highlighted in the figure below and placed
within the existing categories that were found in the literature. Two outcomes
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(loose coupling and accommodation) support and extend existing fmdings on
intermediate change outcomes while one outcome (assimilation) represents a
new category. Loose coupling, assimilation and accommodation are defined
and illustrated with empirical examples below.
Table 5: Implementation Outcomes
1. Loose coupling
According to Weick (1979), "loose coupling occurs either when two separate
systems have few variables in common or when the common variables are
weak compared to the other variables that influence the system" (pg.ll1).
Løwstedt (1993) distinguishes between changes in the formallevel, meaning in
formal rules, plans, and policies on the one hand, and actual changes in the
organization on the other.hand. These two change levels will be referred to as
the strategic level and the operationallevel.
In this case, loose coupling refers to the two different levels in the
organizations: the strategic level and the operational level. These two
organizationallevels represent the systems that Weick (1979) refers to. Loose
coupling means that although a strategy is changed at the strategic level, this
does not necessarily mean that actions have changed at the operational level. A
loosely coupled change outcome thus refers to situations where the changes
have been made at the strategic level - a new strategy has officially been
implemented. At the strategic level the ideas and principles of the new strategy
are in place. Actual work at the operationallevel however, has not changed.
Probing the data, and exammmg when loose coupling outcomes occurred,
showed that this outcome is closely linked to two types of modifications. Loose
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coupling can be the result of non-deliberately failing to make sense of the
changes (interpretation error) or more deliberately refusing to implement the
changes (non-compliance). The following quotes indicate loose coupling in the
business unit B:
We have made the changes on paper ..... but it takes long before they
engrain the organization (Implementation Coordinator, case B)
But then we experience uncertainty about the map and the terrain. They
don'tfit ... (Implementation Project Member, case B)
It 's almost like before, because the changes are on paper, but we don 't
need to follow them. (Employee, case B)
2. Assimilation
Assimilation means to absorb and to make one's own or to assume a
resemblance. As a change outcome, assimilation reflects a situation where the
strategy is successfully changed at the strategic level, and work practices at the
operationallevel seem to have changed, but in reality new labels hide old work
practices. In other words, there is a mismatch between changes at the strategic
level and operationallevel, much like the loosely coupled outcome, but in this
case, the mismatch is disguised. Data analysis indicated that assimilation
outcomes occur when people at the operational level fail to make sense of the
changes (interpretation error), or when organizational members at the
operational level fit what they want to into the new strategy (strategic
interpretations). Similar to loose coupling, this outcome is also based on
inconsistencies across change levels. Formalities have changed, but
practicalities have not really changed. Below are quotes that describe an
assimilation outcome:
...we end up with integrated teams consisting of only mechanics.
(Internal Consultant in BRA Project, case C)
I don 't think these teams are without a leader. If they don 't have aformal
leader, there will soon evolve an informalleader ... Ifpeople think it's
possible to flatten the organization by self-steered teams and by removing
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the line leader, then they forget that a new line-leader will immediately
emerge. (Improvement Group Leader IL case A)
Nobody in this corporation satisfies the requirements for salary level
H .... We have worked out a way to get it anyway. (Fop Manager, case C)
The difference between loose coupling and assimilation is that in assimilation
outcomes, the organization attempts to hide the gap between planned and
actual changes. One of the quotes describes how the organization chose to
implement integrated teams consisting of mechanics. The original idea was that
electricians, mechanics and automation workers would benefit from
cooperating in teams. However, this particular business unit preferred to keep
the old way of organizing - in disciplinary units. So their solution was to
rename the disciplinary units into teams. This is a clear example of how an
organization attempts to fit what it wants into the new ideas within the new
strategy (strategic interpretation), so as to appear to have implemented the
planned changes (assimilation). This change outcome is difficult to get at by
management and others because on the surface everything seems perfectly
correct.
3. Accomodation
Accomodation means to adjust or to be willing to adapt oneself. This outcome
refers to a situation where both the strategy and the organization have been
adjusted in the implementation process. The planned strategy has been
explicitly and visibly modified. More importantly however, some elements of
the initial strategy have been implemented, perhaps in combination with other
ideas, and hence the organization has adapted itself and changed according to
parts of the new strategy. Other elements in the planned strategy have
purposely been left out. This is similar to Lozeau, Langley, and Denis (2002)
notion of customization, and Bartunek's (1984) synthesis based on new
combinations of old and new. Data analysis showed that accommodation
outcomes are tied to either expansion or contraction modifications in strategy.
Other types of modifications may have preceded expansion or contraction, but
the main point is that an accommodation outcome means that there is no
significant gap between planned and actual changes. The changes are
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consistent across strategic and operationallevels. The following quotes indicate
that accomodation outcomes could be found in the business units:
BRA and IBD were pretty loosely defined in terms of operationalization.
This results in different variations ... (Assistant Project Leader, case B)
All of the business units have their own models (Employee, case B)
We can use 10 of the new corporate work processes introduced by BRA,
assuming that we can make some adjustments. If corporate BRA does not
allow adjustments, then we have to consider keeping some of our old
work processes (Report based on GAP analysis, Dec.99 case A)
Strategic level
New strategy as intended from
corporate level
*Operational level:No actual changes in the way
things are done.
Arrows indicate mismatch
between strategic and
operational change level.
Characteristics:
Symbolic changes.
Changes have been made on
paper only.
The map (formulated strategy)
does not fit the terrain.
Based on:
1) Interpretation error
2) Non-compliance
Table 6: Three Change Outcomes
Strategic level:
New strategy as intended from
corporate level
*Operational level:Seemingly close connection
between theory and practice,
Closer investigation shows few
actual changes. Old ways of
working persist but under new
names.
Characteristics:
Symbolic changes.
Old ways of working are
adapted to the new strategy by
renaming old practices andlor
fitting them into new strategy.
Based on:
1) Interpretation error
2) Strategic interpretation
Strategic level:
New strategy modified
compared with corporate
intentions
Operationallevel:
Actual changes consist of new
ideas combined with old ways
of working. Some old practices
and some new, including new
couplings of old and new.
No discrepancy between levels.
Characteristics:
Local. variations of the strategy.
Organizations (or business
units) pick and choose from the
new strategy. Some·elements
are implemented, some are not.
Based on:
1) Expansion
2) Contraction
The first two change outcomes (loose coupling and assimilation) are based on
discrepancies between the strategic and the operational level, or discrepancies
between formal plans and actual changes. They may have passed as successful
implementations if one only measured change at the strategic level since the
planned strategy at the business unit 'level is in accordance with corporate
intentions. Only closer inspection, at lower levels in the organization, reveals
that the changes have not affected the way work is performed.
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The third change outcome (accommodation) is based on discrepancies over
time between the intended strategy (plans) and the realized strategy (actual
changes). Changes at the strategic level are similar to changes at the
operational level, so there is no discrepancy between change levels. The
discrepancy has to do with the temporal dimension. If implementation success
was measured based on how many of the initial intentions had actually been
implemented, then this outcome would be viewed as a failure. Only some of
the intentions have been realized. However, the changes that have been made
are implemented both at the strategic level and at the operationallevel.
The discussion above shows that the common ways of evaluating change
success or failure (or implementation success or failure) may be based on
surface snapshots, and closer scrutiny or a longer time frame, might show quite
different outcomes. The need for more than two (success or failure) or even
three (including partial implementation) possible change outcomes thus
becomes evident as does the need to evaluate changes at different
organizationallevels and across time.
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated that modifications in planned strategies do take
place. Identification of twelve modifications in the business units, and three
modifications at the corporate level, revealed that there are different types of
modifications. A more specific definition of modifications could thereby be
proposed which included both decision-based and action-based modifications.
A typology of five modifications was developed based on the data. Expansion
refers to increasing the scope of the strategy, while contraction refers to
eliminating some elements within the strategy. Interpretation error is a
misunderstanding of what the change is about. Strategic interpretation is more
deliberate and has to do with selectively fitting what one prefers into the
strategy. Non-compliance is also deliberate as it means refusing to abide by the
strategic decision.
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While strategic changes are usually rated as either a success or a failure with
few categories in between, three intermediate categories for change outcome
were presented here. The categories build in part on existing research.and in
part on data and they are closely linked to modifications. The different types of
modifications refer to actions and decisions, while the outcomes represent the
state of affairs at anyone point in time. The first category, loose coupling,
means that although changes have been made at a strategic level, no such
changes can be found at the operationallevel. The second outcome category,
assimilation, is a similar category as it too refers to changes at the strategic
level, but no actual changes within the organization. However, here changes
appear to be made at the operational level because old practices have been
renamed to disguise the mismatch between planned and actual changes. The
last category is accomodation and it represents a situation where changes have
been made at both at the strategic level and at the operational level, but the
changes are not in accordance with original intentions. The changes at the
operational level match plans at the strategic level, so there is a tight fit
between strategic and operationallevels in terms of the degree of change.
The three change outcomes are linked to the five types of modifications.
Expansion and contraction type modifications are inherently linked with
accommodation outcomes since this outcome by definition requires
documented and traceable changes in plans. The other three types of
modifications, which are action-based, are linked in a similar manner to the
outcomes that show discrepancies between strategic and operational levels
(loose coupling and assimilation). The linkages between different types of
modifications and outcomes will be developed further and connected with
reasons for modifications in chapter seven.
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6. ConstruedRealities
In the previous chapter different types of modifications were presented along
with three change outcomes that can be placed within the "partial
implementation" category. In this chapter, reasons for modifications are
explored. The data are analyzed and presented using a sensemaking
perspective.
The chapter begins with a brief presentation of the sensemaking perspective,
focusing on how it will be applied in the analysis. The sensemaking
perspective lies within the cognitive perspective, which was introduced in
chapter three. A key construct in this respect is construed realities. Construed
realities (CRs) have to do with how individuals and groups perceive and
understand things that go on around them. During data collection, substantially
different descriptions about the change content, process and context emerged.
These descriptions represent different construed realities. The sensemaking
perspective and the concept of construed realities, provides an analytical
framework for interpretation of the data. The strength of this theoretical
perspective, as compared with the tentative research model, is its emphasis on
the likelihood of many different interpretations of strategic change within the
organization. The underlying explanation for this rests on an assumption of
social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, see chapter 3 for
more on social construction).
6.1 The Sensemaking Perspective
As the name indicates, sensemaking refers to how organizational members
make sense ofthings. Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) define sensemaking as " the
meaning construction and reconstruction by the involved parties as they
attempt to develop a meaningfulframework for understanding the nature of the
intended strategic change" (pg.442). Weick (1995) describes sensemaking as
including how individuals use interpretive schemes to make sense of things.
Interpretive schemes are described as systems of meaning that the sensemaker
has developed through experience and socialization (Weick, 1995).
.,,,
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Interpretive schemes have also been defined as "shared, fundamental
assumptions about why events happen as they do and how people are to act in
different ways" (Bartunek, 1984, pg 355). Interpretive schemes thus include
both structural and social properties. The social properties consist of shared
assumptions. Sensemaking can be both an individual and a social process.
Individual sensemaking processes refer to fitting new things (such as
organizational changes) into an interpretive scheme or system of meaning
which the sensemaker has developed (Weick, 1995). Social sensemaking
processes refer to constructing meaning through discussions, stories, gossip,
rumours, and negotiations (Balogun, 2001).
Similar to interpretive schemes, although not representing structural properties,
are construed realities (Isabella, 1990; Sutton, 1987). Construed realties are
shared interpretations of events and actions, which guide the attribution of
meaning and significance to specific organizational events (Isabella, 1990). In
exploring how organizational members at different levels make sense of
changes, different construed realities will be identified. There are two main
reasons for focusing on construed realities rather than interpretive schemes.
First, different views of the change process need to be linked to modifications.
This study is not about how different views of the change process evolve, but
rather about the effects of different construed realities. The emphasis is thus on
what the construed realities are and how construed realities can be related to
action rather than how construed realities change and develop. Secondly,
construed realities are more readily available for analysis than interpretive
schemes. Construed realities can be expressed through descriptions whereas
interpretive schemes exist inside the heads of the individuals and are therefore
more difficult to identify.
Sensemaking processes can be triggered by strategic and organizational change
and organizational members use sensemaking processes to resolve ambiguity
and uncertainty (Balogun, 2001). According to Weick (1995) sensemaking
consists of seven properties. Sensemaking is (1) grounded in identity
construction; (2) retrospective; (3) enactive of sensible environments; (4)
social; (5) ongoing; (6) focused on and by extracted cues; (7) driven by
plausibility rather than accuracy.
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Interpretation is closely related to sensemaking, although sensemaking
incorporates more than interpretation. Interpretation requires the existence of
something specific to interpret, while sensemaking can be triggered by mere
uncertainty or surprise. Sensemaking can begin with beliefs and take the form
of arguments and expectations. Sensemaking can also begin with action. It then
involves commitment and manipulation; commitment because interpretation is
needed to explain behaviors for which people are responsible, and
manipulating because it involves stabilizing an otherwise unstable set of events
so that it is easier to explain them. According to Weick (1995), this
manipulation is a kind of simplification of the perceived world.
Sensemaking is an effort to tie beliefs and actions more closely together. In
both cases sensemaking involves taking what is clearer (a belief or an action),
and linking it with that which is less clear. In analyzing the data, this
connection between beliefs and actions is emphasized. Expressed beliefs in the
form of construed realities guide action, but action also shapes construed
realities over time. As mentioned, it is not the development of beliefs that is
central here. Construed realities are taken as given, and the goal here is to
explore differences in construed realities and to probe the relation between
beliefs and action.
Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) found that sensemaking occurs at several levels, In
their study, sensemaking processes were evident on the part of the lower-level
members of a university and external constituents as well as managers. All
were trying to figure out the meaning of the proposed strategic change effort,
its effect on them, and their role in it. (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). The
sensemaking perspective furthermore predicts that people in different
organizational positions are likely to interpret similar events differently.
"People in organizations are in different locations and are familiar with
different domains, which means they have different interpretations of common
events" (Weick, 1995 pg. 53). Isabella (1990) also refers to several studies that
suggest that cognitions and perceptions can differ by individuals'
organizational function or level.
The sensemaking perspective thus predicts that construed realities differ across
organizational levels, but construed realities are also expected to change over
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time. This is the mam point in Isabella's (1990) work on evolving
interpretations as change unfolds. She argues that as change unfolds, different
assumptions and orientations are required at different times in the process. As
new facts arise and new questions are asked, construed realities change.
Organizational change triggers sensemaking. More specifically, events that
organizational employees view as critical act as triggers. In the business units
studied here, three distinct phases in the local implementation process became
clear through the descriptions by organizational members. The different phases
followed some critical event or decision that could be expected to trigger
sensemaking.
To sum up, the sensemaking perspective will be used in the following manner:
strategic changes, and events and decisions linked to the change process,
trigger sensemaking processes. Sensemaking processes are a combination of
individual and social processes attempted at interpreting and understanding the
change initiative. Because different people have different interpretive schemes,
sensemaking processes are likely to result in different views of change events
and actions - different construed realities appear. However, due to the social
dimension in sensemaking, construed realities can be expected to be similar
within certain groups, organizational functions, or levels .
..
Figure 8: Sensemaking Processes and Construed Realities
Research question two concerning why modifications occur creates the
foundation for this chapter. Preliminary data analysis suggested that
sensemaking theory was a useful and appropriate theoretical framework for
answering this question. Sensemaking .theory directs attention to the following
questions:
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1) What are the construed realities (CRs) about the change content, context
and process?
a) Do the construed realities (CRs) differ across organizationallevel?
b) Do the construed realities (CRs) change over time?
6.2 Making Sense of Context
This section presents organizational members' descriptions of context. Context
can refer to many different things, such as environmental, economic, political
and organizational context. The data suggested two contextual aspects that are
particularly important for understanding modifications: (1) organization
identity and image and (2) key actors' main task. The way in which
organization members describe their organizations' identity and image and
which tasks key actors perceive as central reveal important elements in CRs
about context. The section begins with a presentation of relevant theoretical
work on identity and image and continues with descriptions of CRs relating to
these two central contextual issues within the three business units.
In line with literature on organizational identity and image (Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991), the way organizational members interpret and behave
towards strategic issues depends on how they view their organizations' identity
and image. Fox-Wolgramm et al (1998) also found that organizational identity
and image affected the way organizations respond to planned change
initiatives.
Organizational identity has been defined as what organization members believe
to be the organizations' central, enduring, and distinctive character (Albert &
Whetten, 1985). Organizational image on the other hand, has to do with how
organization members believe others see the organization (Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991). Dutton & Dukerich (1991) argue that an organizations'
identity serves to filter and mould interpretations and actions within the
organization. An organizations' image is tied to individual's sense of self,
hence the image also steers interpretations and actions. For example, as Dutton
& Dukerich (1991) found, in case the organizations' image is damaged,
individuals in the organization are motivated to take action.
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In analyzing the data from the three cases in this study, organization identity
refers to the business unit level. Each business unit was relatively large and
independent and organization members were clearly more tied to the business
unit than to the corporation. Organization image describes how members of a
business unit believed that corporate management and "outsiders" viewed each
business unit. The data from the three cases showed no significant
discrepancies between different organizational levels in terms of how
organization members described their units' identity and image. Top managers,
middle managers and employees provided quite similar descriptions of identity
and image. Each business unit will therefore be presented without
distinguishing between organizational levels. Changes in CRs about context
over time however, were found in some cases and this will be addressed.
The second important contextual dimension, key actors' task, is tied to
organization identity and image. Key actors in the change process include top
managers in the business units and leaders of the local implementation projects.
The data indicated that key actors saw their main task or purpose either as (a)
implementing corporate decisions or (b) protecting the business unit. Key
actors who saw their main task as implementing corporate decisions tended to
have a close relationship with corporate management. Key actors who saw
their main task as protecting the business unit were more distanced from
corporate headquarters. Descriptions of identity and image reveal the nature of
the relationship between each business unit and corporate headquarters.
Perceptions of the key actors' main task are presented at the end of this section
after CRs about organizational identity and image have been presented.
Organizational identity and image in business unit A
Business unit A was a refmery and hence a downstream unit. Because of the
downstream focus, organizational members described their unit as not very
important in the corporate connection. Managers (top and middle) and
employees believed they had little power or status vis-a-vis headquarters, and
that the upstream offshore units were the most important in a corporate setting.
[Case Aj is not a core business in the corporation (CEO, case A)
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Interviewer: Does [case AJ, as one of the first units to implement BRA,
have any power to influence the BRA process?
Interviewee (employee, case A): No, I don 't think so. Offshore units are
the strongest. It has to do with internal status in the corporation and who
has most people in the right places. Case A, in a corporate setting, is a
stepchild.
Managers (top and middle) and employees also described how they thought
others viewed their unit:
We are seen as strange and problematic. (CEO, case A)
This view was reinforced by the fact that few top managers wanted to work in
this business unit voluntarily and hence most of the managers were ordered to
take positions here.
The organizational image was also based on history. Extensive negative media
coverage from about ten years back had given the refmery a bad reputation.
The refinery had serious cost overruns related to new investments and
upgrading of the plant. Indeed, controlling costs was still considered the main
challenge for this business unit.
In addition to reducing and controlling costs, another important challenge for
business unit A consisted of retaining the work force,. While controlling and
reducing costs had been a long-term challenge, competence in value-creation
had balanced this out somewhat. But the pressure to reduce costs increased
over time in the change process as the refinery industry was facing difficult
times and plants were being closed across Europe. Keeping employees in the
organization was also difficult. Operators often resigned or transferred offshore
where the pay was higher. Creating stability in the workforce was therefore
described as a challenge as the quotes below indicate.
Nobody wants to work here .... It's unfortunate because we become a
training arena where we train people who disappear in the organization,
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but nobody comes here so we never get any new impulses and we could
have used that. (Employee, case A)
The problem is not really about getting rid of people however, but to
manage with the ones we keep. (Fop Manager, case A)
Organizational identity and image in business unit B
At the time of establishment, this ten-year old upstream unit represented a new
and innovative platform. The organizations' philosophy was based on a
modem and flat organization where everything that could be done onshore was
done onshore. A "shadow organization" was therefore established onshore to
support offshore operations. The flat organization required few departments
and multiple competencies. Multiple competencies meant offshore employees
had to have broader knowledge than their specific discipline. The aim was to
increase the overall understanding and to operate more efficiently by fewer
work orders and fewer employees (these ideas are similar to the philosophy
behind BRA and IBD).
Managers (top and middle) and employees at this unit were proud of their
modem organization and they believed that corporate headquarters though
highly of them as well. Indeed, the unit was often used as a prime example
when the corporate managers showed off their organization to politicians and
top executives. Benchmarking results supported their view of themselves as
"best-in-class". In addition top managers described the unit as having an
environmental profile and high safety and a good reputation externally as a
reliable gas supplier. As compared with other business units, this unit saw itself
as more modem and capable of change.
Our division is used as a prime example of organizational change and
SAP and all that. (Employee, case B)
{Case C} and another upstream unit have chosen {organizational}
solutions that will bring them close to where we were before. (Employee,
case B)
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The main challenges for the unit were work environment and safety issues. In
terms of work environment management described an on-off culture, (too)
close ties between offshore management and employees, conflict-av.oiding
behavior offshore, and a preoccupation with economic compensations.
The "on and off' culture referred to how employees worked twelve-hour shifts
for two weeks, often putting in over-time as well, and then they had three to
four weeks off, when they wouldn't need to think about work at all. Life
offshore was geographically isolated and physically limited. People worked
long hours and shared rooms so there was not much privacy. Social aspects
(food and coffee-breaks) became very important.
Ties within the disciplines were described as strongest. Employees ranked
themselves hierarchically according to discipline. Operators were ranked on
top, automation workers in the middle and mechanics at the bottom. There
were also ties beyond the hierarchies, such as the relationship between offshore
middle managers and employees. One of the top managers described the
relationship between offshore workers and middle managers as perhaps too
close, because it lead to conflict avoidance.
People are only out there for 2 weeks, and often choose to avoid conflicts
with co-workers or subordinates. (Top Manager, case B)
The good work environment was seen as extremely important both by
managers (top and middle) and employees. The BRA change process severly
damaged the work environment. During the change process a full-blown
conflict became known throughout the corporation. The problems during the
change process affected the units' image. Over time, top managers had to admit
that their business unit was not as ready for change as they had believed, and
their (and employees') identification with a modem and innovative
organization suffered a blow. The positive identity and image changed.in a
negative direction during the change process.
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Organizational identity and image in business unit C
Business unit C represented another upstream division, which was described as
old, complex and demanding in terms of personnel and competencies. The staff
was also described as relativelyold in terms of the average age. Management
in the unit saw the staff as strong within their respective fields, but also as the
ones who had chosen stability. Those interested in new ideas and new ways of
working had left and worked at newer offshore installations (such as business
unit B).
In the early phases of the change process, top managers described the business
unit as having high status within the corporation due to its size and importance.
At the same time however, they thought corporate headquarters viewed people
in their unit as difficult and stubborn.
[Business Unit CJ and another business unit are the large and "heavy"
divisions, and a lot of weight is place on what is done here. (Assistant
Project Leader, case C)
Our Project Leader is very qualified and he is characterized as a
demanding customer. The things he came up with were not always
popular. (Top Manager, case C)
Both managers and employees described close ties between management and
union representatives. The working environment was therefore seen as very
good and political processes were explicitly used and seen as legitimate by
both management and union representatives.
There is political work at Business Unit C, but I don 't think there are any
hidden agendas ... (Platform Manager, case C)
Like in case B, the image of this business unit also seemed to change over
time. Top managers' descriptions of organizational image became more
positive over time. Because business unit C ended up fighting the corporate
decision, managers in the unit were very pleased when they felt they were
getting acceptance from both headquarters and from other business units. The
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signs of an improving image also resulted in more positive perceptions of the
organizational identity.
BRA played down aur input at first, but we ended up getting acceptance
for 95% of our inputs after we went into more detail about what we
actually meant and wanted (fop Manager, case C)
Wefelt we had support from the whole system. (CEO, case C)
The main challenges for business unit C were described as reducing costs and
keeping up operational regularity and safety as well as maintaining the good
work environment.
Key Actors' Main Task
Organizational members' perceptions about organizational identity and image
are likely to affect what they focus on in the change process, and what
individuals and groups see as their main task. The main task of key actors, such
as top managers and implementation project leaders, is particularly important
to understand since key actors are likely to have a strong influence on decisions
and actions in the change process.
Below, data from the three cases are analysed in terms of how key actors
described their main task. What did the key actors see as their main purpose?
The analysis shows that key actors either saw their main purpose as (1) getting
corporate decisions implemented or (2) looking out for the business unit. This
is illustrated below, where the key
actors, in the middle, choose either to
side with the corporation or with the
business unit. This may not be a
deliberate or contradictory choice.
Nonetheless it was fairly easy to identify
__jKey
...----, actors
which choice key actors made.
Figure 9: Key Actors' Main Task
In case A, there was a combination of
corporate concerns and business unit
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concerns among the key actors. Top management was mostly concerned with
looking out for the business unit, while the project leader saw implementing
the corporate decision as his main task. This was not surprising since the
project leader was externally recruited and working for the corporate BRA
program. The project leader only had influence for the six months during
which he was physically at the business unit. Those months were focused on
implementing the IT-system. Most of the time then, the focus was on
protecting and looking out for the best for the business unit - if necessary at the
expense of implementing the corporate decision about BRA.
Some ofthis will drive our costs up andwe willloosejlexibility ...I am
asking what kind of organizational improvements I can control? Are they
only within operations and maintenance? (CEO, case A)
In the second case (case B), management and two internal project leaders saw
their main purpose as implementing the changes. They might not have seen this
as a choice between the business unit and the corporate decision however. The
interviews suggest that they believed that the changes were in the business
units' best interest and expected that the changes would go smoothly.
I believe in integrated teams. BRA/IBD requires maturation. But I am
relaxed in terms of [case B]. I think we will manage. We have to think
long-term benefits. (Implementation Project Leader, case B)
Interviewer: Employees don 't see the benefits ofthese changes.
Interviewee: I can 't understand that our people don 't want to be best.
(Implementation Project Leader, case B)
In case C, both management and the internally appointed project leader viewed
their main task as looking out for the business unit. This was particularly the
case for the top manager who literally described this choice he was facing.
I could either try to implement a decision made at the corporate level and
most likely watch the whole decision go down the drain, or I could fight
those above me. (CEO, case C)
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We have understood that to realize benefits in business unit C, we have to
stop trying to reach lBD [and BRA] goals. We don 't want to reach the
lBD [and BRA] goals. The costs are too great. (CEO, case C)
How did corporate identity and image affect the behavior of key actors?
Management in the first unit had described a geographical and psychological
distance from corporate headquarters, thus it is not very surprising that they
also distanced themselves from corporate decisions. In the second case, top
managers had a closer relationship with corporate headquarters, as the favored
unit, and it is likely that top managers wanted to show that this unit would
remain one of the best business units in the corporation. In the last case, on the
other hand, the corporate identity was one of an old heavy-weighter and top
management here was not going to go along with anything corporate
headquarters decided. This does not mean that management in case C was
indifferent to their image in the corporate connection. Case C was also among
the last to implement BRA and the corporate decision had been adjusted and
goals lowered, so the risks involved in looking out for the business unit at the
expense of implementing the corporate decision were reduced.
The data also suggest additional explanations for the different choices key
actors make in terms of main tasks. They are linked to CRs about the future.
The data indicate that key actors who are on their way up in the corporation,
and thus unlikely to stay on in the business unit, view the change initiative as
an opportunity to show what s/he can do. Expectations of career advancement
outside of the business unit thus lead key actors to support the change
initiative. In case B, where several key actors were promoted to higher
positions within the corporation, a middle manager described this in the
following way.
They [the top managers and project leaders] just wanted this
implemented without considering how ... They had tickets upward in the
organization. l think so. This is my.personal opinion. l think it was based
on a career move ... (Middle Manager, case B)
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When, on the other hand, the key actor had just started to work with a business
unit and expected to be there for a while, then s/he focused on building a
relationship with the business unit, if necessary at the expense of implementing
corporately made decisions. This was the case in the last business unit.
Summary of Construed Realities about Context
The analysis of how organizational members made sense of context focused on
two contextual aspects: (l) organization identity and image and (2) key actors'
main task in the change process. CRs about each business units' identity and
image as well as the relationship to corporate headquarters were presented.
The table below summarizes organizational identities and images within the
respective business units. Construed realties about organizational identity and
image were to a large extent shared among members at different organizational
levels within the business unit. Changes in identity and image over time
occurred in case B and C as described in the table.
"Local" and geographically
isolated unit.
Good at value creation but
need to learn to control
costs. •
Best-in-the-class Close relationshipbetween
top management in BU
Image damaged and HQ
somewhat over time.
Image improvedover time.
Modern and efficient
organization with
environmental profile and
young, flexible workers.
Old and complex
organization. Very good
internal cooperation
between unions and
management. Older
workforce.
Large, important, but Distant, but seen as
somewhat difficult and important
slow.
Table 7: Construed Realities about Context in Case A, B, and C
CRs about context were also captured in descriptions ofkey actors' concerning
what they perceived as their main task. In one business unit, key actors (top
managers and implementation leaders) saw their mainjob as implementing the
corporate decision (case B). In the two other business units (case A and C), key
actors described their main job as looking out for the business unit and even
making sure that corporate decisions did not destroy the business unit. Key
114
actors' Cks about main tasks are summed up in the illustrations below. As the
illustration shows, corporate ambitions were slightly lowered in the last case.
Figure 10: Summary of Key Actors' Main Task
Similar to the descriptions of identity and image, employees and managers
within the business unit agreed in their descriptions about key actors' main
task. Hence there were no significant gaps between organizational levels in
terms of eRs about main tasks. As the next sections will show, Cks about
context also affected how organizational members made sense of content and
process.
6.3 Making Sense of Content
As a corporately planned strategic change reaches business unit level, a certain
amount of sensemaking and interpretation is bound to take place (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991). This is particularly the case in large and complex
organizations where it remains almost impossible to secure that all of the
people who need to contribute in implementing the changes have been
involved in formulating them. Often, people responsible for implementation at
the business unit level have limited in-depth knowledge about that particular
change initiative. In complex organizations, a corporate strategy will usually
need to be put into the context of the business unit and made sense of in that
particular context. At business unit level then, formulation at a more detailed
and operational level takes place. Ideally, this formulation keeps within the
boundaries of higher-level decisions, but often, corporate decisions are
questioned in this local formulation process.
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Based on the data, organizational members seemed to be making sense of
content (a) in the attempt of understanding and interpreting the corporately
formulated strategy and (b) in the local formulation that focused on translation
and operationalization of the changes. The local formulation of BRA was
necessary to customize the strategy for each particular business unit. Both of
these processes leave room for multiple Cks about change content, particularly
across organizationallevels, but also over time.
The following quotes show that there were attempts at understanding and
interpreting the content of the corporately formulated strategy in all of the three
business units and at both managerial and employee levels.
Top management level:
Another business unit is struggling because they are spending so much
time figuring things out that they need to hire people to do day-to-day
business (Fop Manager, case A)
I would have expected that somebody else, who knew much about this
[BRA}, could have supported us 100%. But we are on our own. (Fop
Manager, case B)
It was difficult because what we had to do was so unclear. We
underestimated the task and the complexity (Fop Manager, case B)
The profits from this have been questioned all along ... The OD part was
difficult to estimate economic benefits from. It 's more ideas you believe
in, or trends that can improve our competencies (Fop Manager, case C)
Middle management and employee level:
How flat should the structure be - ~e worry about this ... (Middle
Manager, case A)
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There is very little described in BRA concerning roles and
responsibilities. (Middle Manager, case B)
BRA is too general. It is left up to the unit how to do this. (Employee,
case B)
In the beginning everyone was uncertain. What is in these new roles?
What can each person do? (Middle Manager, case B)
Evidently sensemaking occurs at all levels, but what does this result in? In
chapter nine, sensemaking activities will be linked to modifications. In addition
to interpreting strategic content, business units usually need to translate the
corporately formulated strategy both in terms of making it more detailed and
operationally oriented, but also to relate it to the current strategy in the business
unit and perhaps to other change initiatives in the unit.
Local formulations: Case A
In business unit A, local formulations began in the last phase. Prior to that, the
change process was focused on IT changes that were managed by an
Implementation Project Leader appointed by corporate BRA. The local
formulation process might serve to unify a business units' idea of what should
be changed in the unit and how this should be done. Despite this lack of local
formulation and decision-making in case A, managers (top and middle) and
employees seemed to agree on what their organization should change based on
the BRA initiative.
In the beginning the business unit was not very preoccupied with BRA. Few
analyses were done prior to the start of the local implementation project. As
discussed in the previous section, both managers and employees viewed their
business unit as far from corporate headquarters, as an unimportant business
unit in the corporate connection, and as fairly independent. In light of this
perception of themselves, they were n.ot overlyeager to please corporate
management, nor to follow decisions made and formulated by corporate
headquarters. Nevertheless, early plans indicate that BRA would be
implemented as intended and that most employees, at that time, were positive
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towards the BRA initiative. A corporately administrated survey shows that in
December 1997, over half of the asked employees believed that the economic
goals of BRA were realistic and attainable (Vei & Føremelding, Mongstad).
Early plans (documents) from the implementation project show that within the
allotted three month period, the project group aimed to implement all
organizational (OD) and IT changes. After the project was demobilized, the
line management would take over responsibility for realizing the benefits. The
project's work was soon focused solelyon IT however, and most managers and
employees agreed with this narrowed focus in terms of change content.
In the beginning there were plans. It was said that BRA consists of70%
BRA and 30% SAP, but as reality came closer in terms of
implementation, it was not only turned around, but became 100% SAP.
(Employee, case A).
It has not been seen as important to implement all processes
simultaneously. (Implementation Project Member, case A)
Organizationally we are very close to how BRA has drawn their map.
(Employee, case A)
So, although included m the formalized plans, OD changes were neither
pushed by local management nor by the Implementation Leader. As the third
quote indicates, a major reason for this was that the organization members in
case A saw their organization as already fulfilling most of the OD requirements
in BRA. In addition, there were no apparent incentives linked to implementing
OD changes either, except for the benefits the changes were supposed to bring.
The onshore refinery had not linked BRA up with any incentives. Another
change program (Drift 2000) included incentives that could have been linked
up to BRA. This was what the upstream units did when they combined BRA
with IBD (IBD is similar to Drift 2000 but aimed at upstream units).
In the last phase, when the local improvement project had been demobilized,
three different local improvement groups took quite different approaches to
further improvement work. Employees seemed to agree with these different
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approaches. The first improvement group took on all OD changes in BRA and
tried to work to get them implemented. The second group chose to focus on
specific elements within BRA and got those implemented with the help of
Shell. The third group opened up for broader changes again, and these changes
were still in process when data collection ended. The following quote
illustrates a change in the view on BRA. The quote from the last phase of the
implementation process shows that BRA was no longer seen as just an IT-
system.
BRA is much more than an IT system. It 'Il change the way we work.
(Middle Manager, case AJ
Both managers and employees saw challenges and problems with the new
organizational ideas however.
BRA 's model with small teams that own their own equipment is
problematic because each individual is supposed to have several roles.
There is a high turnover rate at [business unit A), which means that we
have a problem in terms of broad competence in our workers.
(Improvement Group Member, case AJ
The table below illustrates how beliefs about what should be changed (the
change content) varied over time in the business unit. It switched between
broadly and narrowly focused changes. There was no obvious disagreement
between organizational levels however. Most organizational members,
regardless of position and level, seemed to agree about what the changes meant
and what this demanded in terms of changes for the business unit.
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BRA will reduce costs. BRA is SAP (the IT
Mostly positive reactions system)
towards changes.
For this business unit
BRA is basically about
a new IT system
The organization will have to
make some changes such as
introduce new work
processes and teams.
Action is needed!
Shell provides an opportunity
to get some changes
implemented (O&M).
Other OD changes need to
be evaluated.
A corporately decided
initiative to reduce costs
by making all business
units similar
Organizational changes are
necessary, but there are
some problems.
Shell has the solutions for
operations and maintenance
(O&M)
Table 8: Construed Realities about Content in Case A
Local formulations: Case B
In the second business unit much more preparatory work was done prior to the
start-up of the local implementation project. Through this preparatory work,
Cks about content can be identified. Top managers in this business unit were
clearly aiming for a radical (deep) and revolutionary (fast) change. Since this
business unit was young and fairly modem in terms of how it was organized,
top managers saw this as a realistic goal. They believed employees were
motivated and wanted to stay in their "best in class" league within the
corporation. The second quote shows that this perceptions of change capability
changed over time.
Our business unit is known for our efficiency ... We are best in- class in
McKinsey evaluations ...we have been used as an example in Statoil
(Middle Manager, case B)
We are much less capable of change than many of us had thought and
expected. (Middle Manager, case B)
The BRA change was immediately coupled with another change initiative
called IBD. IBD and BRA changes wer~ logically linked and reinforced each
other. IBD also provided economic incentives for employees if they succeeded
in the organizational changes. Parallel with local formulations in case B, a
corporate group (UPN - The Upstream Division in Norway) were working on a
120
report with some guidelines for upstream divisions in terms of implementation
of BRA and IBD.
In the business unit, work groups that represented all organizationallevels were
established. In this way employees were involved in the local formulation of
changes. It was decided to implement all of the OD changes within BRA and
IBD quickly a few months prior to the IT implementation. This decision to
implement all OD changes was made despite the fact that the UPN report
opened up for more flexible solutions. The reports based on the preparatory
analyses indicated that the work had been done by unified and representative
groups (e.g. SLP New Model). As the below quote shows, it later became clear
that employees did not always agree with the decisions that were made in the
preparatory phase.
I was in one of the work groups, and there weren 't many choices we
could make. Our CEO said that we could find the answers or he would
make the decisions. (Middle Manager, case B)
We have to be loyal to the decision, but we don 't have to agree. (Middle
Manager, case B)
These contradictory views about content became clear in phase two, when
implementation of organizational changes had been initiated. Management then
faced loud complaints about the change content as well as the change process.
It is important to point out that these disagreements did not surface until
employees had hands-on experience with the changes, i.e. a few months after
implementation of OD changes.
The descriptions of and reactions to content were at a rather personal and
emotional level. Employees struggled to find out what the changes actually
involved, what this implied for them and what this would mean for themselves
and their work situation. The descriptions employees gave of why the changes
were being made and what the changes actually meant were quite different
from descriptions by top managers.
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Management is trying to break up the disciplines. Fortunately they
haven 't managed. We need the discipline network to exchange
experiences and to develop core competencies within our fields.
(Employee, case B)
We have been kept in the dark since day one because they wanted to get
rid ofus. (Employee about his position, case B)
When I have gone to school and trained to be an automatician, then I see
no reason why a mechanic should be doing my job. He should do what he
has been trained to do. (Employee, case B)
It is difficult to see any benefits from this. We have understood that the
goal is to cut down the number of employees. (Employee, case B)
In the last phase, top managers and employees (including middle managers)
moved closer to each other in terms of their descriptions of change content.
Employees were then expressing increased belief in the change process and in
management again.
The new Operations Manager had to ask the Platform Managers and.
middle managers offshore if they believed in this. He thinks they do
believe in the work planned for the fall 2000 (Middle Manager, case B in
the fall 2000)
The relationship between employees and top managers improved when the top
managers agreed to slow down the process and signaled that some of the
change initiatives would be reconsidered and probably abandoned. A
consensus in terms of change content for the business unit was reached through
an evaluation which was conducted one year after implementation.
In case B, Cks about what should be changed in the unit also varied over time.
Employees were not so far from the top managers in the early phases, but once :
implementation had begun they had quite a different opinion of what should be
changed in the organization. Top managers tried to stick to their view, but
finally moved towards the employee' s views.
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Table nine summarizes Cks about content at the different organizationallevels
and over time in case B.
BRA means an even
more modem organization
with truly multidisciplinary
teams. This will give
employees the opportunity
to broaden their skills,
increase their flexibility,
and gain more
responsibilities.
Some of the elements in
BRA/IBD are okay (SAP),
others are more
problematic (such as the
focus on teams at the
expense of disciplines).
BRA/IBD is about
empowering and
upgrading the skills of the
employees. It requires that
employees are active in
gathering information and
taking control.
BRA and IBD are good
ideas, but there are some
problems that need to be
worked out.
BRA/IBD are high-flying
abstract ideas which are
not applicable at the
. operational level.
BRA is an excuse to split
up networks, and to make
fewer people do more
work. The team focus will
destroy discipline based
specialization and
competence.
Table 9: Construed Realities about Content in Case B
Local formulations: Case C
Some of the elements in
BRA/IBD (such as the
team focus and responsi-
bility at lowest level) are
problematic because they
challenge existing values
based on specialization
and onshore support and
they threated well
established work and
personal relationships.
In business unit C, a considerable amount of time was spent early in the
process to formulate the local strategy. Extensive preparatory analyses were
performed to indicate what and how changes would be made in the unit Like
in case B, and indeed most upstream business units, BRA was linked with IBD
to simplify things and to add pressure to both of the change initiatives.
Preparatory work in work groups resulted in a suggested organizational model,
which was very much in line with the initial corporate model. The difference
was that it involved a step-wise process rather than an all-at-once change
process. The changes would thereby be introduced step-wise and over a longer
time period. Work groups represented all levels of the organization, and thus
the suggested model supposedly reflected agreement by managers (top and
middle) and employees. However, as in the case B, there were some
disagreements within the group that did not surface.
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The disagreements did not show up in the report, but there were different
opinions within the group and this should probably have been made
explicit. Some of the group members were strongly against what We
decided on. ..a lot of people argued we already had the optimal
organization. (I'op Manager, case C)
After the suggested model was officially announced employees made it clear
that they did not agree with this. This is different from the case B where
reactions came after implementation. Here, the local formulation process was
not yet over when the reactions came.
We released the report [S&L report containing the new organizational
model} after Christmas and it created a storm onshore and a hurricane
offshore. " (ImplementationProject Leader, case C)
The organization did not like how the work group took this process so far
in the direction of satisfying the BRA principles ... (Employee and Union
leader, case C)
Management quickly complied to the employees' wishes and consensus was
reached on a new decision for the locally formulated strategy through clever
political processes. This consensus continued into the third phase. The different
views on the change content were described as the reason for making
modifications. Employees argued on a factual basis and presented logical and
factual reasoning in a formal report. Management explained that they looked
upon their employees as competent and reasonable people, and if-they were so
much against these changes, then management would not go through with the
initiative.
In a large organization it becomes impossible to change things without
the employees behind the changes ...It is very difficult as a manager to
argue against people with 10-20 years of experience. We have respect for
our employees, we believe in them, and they have the competence at a
detailed level. (I'op Manager, case C))
We have such competent people in our organization and if they don 't
want to do this, we cannot change the organization. (I'op Manager, case
C)
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The table below shows that the CRs about what should be changed varied both
between organizational levels and over time. However, the apparent
differences of opinion between organizational levels disguised rather similar
sceptical views about the changes. Interviews and observations do not support
the conflicting views about BRAlIBD content at different organizationallevels.
Employees were sceptical towards BRA and IBD and so was top management.
In this unit, there were two different CEOs in charge during the change
process. Both explicitly expressed doubts about the BRAlIBD changes.
NN [The first CEO] was a strong leader who reached his goals. He was
uncertain when it came to BRA and he was the one who introduced the
stepwise implementation in GF. (Fop Manager about the first CEO, case
C)
We would have never implemented this 100% (Second CEO, case C)
So, the dramatic internal differences may have been exaggerated for political
purposes vis-a-vis corporate management. This will be discussed further in the
next chapter, when CRs are linked to modifications.
BRNIBO include several
problems.
Strong scepticism at CEO
level.
Some elements in
BRNIBO are seen as
beneficial while others are
too challenging and costly.
BRNIBO includes several
problems.
Initial scepticism becomes
stronger once
organizational model is
presented.
Some elements in
BRNIBO are acceptable
(such as SAP, and certain
aspects of teamwork)
while others are not.
Some elements in
BRNIBO are seen as
beneficial while others are
too challenging and costly.
Work groups see possi-
bilities in BRNIBO and
propose to implement all
changes but in a gradual
fashion, to avoid shocking
the organization.
Some elements in
BRNIBO are acceptable
(such as SAP, and certain
aspects of teamwork)
while others are not.
Table 10: Construed Realities about Content in Case C
Interestingly, an evaluation in business unit C showed that when asked about
the BRAlIBD changes one year after implementation, employees still voiced
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their initial scepticism based on the corporate BRAlIBD strategy. This
indicates that employees' CRs remained quite static in this business unit,
despite all of the commotion caused by employees to successfully and
dramatically modify the initial suggestions into a local version ofBRAlIBD.
Summary of construed realities about content
The data analysis showed clear evidence of sensemaking about content at all
levels of the organization and over time. Multiple CRs across organizational
levels were found, as well as changes in CRs over time.
In case A there was no evident divergence in CR's between different
organizational levels, but then again there were hardly any changes in the
organization at that time. Most of the sensemaking about BRA occurred in the
last phase, when they started working on organizational changes. In the second
and third cases (B and C) on the other hand, sensemaking began in the first
phase and continued through all of the phases. In these two cases, CRs about
content began to diverge over time. In case B, management and employee
descriptions of the change initiative appeared to diverge after initiation of OD
changes, when the changes had begun to affect work life. In case C, a similar
discrepancy appeared earlier in the change process, although it can be
questioned whether or not there was any real disagreement with the business
unit concerning change content. This will be elaborated in the next chapter.
The CRs changed over time, particularly at management level. Over time, top
managers in the three business units increasingly understood the problems
employees had with the changes and the potential consequences of pushing the
changes too strongly. Employees changed CRs over time much less than
expected. Employees' arguments against the changes were surprisingly similar
across the three cases and over the three-year period. Even employees within
business units that had modified initial plans quite substantially, continued
referring to BRA and IBD as a rigid and top-down change initiative. When
management met employees' concerns, then naturally employees were more
willing to go along with the changes,. but opinions and descriptions of the
BRAlIBD changes did not necessarily change.
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6.4 Making Sense of Process
The importance of probing how organizational members make sense of the
change content may seem more obvious than exploring how they describe the
change process. The tentative research model suggested that the change
process affects change content and that it can cause modifications in content.
Research on procedural justice has furthermore shown that perceptions of a
change process can be crucial in terms of how affected individuals view the
outcome of the process (Greenberg, 1990; Kim & Mauborgne, 1997;
Konovsky, 2000; Novelli, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro & Brett, 1993;
Tyler & Bies, 1990)). As mentioned in chapter five, all three cases studied here
ended up implementing approximately the same degree of changes, but the
change processes were quite different. Comparison of the processes in the three
cases shows that the change process in case B involved more turmoil and was
more destructive for the work environment.
Procedural justice theory posits that although individuals may disagree with the
outcome (which in this case is closely linked with change content), they are
more likely to accept it if the process leading up to the outcome has been fair.
Descriptions of how the change process has evolved may therefore be
important for two reasons. (1) Perceptions of the process are linked with
reactions to content. (2) Perceptions of the process affect action in the
implementation process. So, even if there are no obvious disagreements about
content, process issues may cause reactions to content and actions aimed at
modifying the content. Perceptions and descriptions of the change process are
also important in a long-term perspective, because they are likely to affect
employees' views offuture change processes.
CRs about the change process are presented for each case. The main focus in
the following presentation is on each respective business unit. Sometimes
however, views of the corporate change process affected the change process
within the business unit. Therefore, views concerning the corporate change
process will be described where this is relevant.
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Descriptions of the change procese in Case A
Three factors in terms of CRs about process characterized descriptions about
the change process in the first business unit: (1) Descriptions of the change
process were similar across organizational levels within the business unit. (2)
Corporate members described the change process in the business unit
differently than business unit members. (3) Business unit members described
the corporate level change process differently over time
There were no significant differences in descriptions about the process across
organizational levels within the business unit. Top and middle managers as
well as employees were telling the same story concerning the change process in
the unit. This consistency across organizational levels can be tied to earlier
findings on similarities between how managers and employees made sense of
content. The consistency between managers and employees persisted over
time, although their views about the change process developed over time.
Corporate staff members, however, described the change process in the unit
differently. Hence the discrepancy in CRs in case A was between corporate
headquarters and the business unit. Recall that key actors within management
saw their main purpose as looking out for the unit, so a discrepancy between
headquarters and the business unit on process descriptions is not surprising.
Phase I was described by business unit members as a period where they were
involved in BRA through the corporate BRA program called BRA Basis. This
work was done at headquarters. In terms of preparing for implementation in the
business unit, not much was done. Managers and employees alike explained
that they had already done most of the organizational changes through a change
program in 1996 (OD 96). This construed reality about what needed to be done
is closely linked to making sense of content. The quote below illustrates how
phase I was viewed .
..... our unit had put a lot of resources into BRA Basis. We were pretty
well prepared With OD 96 a lot of work had been done on work
processes and this work was in accordance with the new ideas - we
didn 't need to go through the AS-IS phase [the preparatory phase]. There
was already agreement between what we did and the BRA principles"
(Middle Manager, case A)
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The citation indicates that because organizational members viewed their way of
organizing as similar to a BRA organization, no large OD changes were needed
and hence no OD process was needed to prepare the business unit.
In phase II the local implementation project group was in charge. It included
people from the corporate BRA project, people from the business unit, as well
as some representatives of other business units. This combination was
deliberate and the purpose was to ensure experience transfer through the
corporate BRA program. Project steering with tight deadlines was employed.
Among other things, the project delivered extensive IT training for all
employees. Communication between the business unit and corporate
headquarters concerning BRA was channeled through the project. While early
plans from the project included OD changes, the Project Leader made it clear
that the group had to focus on getting IT implemented.
The Implementation Project was not supposed to do anything other than
implement SAP ...I worked in the project towards the end ... The Project
Leader was extremely clear on this. We would implement SAP because
that was what we were being measured against .... It was made very clear
that we would be measured on this. (Employee, case AJ
While the project group viewed the implementation in phase two as a success,
the below citation suggests that in retrospect, not all people were pleased with
what the project group had done.
I don 't think it's right when a centrally driven project, such as BRA/SAP,
sends a big project group to implement the system only and then leaves
the rest to a local group. I don 't think this was the intention, but this was
how it turned out fairly early in the process. (Employee, case AJ
When the project was demobilized, OD changes were handed over to a local
group. In light of what organizational members had said previously regarding
already having the organizational changes in place, this should not have
represented any major problem. However, more and more people were
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realizing that they would have to make some OD changes. In the third phase,
the focus on OD changes began. Three distinct local improvement groups -
each with a different leader - worked subsequently on OD changes. The first
group worked based on the recognition that not all of BRA had been
implemented. The local implementation project had handed over a number of
issues to this group, and the majority of the issues concerned OD changes. For
about six months the group tried to figure out what to change and how to go
about it. The work resulted in an updated OD plan and a draft for an action
plan. During this work, an element of flexibility became evident in terms of
how members of the improvement group viewed the corporate change process.
As opposed to the IT changes, which had been described as top-down and
tightly controlled, the changes were no longer perceived as tightly steered from
corporate headquarters.
A practical use of BRA must be allowed. The theory has to be applicable
in practice. (Improvement Group Leader L case A)
It 's a question of how far we want to go in terms of responsibility at the
lowest level. Should we go all the way like BRA suggests? We have to
take a stand to this here at [case Aj. (Improvement Group member, case-
A)
Well what is decided centrally has to be taken with a grain of salt. We
have to decide how we are going to do this. (Improvement Group Leader
L case A. Emphasis added)
This view was reinforced by statements made by members of the corporate
BRA Program at a meeting between the business unit and corporate BRA.
Corporate BRA member: Which work processes and governance
principles do you [the business unit} want to implement?
Improvement Group Leader I, case A: HIdidn 't know we had a choice.
Haha. "
The lack of corporate controlover the OD changes was also evident through
the absence of any involvement or support from corporate BRA during phase
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three. With the exception of some initial contact, corporate BRA members
were not involved in any of the changes that were planned and implemented in
phase three. The following statement was made in the month after
implementation of IT.
BRA has abandoned us. They are not interested in our experiences.
(Employee, case A in Feb.99)
This first improvement group had a number of parallel issues to deal with and
in retrospect it was described as slow-paced, democratic, and perhaps a too
open process. Not much came out of it in terms of actual changes in the
organization, although plans (OD plan, action plan) were sketched out.
It has taken a long time without anything specific to show for it.
(Employee, case AJ
The second improvement group quickly narrowed the focus to include only
changes within operations and maintenance (O&M). A few top managers were
unhappy about this narrowed focus, but in retrospect the necessity of focusing
was explained by a crisis in the refinery industry.
We had to save money! We couldn 't keep working at changing the
culture. That costs money. We were in a completely different situation.
(Improvement Group Leader IlL case A)
The local change initiative no longer had any links to corporate BRA and the
changes were never referred to as BRA changes. The change program was
called the MERIT program, but it included many of the same ideas as BRA.
The CEO in case A said the following concerning the narrowed focus and
cooperation with Shell.
This is all in line with BRA. We want to invite BRA to join us. This is not
in conflict with BRA principles. (CEO, case A).
131
The view among managers and employees within the business unit was that
BRA had not been able to provide necessary tools and techniques for
implementing organizational changes. Instead the unit drew on experiences
from Shell. The corporation had signed a formal cooperation with Shell, and
the change initiative proceeded in a project steered fashion with preparatory
analyses (similar to those suggested by corporate BRA, but never performed by
this business unit) and with Shell highly involved through the whole change
process.
The Action Plan [from improvement group 1] is too broad and glossy-
we need a specific and concise plan. (Improvement Group Leader IL
case A, Aug.99) .
There was a big change when the second improvement leader took over.
Everything became more specified. But this was also the time at which
Shell entered the picture and new pressure was put into motion. (Key
actor in implementation project and improvement group I and IL case A)
The new improvement group leader agreed with the CEO that MERIT changes
were not in conflict with BRA. However, he did not invite corporate BRA
people but kept them at arms length.
BRA is not in the picture any more. They wanted a guy here now that we
are doing the Shell process, but we said no, because we are the ones
paying for this. (Improvement Group Leader IL case A)
The last improvement group opened up for broader issues again. The group
leader explained that they would reconsider cultural aspects and re-evaluate the
value chain. These ideas were similar to the arguments that created the basis
for BRA. The value chain in case A had not been affected however, since only
some of the changes inBRA had been implemented.
While descriptions of the change process showed that managers and employees
basically agreed on how the change proceeded in all three phases, corporate
level managers described the change process in this unit quite differently.
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Corporate managers complained that the unit had not done the required and
necessary preparatory work and there was talk in the corporate BRA project
about whether or not the unit should be allowed to start up the local
implementation project. Corporate BRA was responsible for launching and
partly staffing the local project group. They decided to let the unit start
implementation, despite the lack of sufficient preparatory work. Once the local
implementation project was in place, the corporate BRA people struggled to
get legitimacy. Particularly the change management group, which would have
been central in terms of OD changes, struggled to get legitimacy in the unit and
they were practically shut out of the change process even during phase II.
Business unit managers did not think the corporate BRA people had enough
competence about the refinery business and therefore refused to listen to them.
While the business unit complained that corporate BRA people could not
deliver the necessary tools and techniques, they were not allowing the
corporate people access to learn about the local context and business. From the
corporate position it became impossible to deliver any customized tools or
techniques for implementation of organizational changes. This discrepancy
between corporate headquarters and the business unit in terms of how the
change process was viewed did not improve the somewhat strained
relationship.
Members within the business unit changed their perceptions of the corporate
change process over time. They saw BRA as more optional as time went by. In
the early phases BRA changes were described as top-down. Managers as well
as employees did not sense that they had any choice but to implement the
changes.
It seems that BRA has not been very open for input. A finished concept
has been sent out to the unit and this was how it was supposed to be
done. But then some holes appear here and there and this creates
frustration ...It was difficult to move from transparencies to what this
really meant in practice ... (Implementation Project Member, case A)
Particularly the IT changes were referred to as forced from the top. Once the
change process got started however, signals of more flexible solutions were
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picked up both from corporate members and from top managers in the business
unit. The optional change issues were clearly linked to the organizational
changes. OD changes were introduced late in this business unit, and the
perceptions of a more optional change process appeared over time.
The table below summarizes the CRs about process case A:
The business unit is not
putting any resources or
work into BRA change
process.
The IT change process
is good, but the change
process lacks the OD
component.
The business unit
contributed through
corporate BRA project.
No need for preparatory
work in the business unit.
The local implementation
project runs the process
with focus on IT.
No need for OD changes
The Business unit is doing
its own thing. No
connection or controlover
OD change process.
Need to introduce som
OD changes but the
corporate BRA program
locks tools and techninves
for this. Three different
improvement groups work
hard to implement OD
changes.
Top-steered and
corporately controlled
process
Top-steered and
corporately controlled
process
More flexible change
process. Possible to
affect OD changes at
business unit level.
Table 11: Construed Realiti~s about Process in Case A
Descriptions of the change process in Case B
Descriptions of the change process in the second business unit showed (l)
different CRs about the change process within the business unit. Employees
and top managers disagreed about what happened in the change process. In
addition, (2) descriptions of the change process in the business unit changed
over time - particularly for top managers; and (3) organizational members
described the corporate change process differently over time.
There was a clear discrepancy between how top managers and employees
(including middle managers) retrospectively described the early phases of the
changes process. Recall that there were no signs of significant disagreements in
terms of the content of BRA in the initial phase. Preparatory analyses
performed by ad hoc work groups presented a suggested model for new
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organization, and a decision was made to go for a new organization fully in
line.with IBD and BRA principles. Reactions to both the change process and
content came later - during phase two. As time passed, descriptions of the
change process in the unit changed somewhat. Particularly top managers began
to describe the early change process much more self-critically over time.
At first however, top managers described this early period as open and
involving. The local implementation project, named SLEBRA, had two leaders
who could both be considered as local or internal. They had in-depth
knowledge of the unit and a history within the unit. One leader held
responsibility for IT changes and the other for OD changes. In the first phase a
great deal of preparatory OD work was done. Representative work groups
reported to SLEBRA, and a number of employees were involved in the
different work groups.
The unit chose to work on a new organizational model by having a broadly
represented group conducting seminars. Three seminars, each lasting for three
days were supposed to end up in a suggested new organizational model. While
the OD work group was working on solutions. for integrated teams, there was
also some "unofficial" work done offshore to come up with solutions. One of
the offshore shifts made an informal proposition, based on their own initiative,
and the proposition was widely supported by the employees. The OD group
was struggling with some issues and considered adapting the offshore groups'
solution. A top manager within the business unit then made it clear that the
solution from the offshore group could not be applied. One of the members of
the official OD group explains:
It [the offshore groups' proposition] came as a wild cardfrom the side
and it did not fit in to the model we had at that time". At this time, the
Operations Manager cut through and made it clear that resources were
to be placed in the teams and not with the disciplines. (Key member of
the Local Implementation Project, case B)
Employees lacked general BRA knowledge. Without this basic
competence, comments on suggestions were bound to be made on a very
flawed basis. (Project Member, Implementation Project in case B)
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There were some delays in getting a suggested organizational modelon the
table. According to one of the key actors in the unit, one reason the OD group
did not want to make a decision was an initiative by case B, to get common
guidelines for implementation of BRAlIBD from the Norwegian Upstream
Division (UPN - the division consisting all national upstream business units) .
The result of this work was expected to affect the choice of organization model
in the business unit.
An organizational model based on BRAlIBD was presented in case B a few
months after the UPN report was finished. The UPN report gave no explicit
guidelines for how business units should apply BRA and IBD, but it opened up
for flexible solutions and emphasized the broader and more vision-based goals
of e.g. integrated teams. The proposed organizational model in the business
unit was surprisingly unaffected by the UPN decision. It was based on the
initial BRA and IBD plans and it was more ambitious than the UPN report
actually required. The decision on a new organizational model triggered a new
phase of working out details. But first the decision was quality assured. Three
managers created a "start-up document", which described the details of how
the organization would be divided into integrated teams and how the platform
would be divided into systems. This work ended up in an OD document
referred to as "the Bible". The "bible" provided in-depth details of how to
move from old organization to new organization, i.e. the OD component of
BRA.
The document describes necessary details concerning the transfer from
today's discipline oriented organization (the Sleipner model) to a team-
oriented organization (BRA/lBD). (The bible, line 114).
While top managers described the first phase as open and involving, middle
managers and employees reported that there had been little involvement and
hardly any possibilities to affect the change process. Those who said they had a
chance at being involved described situations where they perceived that they
were invited to provide input, but their input was always discarded. Many
employees referred to the solutions that had been worked out unoffically
offshore, but there were also references to the work groups. In both cases the
involvement was seen as symbolic rather than real.
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.... even if we had a lot of work groups and committees and all that .... this
was in place beforehand. ... (Middle Manager, case B) .
The changes are perceived as forced and that creates resistance. People
only do a minimum. We cannot affect anything. The signals are too
strong from above. We can only be in itfor the ride. A lot of good input
has just been ignored. (Employee, case B)
These statements about the preparatory phase were made during the second
phase. After all of the preparatory work was completed, phase two began with
the start-up of a new organizational model. During phase two, the focus of the
local implementation project turned to implementing IT changes.
Responsibility for realizing the benefits of the organizational changes was
handed over to the line management. A few months after the new organization
was implemented, employees and middle managers seemed to be in a state of
shock. Decisions were not being made and people were paralyzed due to the
changes. No one was taking charge of the change process. Since the local
implementation project, SLEBRA, had moved on to work on the IT changes,
OD people had been promoted or gone back to their previous jobs. Employees
described this period in the following ways:
When we had training we would ask "what do we do now? " and then we
were told that our division had to decide by itself Who in our division
decides this?" (Employee about phase IL case B)
A classical mistake that was done was to have a group work at this "start
document" and then transfer these people to other positions. Who is
there to answer questions then? (Employee, case B).
The top managers in the business unit also described the period as a time when
no one was taking charge. They expressed disappointment in middle
management and were asking why middle managers failed to take
responsibility and get involved. The middle managers, on the other hand, felt
that they were on their own and that they were incompetent in managing the
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change process. They were also uncertain about how much charge they could
take based on their new role as coaches. Middle managers were asking why the
top managers or project people refused to support them or take charge -of the
change process. There were training seminars during this period, but most of
the training concerned the new IT-system. Other types of seminars were
criticized as too focused on keeping the pressure on.
They focused on keeping up the pressure without supporting - which was
what was needed. The human aspects of this were not discussed. I was at
the meetings to get support and additional knowledge, but all I got was
more frustrated" (Middle Manager, case B).
When middle management cried for help and assistance, the lack of support
from top management was not based on ignorance. Top management had not
expected middle management to react with paralysis. When they did, then they
were deliberately left alone by top management, based on the belief that this
might force them to take responsibility.
We demobilized the project in May but kept the pressure on until the end.
You can 't use a project organization to do line work, then you 'll never
get it right. (Implem~ntation Leader for OD, case B)
The quote illustrates that top management and key actors saw a need for line
management to take over responsibility of the change process. During this
time, there was talk both at the top level within the business unit and at
corporate level about what to do with the middle managers and employees who
were unable or unwilling to change. Statements such as "does/should this
organization have room for employees who are unable to change?" could be
heard. The data collected for this dissertation shows no evidence that this was
communicated downwards in the organization, just that these types of
questions were debated at higher levels. These types of statements indicate
that, at this time, most top manager~ did not understand how employees
experienced the change. Top managers tended to refer to lower levels as
difficult and resisting changes and therefore there was little willingness to
support middle and lower organizationallevels.
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Towards the end of phase two, the frustration hit the ceiling. Employees,
middle managers, and top managers all described how the pressure and tempo
had to be reduced somewhat in May and June. For a brief three-week period
(during revision stop) the old organizational model was reintroduced and
employees were very happy about this. Earlier negotiations had resulted in an
agreement to use the old way of organizing during revision stop because the
three week shut-down required extremely efficient and well-known work
routines. A new way of working might not yet be as efficient. During the
summer, support was increased as two change facilitators were appointed to act
as process advisors. Top management further imposed some controlover the
process by initiating evaluations during the change process. Three evaluations
of the change process were plarnied in addition to a larger evaluation, which
would be conducted one year after implementation of OD changes (The
January-Evaluation). Unlike the three "process-evaluations", the January
Evaluation had been planned from the start. The three process evaluations were
introduced during the change process in order to follow the development of the
process more closely and to correct and adjust minor things. Management
made it clear that major adjustments would not be done until after the one-year
trial period.
In line with the employees' construed reality that has been described so far, the
May Evaluation (the first evaluation) showed that employees felt the changes
were going too fast; there was a lot of chaos and frustration; inconsistent
management and a lack of upward communication; no trust in corporate top
management; and motivation and work environment was suffering. In
retrospect, one of the key actors in the implementation project no longer
blamed the middle managers but said:
In the period between January and March 2000 it seems like people
thought we could just push the button ...we had no one to continue the
process. There was no active support from onshore. (Assistant Project
Leader, case B)
Another top manager had begun to question some of the assumptions
underlying the BRAlIBD change initiatives.
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Af/at organizational model rests on afundamental assumption that
everyone in the organization wants to see the big picture and wants to
develop within the organization. But this is not necessarily so. (rap
Manager, case B)
Descriptions about the last phase of the change process showed less of a
discrepancy between manager and employee views. Both groups described
how the process had been slowed down, and how they almost had to start over
again after having gone back to the old way of working for three weeks. A new
Operations Manager replaced the previous one (who was promoted) in the
middle of phase two. The new Operations Manager contributed to decreasing
the divergent Cks in terms of both process and content by reaching out to the
employees, slowing down the process, and increasing support. Unlike the
implementation leaders and the previous Operations Manager, who had seen
their main task as implementing the corporate decision, the new Operations
Manager saw his main task as looking out for the business unit. He attempted
to rebuild trust between middle management and top management and
appointed a full-time implementation coordinator. The coordinator was a
previous middle manager that held legitimacy within the organization. He was
to work closely with the two change facilitators. Although things were slowed
down, management officially continued to emphasize that no adjustments
would be made within the first year. Unofficially however, employees were
getting hints at possibilities of adjustments.
Managers have indicated that we might go back to the old organization.
It 's almost like before, because the changes are on paper, but we don 't
need to follow them. (Employee, case B)
As expected, the January Evaluation eliminated some of the change elements in
BRA and IBD. Because of the dissatisfaction with the early process,
management was pressured both in terms of who would perform the one-year
evaluation, and the focus and results of the evaluation. The January Evaluation
became extremely important for showing employees a fair process this time
around.
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I hope it's-done right this time [about phase Ill} and that they [manage-
ment in the business unit} will play with open cards and have an open
and honest agenda" (Middle Manager, case B)
As opposed to business unit one, this case revealed a discrepancy between CRs
within the business unit. The different CRs concerning process were extremely
damaging to the work environment as they created mistrust between top
management and the rest of the organization. Data includes only a few
statements from Corporate BRA members, but these statements indicate that
corporate members held a similar view of the change process as the top
managers within the unit. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that
initially, corporate members had great hopes for this unit and encouraged us to
collect data in this unit. Organizational members within the central BRA
Project expected that business unit B would be successful in implementation
and that they would go far in terms of changes.
CRs about the corporate change process were fairly static. The change process
was seen as extremely rigid and top-down managed until the new Operations
Manager slowed things down and indicated that modifications could be
expected as a result of the January Evaluation. Only in phase III did employees
and managers really begin to believe in possibilities for local variations of
BRA. This was despite several signals, earlier in the process, about possibilities
for flexible solutions from the UPN level (corporate) and from other business
units that were implementing BRA and IBD.
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The tables below summarize the CRs about process case B:
The process needs to be
slowed down.
Trust in (partly new)
management is slowly
regained.
Employees resist
changes because they
are unwilling to change.
Need to increase
pressure.
The process needs to be
slowed down.
Too much has been done
too fast. Employees were
not ready. Support needs
to be increased.
Top-steered process
Top-steered and
corporately controlled
process
The changes are
impossible to effectuate
because they are
unclear. Some of the
decisions that were made
were wrong and the
change process has
been unfair.
Top management can
not be trusted after this
process. They have not
given any support.
More flexible change
process. Possible to
affect OD changes at
business unit level.
Top-steered and
corporately controlled
process
Table 12: Construed Realities about Process in Case B
Descriptions of the change process in Case C
The last case in this study was one of the last business units that implemented
BRA. Similar to case A, 'the most significant discrepancy in CRs was between
the business unit and corporate level. Although the process involved several
internal conflicts about content, top managers and employees described the
process in a similar manner. There were no significant changes in CRs over
time in this unit. CRs about process included: (1) Corporate members described
the change process in the business unit differently from business unit members.
(2) Employees and managers in the business gave similar descriptions of the
change process. (3) The descriptions ofboth the local and the corporate change
process were fairly stable over time.
Overall, the change process in business unit C can be characterized as
involving much hard work, a lot of political processes, and scepticism towards
BRA and IBD at all levels. At the same time, the process was described as
stable and continuous because the Implementation Leader and some of the
other key actors were involved from phase one to phase three, which meant a
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time period of three to four years. At a general level of description both
corporate level members and business level members agreed.
Business unit members described the preparation phase as filled with analyses.
Work groups tried to come up with a good solution for a new organizational
model. Similar to case B, here too were stories about how opposition in the
early phases had been quieted down and won over. However, this was never a
major issue of concern in the unit since employees had their say right after the
report with the new organizational model was released. The new organizational
model was very much in line with BRAlIBD intentions, although the plan was
to implement the changes over a longer time period and in four steps. Most
employees focused on the proposed changes however, and did not grasp the
long time frame that was suggested.
This report [the S&L report} was similar to the [case B} model. But we
never intended to implement everything overnight. It was a stepwise
model which we intended to use three years on implementing. (Project
Leader, case C)
After the report had been released, a representative group was appointed to
conduct a consequence analysis. Consequence Analyses were standard
procedure and a part of best-practice requirements in large-scale organizational
changes in the corporation. The purpose was to evaluate the consequences of
performing the suggested changes. Several of the other business units had
skipped this analysis. Managers and employees in the business unit described
how a representative group of eight people suddenly exploded into almost sixty
people working on the analysis. The report that came out of this analysis
reflected employees' views, much to the frustration of the group leader who
came from the corporate change management group. The Consequence
Analysis presented 120 detailed concerns about the new organizational model -
all of them represented negative consequences.
What surprised us was that no positive effects of BRA were included in
the analysis. They said they had looked for positive effects but couldn 't
find any. (Implementation Project Leader, case C)
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At the time, the CEO who had pushed for the step-wise model had left the unit
for another position in the company, and there was no new CEO in place yet.
After 3-4 months without a CEO, a new CEO was in place and he was also
explicitly doubtful about BRAlIBD. This was at a time when many other
business units were struggling with BRAlIBD implementation and the UPN
report had been on the table for six months. Recall that the UPN report
basically opened up for flexibility and variations in how far the business units
wanted to go in terms of several of the BRAlIBD changes. As mentioned in the
previous section, this did not seem to affect the organizational model chosen in
the case B. In this case, however, the new CEO had doubts about BRA and
lBD and the suggestions in the UPN report were more actively used in this
business unit.
The CEO decided to view the Consequence Analysis as the voice of the
employees. The CEO and the Implementation Leader responded to all 120
issues, and proposed that due to the resistance from the employees, the
organization would only go through with the first two steps. The first two steps
included implanting a new activity-based governance model and redistributing
responsibilities based on system and areas, as well as continuing the work with
situational teams. The first two steps excluded reducing the number of middle
managers and introducing administrative roles in the teams. This new and
revised suggestion for organizational model could to some degree be supported
by the UPN decision.
It [the Consequence Analysis J pointed to some of the weaknesses I was
afraid of which we are now seeing in some of the other divisions. It was
all right to get the Consequence Analysis on the table. It confirmed what
top management saw. But we would never have implemented this one
hundred percent anyway. Implementing BRA/IBD would have resulted in
people spending their time in meetings and behind the PC instead of in
their work clothes doing their job. (CEO, case C)
While management eliminated the most controversial changes, they also made
the employees responsible for cutting down the number of changes they would
implement. Top management emphasized that the division could no longer
apply for lBD approval and the higher salary level. Union members then
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became involved and reintroduced enough changes so that the unit could apply
for IBD approval and the increased salary.
We wanted our unit to get the pay-raise to level H as well, since other
units had gotten it before they actually implemented the changes, based
on intentions about implementing IBD. (Implementation Project Leader,
case C)
We were very explicit in the adjusted model about not being eligible for
Salary Level H The unions then entered the scene and ..... they pretty
much described what was in BRA/IBD - cooperation across disciplines,
increased responsibilities, and team work We thereby got a "Step 2
Plus" version, which qualified us to apply for IBD approval (and Salary
Level H). There was some tactic involved when we did this of course ...
(CEO, case C)
The CEO called a meeting with UPN (the level above the business unit) and a
meeting with the Corporate BRA Steering Committee. In both meetings the
CEO made it clear that the business unit would not make as big changes as first
planned. They would modify the original strategy and make a local version of
BRAlIBD. The CEO explained that the business unit needed to make local
variations in BRAlIBD predominantly based on differences between this
platform organization and other platforms. Business unit C was an old and
complex platform and the Consequence Analysis proved that there was little
willingness and capacity for change among the employees.
I told them [U&P leaders} we would not be going as far as we first had
described. They frowned at this at first, but then it matured a little ..... We
got support and they [corporate BRA leaders} wished us good luck We
felt we had the support from the whole system, and we had expected more
resistance. (CEO no.2, case C)
We argued based on substance and facts that we had to go through a
different change process here compared with some of the other divisions.
Our arguments had to do with our major goals of continuity and safety. "
(Employee, case C)
There were no marked differences in how managers and employees described
the first two change phases. Despite the conflict concerning content, which was
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most vividly illustrated through the Consequence Analysis, most people
described the process in a similar manner, which was as a good and fair
process.
Management listened to us and said it was necessary for us to cooperate
to come up with good solutions. (Employee, case C)
People here are very pleased with the way we 've managed the process.
They feel that they have been involved in the decision-making. (CEO,
case C)
We have been very explicit about our openness internally and we have
gotten good feedback on this. We have gained trust because of it.
(ImplementationProject Leader, case C)
Corporate project members did not see the process in the same positive light
and they described the unit as difficult, stubborn and infused with political
games. According to the top managers in the business unit however, this view
changed as corporate level managers gained more understanding of the
situation.
In the beginning the corporate management said we were doing things
wrong here at case C, but we asked what the other divisions had done.
How were they doing? No one had so far implemented BRAfully, and no
one had implemented BRA successfully. You see, we could argue based
on experience that we did not believe in this. (Assistant Project Leader,
case C)
Wefollowed our gut feeling. We were looked upon as difficult and slow.
But now, even the UPN management says that we need to make local
adjustments ...1 am certain we did the right thing (CEO, case C)
Implementation of the new organizational model and the new IT system
(November 2000) was followed by a training and evaluation period of one
year. Four months after the official implementation, the unit performed an ffiD
evaluation. This was part of an agreement with corporate management. The
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unit had self-imposed an evaluation and if the ffiD evaluation was positive,
salaries would be raised and effectuated back in time (from November, 2000).
In cooperation with so-called neutraloutsiders (myself and another researcher),
the ffiD evaluation group developed a survey to evaluate the degree to which
the changes had been implemented. The evaluation showed that the unit was
doing what it said it would be doing, and salaries were increased accordingly.
Having been part of the ffiD evaluation group, it came as no surprise that the
results were positive. Despite repeated attempts at rephrasing the questions to
get more reliable data, the group opted for "the sure thing". Examination of the
survey showed that it was practically impossible to get negative results the way
the questions in the survey were framed and the way results were interpreted.
When confronted with this, top managers explained that the purpose of the
evaluation was not to evaluate how much of the changes were actually
implemented. Rather the purpose of the evaluation was to use it (1) to
legitimize increased wages (salary level H), (2) as a leverage to pressure
employees to carry through the changes (prior to performing the evaluation),
and (3) to affect corporate managements' view of the change process.
One year after implementation, the business unit carried out a large evaluation.
The purpose of this evaluation (the one-year evaluation) was to formally end
the BRAIIBD change process and to use the results of the evaluation to guide
future organizational improvement activities. The evaluation measured how far
the unit had actually come in terms of changes and recommended what it
should focus on in the future. The evaluation reported slow progress and
emphasized the importance of toning down some ideas - such as teamwork.
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The tables below summarize the CRs about process case C:
The thorough and high
quality preparatory work
lead to a suggestion of full
BRA/IBD change from the
implementation project
group.
Massive resistance
among employees makes
full change impossible ..
The change process
goes smoothly.
It is still a slow process
with limited and controlled
changes.
Slow change process
with evidence of some
change.
There is a lot of political
work and resistance in the
business unit.
They are going backwards
into the future.
All of the necessary
preparatory work is done.
Slow change process
with few changes.
The change process
goes smoothly.
It is still a slow process
with limited and controlled
changes.
Rigid ideas. Must be
possible to affect change
process at business unit
level.
More flexible change
process. Possible lo
affect at business unit
level.
More flexible change
process. Possible lo
affect al business unit
level.
Table 13: Construed Realities about Process in Case C
Discussion and summary of CRs about process
Descriptions of change processes are important because process Issues ate
linked to how satisfied organizational members will be with the change
outcome. Divergent CRs' across organizationallevels could be found between
corporate level and the business unit (case A and C), but also within the
business unit. In case B top managers accounted for the change process
differently than middle managers and employees.
Divergent CRs within the business unit affected the overall perceptions of the
change process much more negatively than did discrepancies between the
business unit and headquarters. Employees in case B were clearly unhappy
with the symbolic involvement in the change process. The frustration with the
change process also resulted in dissatisfaction with change content. Employees
described the changes as excessive and had lost trust in top management in the
business unit. These types of descriptions did not appear in the other cases and
they have to do with perceptions of how fair the process has been. Procedural
justice theory holds that process fairness is linked to involvement,
explanations, and clear expectations (Konovsky, 2000). All of these
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dimensions of fairness were problematic in case B, and resulted in considerable
damage in the work environment. In case A and C, on the other hand, where no
signs of unfair process were evident, employees and managers could focus on
negotiations about content, internally or vis-a-vis corporate management.
According to existing research, CRs about process are likely to change over
time (Isabella, 1990). If asked to describe the process two years later, most
employees and managers would probably have quite different recollections of
what happened, both because memories tend to be selective, but also because
decisions and actions tend to look differently from a distance. The data
collected here does not capture significant changes in CRs over time very well,
probably because the time frame is too short. In case B, however, top managers
clearly changed their descriptions about the change process and content over
time.
There are more signs of changes in CRs about the change process at the
corporate level, which incorporates all three years. Over time, the corporate
BRA process was increasingly perceived as possible to affect. Early references
to BRA almost exclusively described a top-steered and tightly controlled
change process. As each business unit became more familiar with BRA, the
changes initiated from the corporate BRA project were viewed as less rigid,
This was particularly the case for OD changes. The last business unit studied
here described BRA and IBD as fairly rigid, but worked actively to affect both
the change content and process in the business unit.
6.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter presented CRs about the context, content, and process of change.
CRs refer to shared interpretations of events and actions, which guide the
attribution of meaning and significance to specific organizational events
(Isabella, 1990, pg. 9). Based on a sensemaking perspective, different CRs
within each case were identified and presented. The following discrepancies in
CRs were found in the data: (l) Discrepancies between internal and external
. .
CRs. CRs within the business unit differed from CRs at corporate level. (2)
Divergent CRs within the business unit. Top managers' CRs differed from the
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rest of the organization (employees and middle managers). (3) Cks changed
overtime.
Discrepancies between internal and external Cks were found for both content
and process in case A and case e. In case A the discrepancy was obvious, but it
was never a big issue, probably because the relationship was seen as rather
unimportant. In the third business unit however, the discrepancy was somewhat
disguised by a short-lived but very noisy conflict within the business unit. This
conflict seemed to indicate that there was a discrepancy in Cks about content
within the business unit, between management and employees. A close
examination of the data indicates that there was no real conflict within the
business unit. No one in the business unit wanted to implement BRA and IBD
fully. The reasons for staging an internal conflict will be probed in the next
chapter.
While there were no internal discrepancies in terms of context, internal
discrepancies were evident both in terms of content (case B and e) and process
(case B). Both of these discrepancies in Cks lead to conflicts. The conflicts
were handled quite differently however. This will also be elaborated on in the
next chapter, which links diverging Cks to modifications.
Multiple Cks thus appeared to diverge either between the corporate level and
the business unit level, or within the business unit level between top
management on the one hand and lower level management and employees on
the other hand. Discrepancies in construed reality across organizational levels
are summarized in the table below.
CASE A
_-------i ---- _
CASES
......_-.------------\
,,,,,,
............ _--_ ... _ ..... "' ..
Figure 11: Overview of Diverging Construed Realities
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CASE C
As the figure shows, the discrepancies in CRs correspond to how key actors'
interpreted their main task. When key actors saw their main task as
implementing the corporate decision (case B), then discrepancies in CRs
appeared within the business unit between top management and employees,
while no such discrepancy was found between top management and the
corporate level. When key actors saw their main task as looking out for the
business unit on the other hand, such as in case A and C, the discrepancies in
CRs were between headquarters at the corporate level and the business unit.
The CRs of context changed over time in two of the business units. In one case,
organizational identity and image improved over time (case C), whereas in
another case (case B), it deteriorated. Changes in image were linked to the
apparent success of the change initiative. CRs of content changed mostly at
management level as top managers saw more and more challenges over time
and when there was an initial discrepancy, managers tended to move towards
employees' views of the change process. Employees were more willing to
cooperate if management acknowledged their opinions, but employees'
descriptions about change content remained surprisingly static over time. This
was the case even when the change content had been severely modified within
the business unit.
CRs about process changed over time. The corporate BRA process, particularly
the OD component, was increasingly viewed as optional, or at least flexible. In
case A, the description of the process also developed and changed over time, as
the focus shifted. Another type of change in CRs about process could be found
among top managers in case B, where top managers described the same period
differentlyas time passed by. In May 2000, top managers were describing the
early change process as open, involving and good. In the fall of 2000, top
managers were describing the same time period as too much change initiated
too fast. Part of this shift in CRs over time had to do with new top managers
corning in with a different view. The shift was also clear among remaining top
managers however, and this indicates that managers increasingly understood
the employees' situation.
If one recognizes that sensemaking occurs at all levels of an organization, then
potential misinterpretations and misunderstandings are inevitable.
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Sensemaking processes can be a direct cause of modifications. sensemaking
processes also affect modifications indirectly based on the discrepancies in
CRs that have been discussed in this chapter. In the next chapter, the linkages
between multiple, diverging CRs and modifications will be discussed further.
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7. Linking Construed Realities to
Modifications
This chapter links the construed realities (CRs) presented in chapter six with
the modifications presented in chapter five. Recognizing multiple CRs across
organizational levels and across time is central in understanding why
modifications occur. In this chapter it is argued that multiple CRs are likely to
lead to modifications either directly or indirectly through conflicts and
sensegiving activities.
Multiple and diverging CRs are plotted onto the illustrations of modifications
from chapter five to show the relationship between multiple CRs and
modifications. This data-driven description is followed by a more analytical
discussion. The analytical discussion is divided into three main parts. The first
part deals with the direct effects multiple CRs have on modifications. The
second part shows how multiple CRs can lead to conflict. Different types of
conflict as well as different ways of handling conflict are discussed. The third
part of the analytical discussion looks at how multiple CRs lead to sensegiving
activities by both managers and employees. Sensegiving is different from
sensemaking. Sensemaking has to do with the process of trying to understand
and make sense of new things. Sensegiving on the other hand, has to do with
trying to influence other people's (or groups of people's) CRs. Different tools
and techniques used by organizational members for sensegiving are presented.
In each of the three sections, propositions are developed predicting when and
what types of modifications are likely to occur. First the empirical basis for the
propositions is recapitulated. Arguments describing why the suggested
relationship is likely follow each proposition. Finally, the proposition is linked
up with existing research.
7.1 Visual Presentation of Multiple Construed
Realities
Construed realities (CRs) are first linked to modifications by superimposing the
multiple CRs found in chapter six onto the illustrations from chapter five.
Previously the illustrations were based on visual mapping of the process, which
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showed how the business units moved from the old strategy to a BRA strategy.
In chapter five, modifications in the strategy were highlighted. Here, the
diverging CRs are included in the visual mapping and the modifications are
labeled according to the typology presented in chapter five. As described in the
methods chapter, visual mapping can be used for simultaneous representation
of a large number of dimensions and to show precedence and the passage of
time. Having identified when modifications occur, makes it possible to probe
the CRs that existed in the organization in the time period prior to the
modification. Recall that organizational members were asked to describe
different phases in the change process, and this revealed differences in CRs
across organizationallevels and over time.
This section provides a visual illustration of the linkages, which facilitates a
more analytical discussion of how multiple CRs are connected with
modifications. A brief recapitulation focusing on CRs (from chapter six) and
modifications (from chapter five) precedes each illustration.
Case A:
In case A, there was not much going on in the preparation phase. In the
implementation phase, corporate level and business unit level members
described different CRs when asked about change context and content.
Corporate level members' expected changes in both IT and OD in the business
unit, but the unit strategically interpreted their situation to be one that only
needed IT changes. The planned strategy in the business unit still contained
OD elements, but there was wide consensus within the unit that IT changes
would be in focus. The gap between the actual changes and the planned
changes thus consisted of OD changes that were not implemented.
The first local improvement group picked up the OD elements that had been
left out by the local implementation project and worked on them for
approximately six months. Management became pressured due to poor industry
results and needed to reap benefits of OD changes. Immediate action was
needed. Conveniently, a newly formed alliance with another oil company
provided opportunities. CRs about what needed to be done in terms of changes
(content and process) had changed over time. A second local improvement
group was established based on this and focus was turned to one specific area
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of OD changes - operations and maintenance. The new OD group formulated a
new change program (MERIT) based on competencies within the allied oil
company and hence a contraction type of modification, involving OD changes
in one area only, occurred.
After the operations and maintenance changes were implemented, a third
improvement group took over responsibility for local improvement work. This
time the broader issues, which had been addressed by the first improvement
group, were picked up again. An expansion modification was therefore
expected at the time data collection ended. Again, CRs about content and
process had changed. One reason for this change in CRs over time was that the
business unit had showed good performance indicators so the pressure was off
for quick results. Another reason seems to be that the idea of further OD
changes had matured in the organization. Issues within BRA that had
previously seemed irrelevant were now up for discussion again.
Strategic
: lnterpretation---------------------------------------1-----:-----------1---,,,,,,
! Contraction
t_____ -,,
Preparation Phase (mid 1997 - Oct.1998)
Implementation Phase (Nov.1998 - Jan.1999)
Diverging CRs between Corporate and Business unit level
members.
Strategic interpretation
Locallmprovement Phase (Feb.1999-
CRs about content and process have changed over time in the
business unit.
Contraction
CRs about content and process have changed over time in the
business unit.
Expansion
Expansion
?
Time
Figure 22: Un king Divergent CRs to Modifications in Case A
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Case B:
In case B, the business unit saw benefits in coupling BRA and mD. The local
formulations lead to expansion of the strategy, by coupling BRA with IBD.
Once changes had been implemented in phase II, employees experienced
problems in actually performing their work according to the new strategy. The
employees did not immediately understand what the change meant for their
everyday work life, and there was a time lag in which they tried to make sense
of the changes. What did it mean to have a role in the integrated team? How
much time should the team members spend together? An interpretation error
occurred based on the existence of multiple CRs. Middle management and
employees in the business unit did not have the same level of understanding
concerning the content of the strategy as top management. Middle management
and employees also became very preoccupied with the change process and
described it as top down and non-supportive. Once middle management and
employees began to understand what the changes implied, they realized they
did not agree with the change content. The multiple and diverging CRs
concerning change content and process resulted in a full-blown conflict
between top management on the one hand and middle management and
employees on the other hand.. The conflict escalated and middle management
and employees responded to increased pressure by noncompliance.
Finally management dealt with the conflict by slowing down the process and
increasing support. Managers strategically interpreted the planned strategy by
informally deviating from their original plans in terms of how they would
effectuate the change. Employees then began to cooperate in terms of
participating actively in work groups and discussing how to continue working
with the changes. The gap between the actual change and the planned change
was still large however. Only when the planned change was formally modified,
through contraction, was the gap reduced and the map started to look more like
the terrain.
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Preparation Phase (mid 1998 - Dec.1999)
Initial idea at corporate level and business unit CR about content
and process diverge slightly. Expansion
Expansion
Implementation Phase (Jan 2000 - April 2000) ! InterpretationDiverging CR s on content within the business unit.
: error
Interpretation error I
I
Diverging CRs on process within business unit becomes evident. II
I
Conflict I_~_,
I
I
Testing and Evaluation (May 2000· Jan 2001) ..................
Conflict persists I
I
Non-Noncompliance I
Increased divergence within business unit in CRs on content ! complianceI
and process. II
StrategicI
Strategic interpretation II interpretationI
I
I
Contraction..........................
One-year evaluation <,I
I
Contraction II
I
I
I
!Time
Figure 33: Linking Diverging CRs to Modifications in Case B
Case C:
Case C revealed unified a CR in the early phase. Local formulations lead to
expansion of the strategy by coupling BRA and IBD. Once management
presented a complete suggestion for new organizational model, multiple and
diverging CRs in terms of content became clear within the business unit.
Management and the implementation project had suggested a new model that
went all they way in terms of BRAlIBD. Employees loudly voiced their
opposition in a Consequence Analysis. Management then quickly eliminated
the controversial contents in the change initiative through contraction. They
went so far in their eliminations however, that employees actually reintroduced
some elements of change again through an expansion of the strategy.
Employees were not willing to give up economic benefits that came with the
changes. Both of these modifications occurred during the early implementation
phase, which involved local formulation and ended with parallel
implementation of IT and OD components.
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Actual changes were close to planned changes in this unit. One year after
implementation, an evaluation was carried out. Based on the results from the
evaluation, it was suggested to tone down some of the change initiatives and
hence a contraction was suggested. Signs of strategic interpretations also
became evident. The evaluation report suggested moving from situational
teams to discipline-based teams, which meant returning to the old discipline-
based way of organizing work.
Preparation Phase (Nov.1998 -April2000)
Initial idea at corporate level and business unit CRs about
content and process diverge slightly. Expansion
Expansion
Contraction
Implementation Phase (May 2000 - Nov 2000) ICR's about content apparently diverge within the business unit. ExpansionConsequence analysis report.
Contraction
Multiple GR's about content persist, but this time employees
Iwant more of the new strategy than management suggested. I
I
Expansion II
I
I
I
I
Training & Evaluation Phase (Dec.2000 - Dec.20D1) II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
One-year evaluation. II
I
Contraction II,
Contraction,..Time
Figure 44: Linking Diverging CRs to Modifications in Case C
The three illustrations show that multiple construed realities either precede
modifications, cause conflict, or lead to sensegiving activities. Based on the
data, the following relationship can be proposed:
PI: Multiple CRs, may lead to modifications in strategy, conflict, or
sensegiving activities.
This relationship between multiple CRs and modifications is the essence of this
thesis. It has been argued that CRs diverge both across organizational levels
and across time. The reason multiple and diverging views of what the change
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content, process, and context consist of lead to modifications is because in
planned changes higher level employees formulate the changes while lower
level employees are central in actually performing the changes. If lower-level
employees hold a different view of what the changes are about (multiple CRs
across levels), then it is likely that they will implement variations of the
intended changes. Modifications as a direct effect of multiple and diverging
CRs are often unintentional, where the different CRs remain unrecognized.
Multiple CRs across time are also likely to lead to modifications. If e.g.
managers change their view over time, then the strategy willlikely be modified
accordingly.
Multiple and diverging CRs do not always lead to modifications directly.
Different CRs can also lead to conflict or sensegiving. Conflict requires
recognition of the different CRs and the conflicting parties have to perceive the
matter as somewhat important for them to enter into conflict. It has been
argued that strategic change triggers sensemaking. Because of aspects such as
differences in personality, history, experiences, and position in the corporation,
different individuals and groups of individuals are likely to establish different
CRs about the changes. Once CRs are established it can be very frustrating to
realize that other, and perhaps powerful, groups in the organization hold quite
different and sometimes contrary views about the changes. Conflict is one
response to multiple and diverging CR's. Sensegiving represents another
response. Sensegiving has to do with how people try to affect other people's
sensemaking processes. For the same reasons individuals or groups enter into
conflict, they may choose to try to change other people' s opinion about the
change.
The different elements within the proposition will be developed further in the
remainder of the chapter. Subsequent propositions clarify why and when
multiple CRs are likely to lead to modifications as opposed to when multiple
CRs are likely to lead to conflict and sensegiving activities.
Prior to the development of more specific propositions one might ask if and
when multiple CRs do not lead to modifications, conflict, or sensegiving
activities. It is argued here that multiple and diverging CRs in organizations
will generally lead to modifications, conflict, or sensegiving activities unless
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the groups with different CRs remain autonomous and independent of each
other. If no interdependencies exist between the groups that hold different CRs,
then continuing with different and diverging CRs can be quite unproblematic.
As soon as any connection or interdependencies evolve however,
modifications, conflict, or sensegiving activities are likely to occur.
7.2 Modifications Based on Diverging Construed
Realities
In chapter six, multiple construed realities (CRs) concerning change context,
content, and process were presented. Multiple and diverging CRs were
revealed, mostly between organizationallevels, but also across time.
The fact that organizational members interpret and understand the change
content in different ways can obviously lead to modifications in strategy. The
modifications are not always deliberate, but sometimes due to
misunderstandings or misinterpretation. Modifications may also be more
deliberate and due to strategic interpretation. Six modifications that can be
linked directly to multiple and diverging CRs were found in the data.
1) Strategic interpretation in case A, phase I
2) Expansion in case B, phase I
3) Expansion in case'C, phase I
4) Interpretation error in case B, phase il
5) Contraction in case A, phase III
6) Expansion in case A, phase III
The first four modifications occurred due to diverging CRs across
organizational levels, while the last two modifications involved CRs that
changed over time. Two propositions are presented, which deal with the direct
effect of multiple CRs. Since the propositions in this thesis are based on
empirical findings, the different modifications that lead up to a proposition are
first briefly summarized.
Multiple CRs diverging across organizationallevels
Strategic interpretation in case A, phase 1The business unit chose to interpret
relevant BRA changes as IT-related. It was argued that no organizational
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changes were needed within the business unit, as BRA requirements in terms
of OD changes were already fulfilled by the business unit. This interpretation
of the content of BRA and the local context within the business unit was
different from corporate level ideas. Multiple and diverging CRs concerning
context and content thus existed between corporate level and business unit
level.
Expansion in case Band C, phase l Another change process, IBD, was
coupled with the BRA change and the strategy was thereby expanded. This
occurred during local formulations in the business units and thereby it
represents a discrepancy between corporate level CRs and business unit CRs
on content. Corporate level members did not disagree with the decision to
merge the two change processes, but the idea to expand BRA and include IBD
came up through local formulations within the upstream business units.
Interpretation error in case B, phase 2. Different CRs about content appeared
within the business unit between top management on the one hand and middle
managers and employees on the other hand. This caused interpretation errors.
Organizational members struggled to understand what the changes implied for
their work situations. The result was a discrepancy between actual and planned
changes. Employees did not have the same idea about what should be changed
as the management had, and the mismatch was mostly due to a lack of
knowledge about content at this time. The multiple and divergent CRs about
content did not appear until after implementation of organizational changes.
All of these first four examples show modifications occurring as a direct effect
of multiple and divergent CRs across levels. The modifications occurred
relatively early in the change process. The following linkage can therefore be
proposed:
P2a: .Multiple CRs, which diverge between organizationai levels, are likely to
cause modifications early in the change process.
Multiple CRs that diverge between organizational levels are likely to lead to
modifications, because the strategy that has been planned and formulated at the
top of the organization needs to be made sense of at lower levels. Local
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formulations involve interpretation of what the strategy means, clarification of
how the strategy will affect that particular division or business unit, and an
understanding of how the changes fit with current strategy and other change
and development efforts. In addition to interpretation, local formulations
include operationalization of the strategy. General ideas and goals need to be
translated into concrete action.
When managers and employees at the business unit level make local
formulations, then both deliberate and non-deliberate misinterpretations are
likely to occur. If organizational members at the business unit level have
different CRs than organizational members at the corporate level, the strategy
will be modified either as it is interpreted or as it is operationalized.
It should come as no surprise that people have different views and opinions.
Yet when corporate level managers have worked long to formulate strategy,
they tend to forget that lower levels in the organization might not have worked
on the same issues and arrived at the same conclusions. Because top managers
have worked long at formulation, they tend to define a strategy that is sent
downward in the organization as implemented. At the receiving end, however,
lower level managers and employees are just beginning to work with the new
strategy.
In much of the strategy literature, the focus is on decision-making in the
strategy formulation phase, and less attention is paid to whether or not the
decision can be implemented. In this literature, implementation is viewed
merelyas acting upon decisions. This is similar to the top-management view of
implementation as passing a decision on to the next level. It has been argued
here that implementation involves decision-making at lower levels and these
decisions are not always within the boundaries of higher-level decisions. Even
when members at the business unit level understand the original strategy
correctly, corporate decisions often come up for debate again at lower levels.
Passing a decision onto the lower level does not guarantee implementation.
Local formulation processes present a plausible explanation for why
modifications based on multiple CRs occur early in the change process.
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Another likely explanation for why modifications based on multiple Cks
appear early in the change process is that top management has failed to
communicate the strategy properly to lower levels. Through communication,
top management can get lower level managers and employees to understand
the strategy. A lack of proper communication was the first probable
explanation that came to mind when multiple Cks were uncovered in the data.
However, further examination of the communication processes in the
implementation process showed ample communication. In some instances
employees even complained about too much information because learning
about the change content and process took so much time. This indicates that
communication does not always ensure common Cks.
Recent research has emphasized that one-way communication, where top
management focuses on getting a message through tends to predominate in
change processes (Lewis, Hamel, & Richardson, 2001). It is argued here that
although two-way communication might facilitate recognition of different Cks
and allow for sensegiving activities that might lead to consensus, two-way
communication will hardly eliminate modifications based on multiple Cks.
This is because employees need time to make sense of a new strategy.
Improving and increasing communication does not eliminate the time required
for sensemaking. Organizational members need time to make sense of a new
strategy. Even when all employees understand the new strategy, commitment
to change does not automatically follow. This was illustrated in a previous
citation by a middle manager when he stated that although they (the
employees) had to be loyal to the decision they did not necessarily agree with it
or believe in it.
Strategy implementation and organizational development literature on
involvement recognizes the potential problem of multiple Cks and prescribes a
high level of involvement in the strategy formulation phase. Involving lower
level managers and employees in strategy formulation is a widely accepted
way to create understanding, ownership, and commitment for the change. The
data analysis showed that involvement was not always genuine, and that some
employees felt pressured into consensus during strategy formulation. One well-
known way of dealing with conflict is to elevate the discussion onto a level
where everyone can agree (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). Upon implementation
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and local formulation, abstract and vague decisions need to be operationalized
and then the different CRs are likely to become evident again. Involvement
may therefore not always solve the problem of multiple CRs that diverge
across levels. This is particularly the case when involvement is symbolic rather
than real, and when only a temporary consensus is reached based on group
pressure or abstract and vague decision.
Political perspectives on implementation also recognize potential modifications
early in the implementation phase. Resistance is usually presented as the main
cause of modifications. Multiple CRs can certainly involve resistance,
particularly when they turn into conflict, but it is argued in this thesis that
resistance and conflict often appear later in the change process. Furthermore,
resistance presupposes a conscious action, whereas multiple CRs are not
always recognized, and modifications may be non-deliberate. Political
perspectives do not incorporate such non-deliberate misinterpretations at lower
levels, nor do they account for the time it takes for lower level employees to
make sense of the change and to create an opinion of the change.
Multiple CRs diverging over time
Chapter six also revealed that CRs change over time. This was particularly the
case in the first business unit. Changes in CRs over time lead to expansion or
contraction type modifications.
Contraction in case A, phase 3. Early plans included IT changes and all OD
changes. About six months after implementation, OD changes were officially
narrowed to focus on one area - operations and maintenance. CRs had changed
over time. Most managers and employees saw a focused OD change as natural.
This view evolved partly from the opportunity that appeared through the Shell
cooperation.
Expansion in case A, phase 3. CRs had once again changed over time in case
A. Some OD changes had been successfully implemented. Industry
performance and organizational performance indicators were improving
considerably, and organizational members were ready to consider additional
OD changes.
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Based on these empirical examples of modifications based on CRs that
changed over time, the following relationship can be proposed:
P2b: Multiple CRs, which diverge across time, are likely to lead to
expansion or contraction type modifications.
When CRs change over time within the same group of organizational members,
then modifications are likely to be made through new decisions. This is
because if those responsible for implementing the changes no longer believe
that these changes are optimal, then they will reformulate the strategy, either by
introducing new elements, or by eliminating some of the change elements.
Previous research has found that interpretive schemes (which are here The
whole stream of cognitive research focusing on strategy formulation and
strategic decision-making is based on the idea that when top managers see the
world and their surroundings in a new way, they initiate changes. referred to as
CRs) change over time during implementation (Isabella, 1990). Previous
research has linked changes in interpretive schemes among top managers with
organizational change (Bartunek, 1984), and found that top managers' strategic
issue diagnosing leads to strategic change initiatives (Dutton & Duncan, 1987).
This stream of research links changes in CRs to the initiation of strategic
changes, and not to modifications in a change that is already under
implementation. The proposition above supports and extends previous findings
as it suggests that changes in CR over time not only lead to initiation of
strategic changes, but can also lead to decision-based modifications during a
change process.
The proposition partly contradicts previous findings that argue that change
initiatives have a short time period in which to implement changes - a so-
called "window of opportunity" in terms of achieving change. Several
researchers have argued that if the changes are not implemented within a short
time frame after change initiation, then the opportunity for change is lost (Tyre
& Orlikowski, 1994). Contraction type modifications support this finding, but
here it is argued that also expansion type modifications can occur as CRs
change over time. If organizations expand the strategy over time,· then the
window of opportunity has not been closed, on the contrary. Because CRs
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change and develop over time, some change elements can be left out in the
beginning but then picked up later in the change process, when they are more
appropriate, or when the ideas have matured among more organization
members.
The data suggest two additional ways in which multiple CRs are dealt with,
apart from making modifications. Theyare (1) multiple CRs lead to conflicts
and (2) multiple CRs lead to sensegiving activities. Both eventually lead to
modifications.
7.3 Modifications Based on Conflicts
"People in organizations ... have different interpretations of common events.
When these conflicting interpretations are aired they create political struggles."
(Weick, 1995, pp.53)
As the quote above suggests, different interpretations - or multiple CRs - can
create conflicts if they are recognized and confronted. In this section different
types of conflict are discussed based on the data. The most important issues in
terms of predicting which type of modification (and in turn which kind of
outcome) one can expect based on conflict, has to do with how the conflict is
handled. Whether a conpict is ignored or addressed depends among other
things on whom the conflict is between.
Different types of conflict
The previous chapter identified periods of open and clear conflict in the second
and third case. Multiple and diverging CRs lead to conflict and ultimately to
modifications the following times:
1) Non-compliance in case B, phase III
2) Strategic interpretation in case B, phase III
3) Contraction in case C, phase II
4) Expansion in case C, phase I
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Conflict can be defined as a state of disagreement and disharmony. The
intensity and emotional aspects of the conflict in case B were considerably
stronger than in case C. There are at least two plausible explanations for this.
The first explanation is that the second case depicts a real conflict while in the
third case there was no real conflict within the business unit. Instead, a
potential conflict appeared between the business unit and headquarters based
divergent CRs. Organizational members at all levels of the business unit were
hesitant and reluctant in implementing BRA. Both the first and the second top
manager in case C explicitly voiced doubts about the change initiative. Yet the
first top manager let the local project group work out a suggestion for full-scale
change. The proposed new organizational model was the basis for the alleged
conflict between employees and top management. The second top manager
said that he would never have implemented BRAlIBD fully. He further chose
to view the Consequence Analysis as the employees' voice. Whether or not the
conflict between top management and employees was authentic in case C may
thus be questioned and this issue will be discussed further in the next section
on sensegiving. Although evidence indicates that there was no real conflict
between management and employees in case C, employees could not have
known this for certain at the time. Employees knew about top management
doubts so far, but they were faced with a proposition to go for full-scale change
and they did not yet have a new top manager. Their reactions must therefore be
understood based on an apparent conflict between what they wanted and what
top management and the project group wanted.
The second explanation, for the different caliber conflicts, is that in case C, the
conflict (if we acknowledge it as a real conflict) was short as it was quickly
resolved through modifications. Not only was the conflict short-lived, but it
was resolved during local formulation. Employees in case C naturally felt they
could affect the change process to a greater degree than employees in case B.
The employees in case C kept their arguments against the changes at a more
factual level and did not display the same emotional reactions towards the
change and towards top management. In case B, on the other hand, the conflict
became evident after local formulations were completed and it then included
both conflict concerning content and widely different accounts (CRs) of the
early change process. In retrospect, employees perceived the local formulation
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process as unjust. The reactions came when the changes were affecting
employees' everyday work situation. At this time the changes were not just
theories about how work would be done in the future, but the changes were
occurring at that time. Arguments became very emotional. Employees reported
they felt management was trying to break up the social environment, that
changes were excessive and difficult to deal with, and that they had lost trust in
top management within the business unit.
In order to differentiate between the two types of conflict, conflict before a
decision has been made will be labeled conflict-in-theory. Conflict-in-reality,
on the other hand, refers to conflict that appears or persists after a decision has
beenmade.
Conflict-in-theory appears early in the change process, before decisions have
been finalized. Conflict-in-theory was only evident in case C. This case was
among the last to implement BRA, so from a corporate perspective, this
conflict appeared late. Conflict-in-reality, by definition appears later in the
change process. It seems then, that full-blown conflicts never occurred early in
the change process. Based on this finding, the following proposition is posed:
P3a: Modifications based on conflicts are likely to occur late in the change
process.
The main reason conflicts did not cause modifications earlier in the change
process is that it takes time for organizational members to make 'sense of the
changes. Divergent CRs may exist earlier, but for conflict to appear,
organizational members have to form alliances and find some channels and
modes of communication to express their differences of opinions. The
emotional aspects of conflict-in-reality also suggest that opinions become
stronger once the changes actually affect everyday work, which is later in the
change process.
Existing theory on strategic change process, particularly that dealing with :
resistance, focuses on gaining commitment early in the change process, for
example through involvement in strategy formulation. Recent research
suggests contradictory findings concerning when employees form opuuons
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about change. Conceptual research points out that attitudes towards change are
formed early and that once attitudes are formed they are difficult to change
(Lines, 2002), while empirical research has shown that employees do not have
strong feelings about the change until later in the change process (Bareil &
Savoie, 1999). The above proposition suggests that even when there seems to
be commitment and a positive attitude early in the change process, conflicts
may appear later, once the operationalization of the changes begins.
Different ways of handling conflict
Once conflict is recognized there are different ways to handle it. The conflict
can either be addressed or ignored. In order to understand how top
management handled conflict in the three cases studied here, it is necessary to
explore whom the conflict concerned and how managers viewed their
situations - in other words how they made sense of context.
Diverging CRs were found between both the business unit and the corporate
level, and within the business unit between top management and employees.
The four modifications that were caused by conflict were all apparently based
on conflict within the business unit (if the internal conflict in case C is viewed
as real). Management in the business units handled the apparent conflicts quite
differently. The conflicts were handled either by addressing the conflict
directly or by ignoring it and trying to force the opposing part to give in.
Conflict handling can be linked back to how the members of the business units
made sense of context. In business unit B, management was eager to reinforce
the good image in the unit, and hence conflict within the business unit was
ignored or met with increased pressure to implement changes. In case C on the
other hand, management made sure the internal conflict was communicated
widely and then quickly and smoothly resolved it through contraction. It is
important to point out that the elimination of some of the BRA/lBD elements
was completely uncontroversial. This was what management wanted to do all
along. The external message however, focused on massive resistance internally
in the business unit, which gave management a legitimate reason to retreat and,
make a local version ofBRA/lBD.
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When conflict was addressed (case C), decision-based modifications were
made (contraction and then expansion). When conflict was ignored on the other
hand (case B), employees responded with action-based modifications (non-
compliance and strategic interpretation). Two propositions concerning conflict
handling can be formulated:
P3b: If conflict based on multiple CRs is ignored, then strategic
interpretation or non-compliance modifications are likely.
P3c: If conflict based on multiple CRs is addressed, then contraction or
expansion type modifications are likely.
The way conflict is handled says something about how management views
employees. Most people appreciate being heard and being taken seriously. If
management ignores signs of conflict and continue pushing their own ideas,
then employees' concerns are not being met. One way employees cope with
this is to find alternative ways of doing things, such as continuing to follow the
old strategy or pretend to have changed the way the work. If management on
the other hand listens to the employees' arguments and confronts their
concerns - not necessarily by giving in, but by responding to employees' CRs--
then negotiations, which either expand or contract the strategy, are made
possible.
Existing research on resistance to change focuses on understanding the reasons
for resistance (Ezzamel,Wilmott, & Worthlngton 2001; Guth &-MacMillan,
1986). Different ways of handling resistance are suggested based on different
underlying reasons for resistance. For instance, if employees resist changes
because they fail to agree with the goals, then management should raise the
discussion to a higher level, where it is easier to agree. If employees resist
because they are uncertain whether or not they are able to perform changes,
then management needs to increase employees' confidence and explain how
they can handle the changes (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). There is limited
research on modifications, and hence previous research has not linked conflict
or resistance to different types' of modifications. This relationship is
nevertheless important because the different types of modifications are closely
related to change outcome. If it is important for the organization to implement
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changes at the operational level as well as at the strategic level, then
management needs to deal actively with conflict, as ignoring conflict is likely
to lead to loosely coupled or assimilation type outcomes. (Recall from chapter
five that strategic interpretation and non-compliance are modifications that are
closely linked to loose coupling and assimilation)
7.4 Modifications Based on Sensegiving
Sensegiving can be defined as ''the process of attempting to influence the
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred
redefinition of organizational reality" (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: pg. 442).
Meaning construction and organizational reality refer to what has here been
called CRs. According to Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991), sensegiving is just as
common in strategic change processes as is sensemaking. "Ultimately strategic
change is a negotiation process .... In this negotiation process each group tries
to sell its vision of the future to the others (sensegiving) ... " ( pg.446). In
change intiation, sensegiving has to do with visions of the future. In change
implementation, sensegiving is not only about visions of the future but also
about visions of the present situation. The CRs about context, content, and
process are communicated through sensegiving tools and activities.
Several modifications based on sensegiving were found in the data.
l) Conflict involving contraction and expansion in case C, phase II
2) Contraction in case B, phase III
3) Contraction in case C, phase III
Conflict involving contraction and expansion in case C, phase I. Contraction
and expansion modifications were made because of internal conflict, as
suggested in the previous section. The conflict was used by management in the
business unit for sensegiving activities vis-å-vis corporate management. The
Consequence Analysis, in particular, provided a legitimate sensegiving tool.
The work on the Consequence Analysis had even been headed by a corporate
manager, which increased the legitimacy of the report even further.
Contraction in case B and C, phase III. One-year evaluations of the BRAlIBD
change process were used to communicate CRs at business unit level. Again,
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the business units were using formal sensegiving tools to convince corporate
headquarters that the changes were not appropriate or necessary for that
particular business unit.
Sensegiving activities appeared both before and after local formulations in the
business units. Before decision making, when conflict-in-theory surfaced in
case C, the Consequence Analysis was used first by employees as a tool for
expressing their opinions about the proposed changes and later by management
to show corporate management how low the change willingness was among
employees in the unit. Sensegiving occurred after decision making as well.
Again, both management and employees voiced their opinions and tried to
affect others' opinions. Managers' in unit C used a formal evaluation (the IBD
evaluation) to show corporate management that the unit was doing what it said
it would be doing. The evaluation was performed a few months after
implementation of BRAlIBD. This evaluation was also used to reinforce
employees' views and to give them a sense of going in the right direction. No
modifications followed since the evaluation was more of an a-posterio
legitimation act rather than aimed at future modifications. In both case B and
C, one-year evaluations were performed as a tool for management to use
towards corporate managers to legitimate eliminating some changes.
In all of the examples above, the channels for sensegiving were formal reports
and evaluations. More and less obvious sensegiving activities occur
continuously in organizations and naturally they will not always lead to
modifications. In the corporation studied here, sensegiving through formal
evaluations and reports was such a successful tool that most business units in
the corporation planned to perform one-year evaluations, probably as a means
for legitimizing contractions vis-a-vis corporate headquarters.
Based on these arguments, two propositions about sensegiving activities and
sensegiving tools or channels can be formulated:
P4a: Modifications based on sensegiving activities are likely to occur late in
the change process.
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P4b: If multiple CRs diverge across organizational levels and legitimate
channels for sensegiving are available, then expansion or contraction type
modifications are likely.
Sensegiving activities lead to modifications late in the change process because,
as stated previously, sensemaking takes time and it is difficult to try to affect
other people's opinion (give sense) before one has made sense of the changes
and clarified one's own point ofview. In planned change initiatives, employees
are usually the last to "receive" the changes and sensegiving by employees
therefore appears relatively late in the change process. Much of existing
strategy research seems to assume that decisions made in the formulation
process necessarily frame later decisions. Involving employees early in the
change process, during formulation, is often seen as a way to secure
understanding and commitment for the changes, and to avoid later
confrontations and negotiations about the changes. The above proposition
suggests that employees and other organizational members influence the
change content throughout the change process, and particularly late in the
change process, when they have had time to make sense of the changes and
have mobilized support. This was the case even when employees had been
involved in the local formulation process.
Proposition 4b has to do with channels of communication for sensegiving
activities. The data analysis showed that formal reports and evaluations over
time became popular and successful channels for sensegiving activities. While
studies on sensegiving activities during implementation remain rare (with the
exception of Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991 and Balogun, 2001), previous
research on other organizational phenomena has shown a tendency for
organizations to rely on formal and written materials (Langley, 1990). In an
empirical study, Langley (1990) found that formal analysis is used as a key tool
of persuasion and verification in the negotiation process between
organizational levels. Organizations and organizational members seem to
prefer formal materials, which legitimize action to a greater degree than less
formal bases for decisions. The proposition thereby supports and extends
earlier findings concerning the importance of formal and written materials as
tools for legitimizing organizational action.
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7.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter multiple CRs were presented as the major reason for
modifications. In the previous chapter CRs concerning change content, process
and context were found to diverge either across organizational levels or over
time. Three different ways in which multiple CRs were linked to modifications
could be found in the data. (1) A direct linkage between multiple CRs and
modifications. (2) An indirect linkage between multiple CRs and modifications
based on conflicts. (3) An indirect linkage between multiple CRs and
modifications based on sensegiving activities.
The table below presents the twelve modifications at business unit level and
different color shading indicates the major reasons for modifications. Light
gray shading represents a direct effect of diverging CRs. Medium gray shading
shows conflict as the reason for modifications. Modifications that are shaded
with dark gray color were caused by sensegiving activities. The illustration
clearly shows how the reasons for modifications shift over time. Modifications
as a direct effect of diverging CRs decrease over time, but they are replaced
with modifications based on conflict and sensegiving. The first modifications
were due to multiple and diverging CRs, later modifications were linked with
conflicts, while sensegiving appeared as a reason for modifications even later
in the change process. The exception is case C, which was among the last to
implement the strategy. The corporate change process had then lasted for four
years already, so although modifications appeared early in case C, employees
and management knew much more about the changes based on the experience
of other business unit.
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•2 Contraction
Modification
number Case A Case B Case C
3 Expansion (?)
4 x Contraction
5 x x
Figure 55: Overview of Modifications over Time
The following table summarizes the propositions that were developed based on
data in this chapter:
Multiple CRs are likely to lead to modifications, conflict, or sensegiving activities.
If multiple CRs diverge across organizational levels and legitimate channels for
sensegiving are available, then expansion or contraction type modifications are likely.
Table 14: Propositions
The reasoning behind the relationships in the propositions were explained in
the chapter, and the propositions were linked with existing research. One
fundamental explanation for the proposed relationships had to do with the time
sensemaking requires. Diverging CRs may exist and cause modifications
directly, but when modifications are caused indirectly by multiple and
diverging CRs, the temporal dimension becomes crucial. Conflicts and
sensegiving activities require more advanced sensemaking and it takes time for
organizational member both to clarify what they think about the changes, and
to mobilize enough support to express their views.
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8. IntegratingModel
This chapter integrates the findings in the previous three chapters through the
development of a model. The model shows the main reasons for modifications
and the outcomes of modifications. The different types of modifications can
easily be included in the model, but have been left out to keep the model as
simple as possible. Based on the model, dynamic outcomes and corporate
outcome are discussed. The findings in the study are also discussed at a more
general level, which has to do with how the findings apply to other strategy
implementation processes.
This thesis set out to answer three questions. The first question asked how a
planned strategy is modified over time. Existing research indicated that during
implementation, some elements within the planned strategy were likely to "fall
out" while other elements were likely to emerge and be incorporated in the
strategy. Chapter five illustrated, empirically, how the planned strategy (BRA)
was modified over time in three business units and how this affected the
change outcome.
The second research question probed reasons for modifying a planned strategy.
The sensemaking perspective was applied as a framework for analyzing and
presenting the findings. In chapter six, CRs about context, content, and process
were presented with a focus on identifying multiple CRs that either diverged
across organizational levels or changed over time. In chapter seven, multiple
and diverging CRs were linked to modifications. Propositions were formulated
predicting when different types of modifications are likely to occur.
The third research question asked about the effects modifications have on
change outcome. In chapter five three different types of change outcome were
identified: loose coupling, assimilation, and accomodation.
The findings can be summarized in the following model:
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Figure 66: Integrating Model
The model shows how multiple Cks directly and indirectly lead to
modifications. Indirect effects are channeled through conflicts and sensegiving
activities. Interdependencies between conflict and sensegiving are shown by
the gray arrow from conflict to sensegiving. The light color indicates that this
relationship is not a main focus, but conflict can lead to sensegiving, and
conflicts can be used in sensegiving activities.
The change outcomes are linked back with multiple Cks showing the dynamic
realtionship between reasons for modifications, types of modifications, and
change outcome. The dynamic dimension in the model also emphasizes that a
change outcome is never final, and that any change outcome may result in
persisting or new discrepancies Cks, which in turn trigger further
modifications.
8.1 Dynamic Outcomes.
The feedback line in the integrating model indicates that outcomes are not
static. The data analysis revealed that business units moved between different
outcomes over time. All three cases studied here moved towards accomodation
outcomes over time. In at least two of the cases (A and B), other types of
outcomes could clearly be found earlier in the process.
In business unit A, the strategic interpretation, which limited the BRA changes
to the IT component lead to an assimilation outcome. The organization
pretended to have changed according to the new strategy, but closer
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examination showed that what they referred to as e.g. integrated teams was
quite different from the description of teams within the new strategy. Later,
however, the unit did implement a selection of the BRA changes. These
changes satisfied several of the BRA principles, and thus the outcome had
moved towards accomodation, where some things were changed in accordance
with BRA, while others were kept as before. There was no longer a mismatch
between changes at the strategic level and changes at the operational level,
because the plans at the strategic level had been modified through contraction.
A probable expansion appeared at the end of the data collection period, but
could not be confirmed at that time.
In case B, the first outcome assessment showed a gap between changes at the
strategic level and changes at the operationallevel, indicating loose coupling or
assimilation. In this case there was no pretence of having performed the
changes however. The gap was not based on strategic interpretation, but rather
interpretation error - employees had problems changing the way they worked.
The modification lead to a loosely coupled change outcome. Loose coupling
persisted after non-compliance modifications, but when management
strategically interpreted their own plans for change, the outcome moved
towards assimilation. Management implicitly allowed employees to work
differently from the plan. When the planned strategy was explicitly modified
through contraction, the business unit moved towards an accommodation
outcome. The different outcomes and modifications in this business unit are
plotted onto the original illustration of the phenomenon below.
Corporate
Intentions
Outcome
Increased
Preformance?
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Figure 77: An Example of Modifications and Outcomes
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In the business unit C, intensive work was done early in the process to
understand the implications of the new strategy. Management explicitly stated
that they would not implement all changes. Early modifications, in the form of
expansion, contraction, and then expansion again, lead to an accommodation
outcome fairly early in the change process within the unit. The accommodation
outcome persisted. In the early phases some new concepts were invented. One
example was "situational" teams. BRA and IDD introduced the concept
"integrated teams". Business unit C wanted to distinguish between permanent
teams and temporary teams, as they preferred to have temporary teams.
Inventing new concepts is in accordance with an accomodation outcome as
long as old practices are not just relabeled. "Situational teams" was a way to
introduce the team dimension without losing disciplinary belonging. In the
one-year evaluation, however, new terms were again introduced. One example
was discipline-based teams. The unit picked this term up from another business
unit. The old way of working (in disciplines) presided at the operational level
and the disciplines were simply renamed into teams. At the time data collection
was completed, it was not yet decided whether the unit would move from
situational teams to disciplinary teams. If the unit ends up re-labeling the
disciplines into teams, then they will have modified the strategy through
strategic interpretation, and the change outcome is likely to move towards
assimilation.
Different types of modifications cause organizations and business units to
move between different change outcomes over time. It has been argued that
multiple and divergent CRs trigger modifications. Multiple and divergent CRs
evolve due to the sensemaking processes that occur once strategic change has
been initiated. Multiple and divergent CRs cause modifications, and the change
outcome depends on which modifications have been made. For instance, when
a strategy is modified through interpretation error or strategic interpretation,
the change outcome is a loosely coupled strategy. Additional modifications can
then be expected since loose coupling implies that there is still a discrepancy
between the strategic and the operational level. The planned strategy is
different from actual changes, hence different views about what the changes
consist of probably persist in the organization. This is similar in the case of
assimilation. In the case of accomodation however, multiple and diverging CRs
are less likely because consensus has been reached. Changes at the strategic
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level mirror changes at the operational level. This does not mean that
accomodation is a fmal or static outcome however, because CIts change over
time. Changes over time are likely to either cause further modifications or new
discrepancies in CRs. It is therefore possible to move in any direction between
the different outcomes. The timing for evaluation of changes therefore
becomes extremely important.
If organizations are likely to move between different types of change outcomes
over time, then it is also important to speculate on when they are unlikely to
move between different outcomes. This is most likely linked to the underlying
reasons for initiating change. If the reason for introducing change in the
organization is predominantly based on legitimation purposes (wanting to show
others that the organization is keeping in tune with new business ideas etc),
then a loosely coupled change outcome is likely to occur and to persist. It
provides the organization with credibility externally, while internally it allows
the organization to focus on efficiency without too much "disturbances" from
changes. If the rationale behind the changes on the other hand consists of
performance benefits, which can only be gained based on the philosophy and
principles within the new strategy, then it is likely that the organization moves
towards an accomodation outcome over time.
8.2 Corporate Level Outcome
How did the change outcomes affect performance at the corporate level? The
BRA change process was initiated to streamline work across the business units.
This was supposed to create efficiencies and result in cost cutting for the
corporation. When the business units only partially implemented the changes,
then naturally some of these efficiencies could not be realized. The corporate
level change outcome will always at least consist of an aggregate of the change
outcomes in the business units. In this research, only three of twenty-nine!
potential business units were included in the study. Based on the partially
implemented strategy in the three business units, the corporate outcome must
necessarily fall in the partially implemented category as well.
l Based on the implementation plan from 1998, see appendix B
180
The three business units, as well as the other business units in the corporation
had implemented the IT system. Although it was not always used exactly as
intended, it was being used quite successfully. Organizational elements
involving new work processes were mostly implemented in terms of operations
and maintenance. Empowerment and responsibilities down to the lowest level
were partially implemented but middle managers had not been significantly
reduced, nor taken on much of a different role.
In the BRA Final Report, the corporate BRA Program, which was responsible
for the BRA change process, evaluated the change outcome and discussed
experiences and learning, which could be applied in future change processes.
The report states: "According tothe objective, Statoil has introduced seven
group work processes through BRA: accounting, finance, human resources,
procurement and supply, operations and maintenance, sales and distribution
and project development" (Pg.1). The report continues: " The BRA project has
been completed in a shorter period of time than was estimated at the start of
the project in the autumn of 1996, and approximately 10 per cent below
budgeted costs. In accordance with the objective, Statoil has introduced an
administrative solution which is flexible in relation to both changing
organisational frameworks and different geographicallocations" (pg. 1)
The report presents a number of suggestions based on what worked well and
what needs to be improved in future change processes. Overall the evaluation
concludes that the strategic goals were reached within less time and at less
costs than estimated. The change appears to have been a success. This is in
contrasts to the findings of partial implementation in the business units and
reveals a discrepancy between the strategic (corporate) level and the
operational (business unit) level, which indicates that the change outcome at
corporate level can be characterized as assimilation.
In the report, there are hints that the change process might not have resulted in
attainment of all initial goals, such as in the following statement: "In the BU
[Business Unit], it is important that the action plans which the units create
during the implementation of BRA are realised. Units with inadequate plans or
unclear relationships to the BRA processes must befollowed up. It is vital that
process owners have the resources to document and follow up the
implementation through the verification and further development of best
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practice ...A change project such as BRA requires active involvementfrom the
management. Disloyalty to a decision to implement change must bring
consequences" (BRA Final Report pg.2).
8.3 Discussion of Findings
Surprisingly many modifications occurred late in the implementation process.
This was surprising because the preliminary research model predicted that
early implementation decisions would set the stage for later ones, and in a
I
sense frame the process (path dependency/sequencing). This was clearly not
the case. On the contrary, the most significant modifications were occurring at
the end of the corporate implementation period, which lasted for four years.
Not only did the modifications occur late from a corporate perspective, but
within the business units, modifications tended to occur relatively late as well,
and usually after local formulations were completed.
In case C, a major modification took place before implementation, and this
modification had serious implications for other business units as well, as other
units followed up with formal evaluations that documented the reasons for
dropping some BRA elements. The question then arises - had this business unit
been the first to implement BRA, would modifications then have occurred
earlier?
The answer is most likely no. Based on the data, at least three reasons for this
seem plausible. The first reason concerns the relationship between time and
modifications, and it strengthens the appropriateness of using sensemaking
theory to understand modifications. Sensemaking takes time. It takes time for
the business units to grasp what the corporate decision is all about. Top
managers in the business units are usually the first ones to begin to make sense
of the changes. For employees, the sensemaking process begins later, and
conflicts, sensegiving and modifications therefore appear late in the
implementation process. In the third case a formal modification was made
early, but only because this unit could draw on years of experience by other
business units within the corporation. The basic arguments for .making
modifications were no different in the third unit, but they were presented more
matter-of-factly and voiced through a legitimate channel - a formal report.
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Most key concerns (such as consequences of flattening the organization,
loosing their managers, learning new skills and forgetting their specialized
skills) raised by employees in case e had already appeared, years earlier, in
other business units, without resulting in modifications.
The second reason that modifications appear late has to do with changes in
Cks over time. Initially BRA was seen as very rigid and top steered by
business unit members. Management and employees in the first two business
units described that they saw no way to affect the change content, nor the
process - particularly when it came to the IT system. Over time however, more
and more indications signaled possibilities to affect not only the change
processes in each particular business unit, but also the change content -
especially the OD elements. One strong signal was the UPN decision to open
up for local variations. It took surprisingly long before this signal reached
lower levels in the business units. In the mean time corporate managers were
being quoted as having indicated flexibility at meetings, larger BRA gatherings
and in more informal connections. So, the Cks about content changed over
time both among corporate members and among business unit members. As
time passed modifications became increasingly accepted.
A final reason modifications appeared late in the change process has to do with
learning. The implementation process was designed to ensure optimal resource
allocation and learning. Focusing on one or a few business units at a time was
supposed to build competence over time and to build a pool of experiences.
The business units did learn from each other, particularly through direct contact
between the business units. They did not however, learn how to implement
BRA better. Instead they learned how they could legitimately avoid
implementing some of the components in the BRA strategy by making
different kinds of modifications.
183
184 .
9. Conclusions and Implications
This chapter consists of conclusions and implications. A brief summary,
emphasizing the main contributions of the study, leads up to a presentation of
practical implications. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future
research follow.
9.1 Contributions
The main goal of this study has been to reveal and explain how planned
strategies are changed upon implementation. A tentative research model was
developed by combining strategy implementation literature with more
emergent change models, also drawing on implementation research from other
fields such as innovation and public policy research. This, while useful to
initiate research, was found to be incomplete in answering the research
questions;
This study shows that modifications do occur in implementation processes. A
typology of different types of modifications. was developed and it might
facilitate and simplify identification of modifications in the future. The
inductive analysis revealing the different types of modifications concluded that
modifications are not always decision-based and formal changes in plans, but
also include change actions by organizational members.
A major reason for modifications is suggested. Preliminary analysis of the data
indicated that the sensemaking perspective best explains why modifications
occur. Modifications occur because organizational members and groups try to
make sense of the change content, process, and context. They develop multiple,
and sometimes diverging, Cks based on sensemaking processes. Diverging
Cks either differ among organizational groups or change over time within the
same group. When multiple and divergent Cks exist, one of three things is
likely to happen. (1) The strategy is modified. (2) The groups/members enter
into conflict. (3) The groups/members try to affect each other's views through
sensegiving. Early modifications are likely caused directly by multiple and
diverging Cks, based on misunderstandings or local formulations of the
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strategy. Later modifications are more likely caused by conflict handling or
sensegiving activities.
This research also contributes to research and practice on evaluation of change
processes. Three intermediate change outcomes, between implementation
failure and implementation success were uncovered. Different types of
modifications were closely linked with the different change outcomes. Some
modifications lead to inconsistencies between organizational levels (strategic
level and operational level), while other modifications resulted in
inconsistencies in plans over time. This finding helps us predict the effect
different types of modifications have on change outcome. The finding also
emphasizes the importance of timing when performing change evaluations.
Change outcomes are dynamic. Evaluations, based on traditional estimations of
success and failure, do not incorporate how the degree of change tends to vary
across organizationallevels and over time.
9.2 Limitations
The most obvious limitation of this study, as with most case studies, concerns
the possibilities to generalize from the findings and the objectivity of the
findings.
Case studies can include a large number of cases, although usually case studies
consist of one or a few cases. Here three business units were chosen as cases,
but the change process was also studied at the corporate level. Three cases does
not allow for generalization to a greater population. In this inductive study, the
goal was to build theory from data and hence to generalize to theory, not to a
larger population. The applicability of the theoretical model that was developed
can only be assessed through future studies.
Ano~er well-known limitation of qualitative studies is the question of
objectivity. Qualitative researchers cannot avoid bringing some of their own
ideas and meanings into the research. While there is always a risk that data
collection is affected by a subjective researcher, all interview data (with only
one or two exceptions) were transcribed verbatim and all interviews and
secondary documentation are available in a database and can be recoded and
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analyzed again. The analysis procedures have been described carefully and
specifically to allow other researchers to follow the theory-building process.
While precautions have been taken to increase the validity and reliability of the
study, there is always a risk that another researcher would come to quite
different conclusions based on the same data material.
9.3 Practicallmplications
Many organizations struggle to implement strategies and the lack of
theoretically based research and theoretical perspectives on implementation
does not help. This study explores changes in strategy during the
implementation process and presents different types of and reasons for
modifications along with a suggested theoretical perspective.
A sensemaking perspective on implementation processes predicts that
modifications in planned strategies do not necessarily occur early in the change
process. The focus on initial phases in change processes may thus be
exaggerated. If what is decided in early phases is likely to be modified later,
then why spend so much time trying to improve early decisions? Because good
decisions make modifications unnecessary? From a sensemaking perspective,
modifications are bound to occur regardless of the quality of the initial plan.
Initiations of change always trigger sensemaking processes. Only a recognition
of and understanding for the sensemaking that occurs at all levels in the
organization over time, can improve the likelihood of success in future change
processes.
The findings in this study have practical implications for: (1) the planning of
strategic changes; (2) change management; and (3) evaluations of the changes
and the change process.
Most people agree that careful planning remains essential in strategic changes.
In this study it was found that major modifications in strategy occur despite
careful planning. Organizations therefore need to include more flexible and
emergent features in their plans and they need to be careful in allocation of
resources, to ensure that a majority of the resources are not spent planning for
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the change. Sticking to initial plans can be important for top managers for
several reasons. Managers who make radical decisions, and succeed in acting
on decisions are often seen as strong and good leaders. Managers who change
their decisions and are open for adjustments, are more often perceived as weak
or indecisive. Modifications need to be introduced in a more positive light in
organizations and not just viewed as a loss of control. Modifications leading to
accomodation outcomes can be a sign of advanced sensemaking. When
organizational members at the business unit modify corporate intentions, then
one reason for this could be that they have been able internalize the changes by
adapting both themselves and the strategy.
The findings also have implications for management of the change process. A
sensemaking perspective on implementation suggests that modifications occur
throughout the change process as organizational members make sense of the
change process and construe different realities over time. The time
sensemaking requires should not be underestimated. Top managers cannot just
drop finished plans onto lower levels and expect business unit members to
understand and accept the changes. Change managers need to provide channels
for sensegiving and allow for two-way communication. Fast-paced changes
may not allow enough time for sensemaking, which is especially important if
the changes involve thinking about and performing daily activities in a
different manner. Pressuring business units and lower organizational members
to perform changes will not eliminate differences in CRs. Increasing pressure
and control might instead have detrimental effects on work environment.
Involvement in early phases might increase understanding among lower level
employees but it does not mean everyone understands and agrees. Likewise, a
lot of information does not mean everyone has received and understood the
message.
Finally, managers need to be more attentive towards how implementation
success and change success is defined. Should success in large-scale and long-
term changes only be related to carrying through original intentions? This
study suggests that modifications are not only negative, and that other change
outcomes exist, within the partially implemented category. These change
outcomes capture discrepancies in changes across organizational levels and
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over time. The study also finds that change outcomes are likely to change over
time, which makes the timing of evaluations of outcome critical
9.4 Theoretical Implications and Suggestions for
Future Research
The findings in this thesis have theoretical implications for strategic change
and implementation research. The implications also lead to suggestions for
future research. Theoretical implications include rethinking the definition of
implementation success, considering new theoretical perspectives for
understanding change and implementation processes, merging emergent and
planned change perspectives, continuing the recent trend of coupling research
on change content with change process, and including multiple levels of
analysis in change and implementation research.
Implementation success has traditionally been viewed as carrying through
initial intentions. This study shows that change outcomes, which would usually
be considered implementation successes, do not always represent change
success at all organizational levels. Three intermediate change outcomes were
found here, but further exploration of alternative change outcomes in between
change failure and change success will likely reveal a multitude of outcomes
along several dimensions. Future research should therefore continue working
on defining implementation success and explore more intermediate outcomes
for a useful typology.
The sensemaking perspective on implementation processes revealed
shortcomings with many existing implementation studies, which focus on
issues such as involvement. In measuring the level of involvement or degree of
commitment, existing research seldom incorporates the many different views
within an organization in terms of these matters. Alternative theoretical
perspectives can shed light on these types of challenges. Findings from a
sensemaking perspective indicate that rapid change processes can be
problematic because they do not allow time for sensemaking, and thus risk that
changes are only made at a strategic level and not further down in the
organization. The sensemaking perspective on implementation also raises
additional research questions. Future research should follow up on Isabella's
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(1990) initiative and study changes in CRs over time, and how reactions to
changes, both at management level and employee level, vary over time. Future
research should also follow up issues such as when attitudes towards change
develop (Lines, 2002), how employees react to change (Bareil & Savoie, 1999;
Stensaker et al. 2001), and how managers deal with emotions in change
processes (Huy, 2002). In addition, future research should address how
descriptions of a change process change over time. This is important because
employees' recollection of an earlier change process is likely to affect how
they view future change processes.
The gaps in degree of change at different levels in the organization show that
research which only measures change at one level risks drawing conclusions
about organizational change on a limited and narrow basis. Future assessments
of strategic and organizational change need to include the lower levels in the
organization, where change actually takes place in everyday activities.
Planned change processes cannot be adequately understood by drawing on a
rational-analytical perspective that assumes everything can be planned in a
rational manner. Future research needs to draw ~n studies ofboth emergent and
planned change processes in order to further explore the challenges in
implementation processes. These challenges are mainly connected with the
emergent features of any change process. A sensemaking perspective has been
suggested here, but other theoretical perspectives should also be employed to
contribute to greater understanding of complex challenges in change processes.
Finally, this study revealed that decisions and plans made during strategy
formulation do not remain static upon implementation. Only by combining
strategy content research with strategy process research can modifications and
other emergent features be revealed and explored. Future research on change
and implementation processes therefore need to study strategic decisions over
time, and explore both formulation and implementation processes
simultaneously. Research on making the right decision, which has here been
referred to as strategy content research, or formulation process research,
remains crucial for strategic change. However, strategic decisions should not
be linked directly to organizational performance because plans are likely to be
changed upon implementation as organizational members make sense of the
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changes. Jeffrey Pfeffer (1992: 19) put decision-making into perspective by
stating the following:
• A decision by itself changes nothing.
• At the moment a decision is made, we cannot possibly know whether it
is good or bad.
• We spend more time living with the consequences of our decisions than
we do in making them.
On the basis of this, he suggests that managers should spend less time on the
decision-making process and more time implementing decisions and managing
the consequences of their decision.
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Appendix A: Glossary of BRA Related Te~ms
(the) Bible
Business unit B's documented and detailed plan on how to move from old way
of organizing to new way of organizing. Focused on the organizational
development (OD) changes within BRA.
BRA
Better Faster Administration (in Norwegian: Bedre Raskere
Administrasjon). A large-scale change program in Statoil. The decision on
BRA was made at corporate level in 1996. BRA would be implemented over
four years.
BRA Basis
The early work of the Corporate BRA Program consisted of a set of core work
processes and a common SAP solution which were named BRA Basis.
BRA Skill Center
One of four units within the Corporate BRA Program. The other units were
Staff, Working Process, and Implementation. BRA Skill Center included BRA
Basis, SAP Technology, Training and Documentation, and Change
Management.
Corporate BRA Program
The BRA Project Group at Corporate Headquarters. Consisted ofhired
consultants, staff members, and members from the different business units. The
Corporate BRA Program worked for over one year after the decision to
implement BRA had been made. The program developed BRA Basis, and BRA
implementation plans.
Discipline-based organization
A way of organizing work. Different disciplines, such as mechanics, are
grouped together. Allows for specialization, but is different from integrated
team based organization where the different disciplines are mixed in teams.
IBD
The Industry's Best Practice (in Norwegian: Industriens Beste Driftspraksis).
Another, more narrowly focused change program in the upstream business
units in Statoil. IBD focused on teamwork and empowerment within operations
and maintenance. This decision was made at UPN level prior to the BRA
decision.
Integrated Teams
Teamwork means responsibilities for performing work is placed with a team.
Team members can have different roles, which to some degree replace middle
managers' roles.
Integrated teams means teams consisting of people from different positions,
e.g. mechanics, operators, and automation.
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Local Implementation Project
The BRA implementation project group within each business unit.
OD changes
BRA changes that involved organizational changes, as opposed to IT changes.
Process
A way of performing work related activities.
Roles
Description of tasks connected with a specific work process in BRA. A role
says something about access in SAP, but it is also used to indicate position and
responsibilities.
SAP/R3
Systeme - Andwendunge - Produkte
An IT-system that integrates different organizational tasks such as
procurements, stock, accounting etc.
Situational Teams
Situational team means team organization on a situational basis. Team
members only work together to solve specific tasks. The team members are
otherwise place with their discipline, eg. mechanics in one group, operators in
another.
Teambased organization
Teamwork means responsibilities for performing work is placed with a team.
Team members can have different roles, which to some degree replace middle
managers' roles.
UPN
The Norwegian Upstream Division. Organizationally located between
corporate headquarters and business unit level but included in the corporate
level in this thesis.
Work Processes
A way of performing work. Refers both to a general organizationallevel, e.g.
accounting, procurements etc., but also to a more specific level which has to do
with a particular task such as doing maintenance on a pump offshore.
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Appendix C: Example of an Interview Guide
O) Who is the informant
• Describe your role in the organization
• Describe your connection with BRA/your role in the BRA change
process
1) Describe the DRA change process in your business unit
• What has been in focus so far? What has been implemented so far?
What has not been implemented yet? What will the unit be focusing
on in the near future?
• How do actual changes correspond with expectations?
2) Give your evaluation of how the following has worked out in the
DRA change process in your business unit
• Communication/information (amount, mode, usefulness etc)
• Possibilities to influence/participate
• Management's capability to motivate employees to change
• Training (amount, content)
• Management of the change process (Who is in charge, corporate or
local managers/actors?)
• Performance measurement and control
3) Change Management and flexibility. Changes in plans.
• Have you experienced any changes in BRA during implementation?
• What would you say were the reasons for those changes?
• Would you say the changes were positive or negative? In relation
to what (implementation success, outcome, performance, corporate
performance)
4) Realization of benefits
• Describe the process around performance measurement and control
of the implementation process
o Do managers focus on realization ofbenefits based on BRA
changes?
o Are there specific goals with BRA changes?
o Do you know if any of the goals are broken down to lower
levels?
o Would you say the goals are realistic?
o Do you know of any process goals that indicate how well
the implementation is going?
• What are the main challenges when it comes to realization of
benefits?
• Which benefits do you expect to gain from BRA?
• How have the expectations for benefits changed over time?
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5) Newwork processes (esp. integrated teams)
• How does the way you perform your job differ today from prior to
the BRA changes?
• What does integrated teams mean to you?
• Would you say the BRA way to work has been adopted by the
organization?
• Has your competence changed since you began to work in teams?
• What has been done to gain acceptance for the new work processes?
6) Cooperation/relationship between BRA and other change initiatives
• What other change processes affect you in your daily work?
• Would you say your unit changes too seldom/too few changes, too
often/too many changes, or just enough?
• How does the BRA change initiative fit with other organizational
and strategic changes in your unit?
(For local implementation project members only):
• How would you describe the relationship between
o The local implementation project and the business unit/line
management?
o The local implementation project and the corporate BRA
Program?
7) Ideal change process
• Has there been any experience transfer/learning? How?
• What would you do differently if the BRA change project began
today. What kind of advice would you give the business units who
have not yet implemented BRA?
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Appendix D: Overview of Preliminary Analysis
Reports
BRA AT MONGSTAD- Six months after "take-off'
September, 1999
Table of contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Methods
1.3 Organization of the report
2 Project Steering
2.1 Expectations to BRA
2.2 Implementing SAP
2.3 Planning activities - adjustments
2.4 Summary
3 Benefits
3.1 Commitment to benefits case
3.2 How to realize benefits
3.3 Costs related to BRA
3.4 Summary
4 Change Management
4.1 Commitment among management
4.2 Involvement and participation
4.3 BRA in theory vs. practice
4.4 Summary
5 Information, Communication and Training
5.1 Quantity of information
5.2 System training
5.3 Change management training
5.4 Summary
6 New Work Processes
6.1 Difference between old and new work processes
6.2 BRA as compared with OD'96
6.3 Efficient solutions
6.4 Flat organization
6.5 Summary
7 System
7.1 Interface between user and system
7.2 Systemintegration
7.3 Summary
8 Conclusions
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BRA/IBD implementation at Sleipner
November 2000
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Findings
1.3 Methods
1.4 Organization of the report
2 Integrated teams
2.1 Actual changes
2.2 Challenges
2.3 Reactions
3 Knowledge of BRA/IBD
3.1 Understanding of BRAllBD
3.2 Experience/perceptions of the change process
3.3 Competence on the goals ofBRAllBD
4 Commitment
4.1 Involvement
4.2 Information
4.3 Resources
4.4 Resistance
4.5 Loyalty
5 Work Environment
5.1 Motivation and job satisfaction
5.2 Safety
6 Conclusions
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Description and Discussion of BRA/IBD at Gullfaks
April2001
Table of Contents
Introduction
General description of BRAlIBD at Gullfaks
• Scepticism towards BRAlIBD - Is this useful for us/Do we need this?
• Involvement and commitment - We want everybody to agree!
• Successful Process - We have done this well!
Modifications in the change process - The road is built as we go along!
• Which modifications have been made?
• Why have modifications been made?
• Postivive or negative modificaitons?
Measurements in the change process - How do we know we are going in the right
direction?
• Goals and benefits case
• Measurements during implementation
Implications
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Appendix E: Coding Criteria at Three Points in
Time
Data Analysis: Criteria for Categorizing data
Fall,2000
Content
Substance
Specificity
Degree of
change
The formulated strategy, ends and means of the change
program
What are the elements in the strategy e.g. new technology, new
organizational structure. Are the elements multiple, conflicting,
inconsistent and so on?
Are the elements general/strategic level or specific/detailed?
Are there any vague or hidden goals?
The gap between how the organization is today and in the
future according to the new strategy
Number of people involved
Working out the details
Path dependency/sequencing In what sequence are things done/do events
occur?
Process
Many people can lead to many interpretations and
many wills and priorities Who/how many are -
involved and how is work divided. How is
information shared?
Many details are worked out in the process, often
because they are not know/cannot be known in
advance. Which details are worked out and how
is this done?
Context
inner context
outer context
Organizational structure, culture, politics and available
resources which migh affect the change content or process.
Economic, social and political factors at the competitive,
industry, national or intemationallevel which might affect the
change content or process.
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DESCRIPTION OF CASES
How the data are presented/categorized
May 2001
1". The Circumstances inwhich a particular
" event occurs ..
Description of Local Context Inner context. Facts about the division,
platforms, the workforce
Gullfaks BRA Project Who works in the local BRA project and
how is it organized?
Relationship to Corporate BRA Program How is the relationship between the
division and the corporate BRA Program.
Between the local BRA project and the
corporate BRA Program?
other (not included) Outer context (covered at higher levels of
analysis?)
economic, social and political factors
Process The implementation process is the process
by which strategies are put into action. !
Description of Intended Events what happens when? Chronologically
description of events acc. to plans
Intended Management of the Change (a) organizing responsibilities and
Process decision-making
(b) working out of details
(c) involvement
(d) information and communication
(e) experience transfer
(f) measurement and control
(g) commitment
Description of Actual Events What actually happened chronologically
Actual Management of the Change (h) organizing responsibilities and
Process decision-making
(i) working out of details
G) involvement
(k) information and communication
(1) experience transfer
(m)measurement and control
commitment
* In my research the implementation process is defined as when a formulated strategy
has been determined/decided on. Everything happening afterwards at the divisional
level is thereby included in the implementation process.
Content The fonnUlated strategy. Ends and means.
Intended Content; Substance, Specificity What is supposed to change, are the
and Degree of Change ends/means clear, consistent and specific,
or inconsistent, conflicting, vague,
multiple? Scale/scope/depth of change
Reactions to Intended Content How do people react to the intended
content
Interpretations of BRA Content Do people try to interpret the intended
content? What types of interpretations are
made of the intended content and how do
interpretations occur?
Actual Content; Substance, Specificity, What actually changes?
and Degree of Change
Modifications any changes or alterations - large or small
- in. the formulated strategy
Identification of Modifications Which mod' s have been done
Reasons for Modifications Why?
Reactions to Modifications How are modifications perceived
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Appendix F: Within-Case Analysis for Case A, B,
and C
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Within-Case Analysis: Case A .
MONGSTAD Phase] PhaseU PhaseUr·
Preparation/pre-project BRA Implementationff()jecf Co~tinuousImpr()venrent
Work' .
Time& May 97- Sept. 98 Sept.98 - Jan. 99 March 99 - Dee, Ol
Duration
Organizational Changes.,Main ,._, Data cleaning . Implement SAP and work Realization ofbenefits.•a\iUV1J.lI;;~
A few analyses required by processes. Somewhat different depending
BRA. on which of 3 leaders.
Appointing Project members
Corporate Stepchild No Sense of Urgency
Context New CEO in Statoil Corporate
Main challenges are to reduce No big change needed restructuring
and control costs. Poor results in the industry in
the beginning of the phase tum
Stepchild in corporate to great results later in the
connection period.
Not very good relationship with Shell comes in with 20%
headquarters ownership
Corprate packages are presented
to lay-off people
Limited preparation Project Steering 3 Distinct Processes
Process
Involvement: A combination of SM 3 distinct processes lead by
Involvement: SM people people and other people in project three different people
involved in BRA formulation at organization.
HQ. Limited involvement. l) Vague and slow paced
process focused on trying
Details: No details worked out Top-down process. to figure out what to do
at Mongstad at this time Strong project steering. 2) Very focused and high
Details worked out by project tempo process. Planned in
Sequencing: Parallell IT/OD group which drew on central BRA detail
implementaion planned people and key people in 3) Broader again, opening up
organization for more general issues
such as value chain ete.
Sequencing: all focus on IT. OD
activities transferred to local group.
As intended from BRA Limited focus Focus on OD & Changes
Content l) Broadly
SM sees their organization as Focus on IT/SAP 2) Narrow focus on O&M
similar to and in line with the 3) Broadagain
BRA princ!I>les.
Modifications Corporate: Corporate:
A modified implementation plan FocusonD&V
Greater responsibility to the line Unfinished components in BRA
Unfinished product (SAP)
delivered from BRA Local:
Practical use of BRA - pick and
Local: all focus on IT choose principles
Local interpretations of teams,
task responsibility ete.
Process changes over time
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"Within-Case Analysis: Case B
March 99 - Dee, 99
Analysis of OD changes Testing and evaluation
eriod
High self-esteem
Upstream unit with flat
organization. Very good Employees were very upset Summer vacations and
relationship with with the content, especially revision stop cooled things
headquarters and "best-in- concerning splitting down.
class" reputation among disciplines into teams. Theybusiness units. were also upset about the A new operations manager
Main challenges were on-off change process due to arrived.
culture and close offshore symbolic involvement and a
ties. lack of support.
June, 99 - UPN Guidelines
Intense analyses lead up to From Analyses to paralysis Step-by-step
Process bigbang
The local implementation Process support and
Appointment of project project focuses on IT, but the control was imposed by
leaders. One for OD and one organization was paralysed management. Tempo wasfor IT, both internal. due to OD changes. reduced,resources
OD changes were dealt with increased and three
first, ~anagementpusheschanges dedicated support people
but give little support. were put in.
Medium to high 3 process evaluations and
involvement. Middle management criticize a I-year evaluation were
A few people worked out the "push-the-button" performed.
details in "the Bible" mentality among top
managers.
BRA. +IBD Large-scale changes - on paper Back to the drawing board
Content only
Integrated teams The I-year evaluation sends
Roles Few actual changes in work the unit back to the drawing
New leadership roles processes. Teams meet daily, board. Integrated teams are
Elimination of middle people use SAP, but few changed to discipline-based
managers changes can be found in work teams. Middle managers are
New governance model routines. "The map doesn't fit reintroduced. Some of the
the terrain'? team roles are eliminated.
Modifications Corporate level: UPN Lcoal level: Mismatch between Locallevel: Process is
Common Guidelines open actual changes and planned slowed down. Content is
up for flexibility changes modified by dropping many
of the OD com onents
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Within-Case Analysis: Case C.
A work group suggests a 4-step The model is revised twice and
model in line with both BRA becomes a modified two-step
and mo. model.
Evaluations in the process show
that BRAlIBD have been
implemented.
l-year evaluation shows
roblems with some elements.
Phase ill
Continuous Improvement
Work .
May 00 - Nov. 00 Dee, 00 - Dee, 01
Analysis of OD changes Implementation of IT and OD in Training and evaluation
Step-by step model presented November 2000.
inA ril 00
Massive resistance Ready for change
Upstream unit A consequence analysis documents Managers and central project
Sceptical top management massive resistance among members argue that the
New CEO in the unit in April, employees regarding the proposed organization is ready for change
2000. changes. through all of the preparatory
work.
Intense analysis leading up to Consensus and politics One step at a time
Process step-by-step model
A new and revised model is worked Management training and
Heavy involvement through out based on input from the support.
Continuous Improvement (KF) consequence analysis.
groups. Details worked out Details are continuously worked
through these groups as well. Broad involvement. out based on learning and
evaluations.
One implementation leader A lot of politics in order to ensure
appointed for both IT and OD concensus.
and until end of2001.
Modifications Corporate level: UPN
guidelines open up for
flexibility.
BRA+IBD Local adjustments required Step 2 implemented
Content
Content in line with ffiD
and BRA, but with longer
time-frame.
Local modifications in content Modifications based on 1-
were required based on year evaluation?
resistance
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